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ABSTRACT 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis providing an overview of the common themes 
and methods underlying this research. 
Chapter 2 reports an experiment that examines the characteristics of effective 
leaders in a leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two 
factors: leaders cooperativeness and their beliefs about followers 
cooperativeness. We find that groups perform best when led by cooperatively 
inclined leaders, partly because they are intrinsically motivated to contribute 
more than non-cooperative leaders, partly because they are more optimistic 
about followers cooperativeness. 
Chapter 3 reports an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous 
contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. As 
predicted, we find that overall provision may be lower under sequential than 
simultaneous contributions. However, we also find that the distribution of 
contributions is more equitable than predicted when the first-mover is predicted 
to free-ride, but not when the second-mover is predicted to free-ride. These 
results can be explained by second-movers willingness to punish free-riders, 
and unwillingness to reward first-movers who contribute. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of social comparisons on reciprocal 
relationships. Using a three-person gift-exchange game we study how 
employees reciprocity towards an employer is affected by pay comparison 
information (information about what co-workers earn) and effort comparison 
information (information about how co-workers perform). We find that pay 
  
comparison information does not affect reciprocity, while effort comparison 
information can influence reciprocal relationships in important ways. 
Chapter 5 also examines the impact of pay comparisons on effort behaviour. 
We compare effort in a treatment where co-workers wages are secret with 
effort in two public wages treatments differing in whether co-workers wages 
are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experimenter. We 
find that pay comparisons are detrimental for effort, particularly when co-
workers wages are exogenous. 
Chapter 6 summarises the findings of this research and concludes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
This thesis is a collection of four chapters reporting studies that contribute to 
different research areas in the field of behavioural and experimental 
economics. While each chapter is self-contained and can be read independently 
from the others, there are common themes underlying the research questions 
examined in these studies, as well as commonalities in the methodology and 
research strategies used to address these questions.  
The research questions addressed in the four chapters of this thesis are 
inspired by considerations about the importance of social preferences for 
understanding the outcomes of economic interactions among individuals. 
While standard economic theory relies on the simplifying assumption that all 
economic agents behave in accordance with their narrowly-defined self-
interest, a large body of evidence gathered through suitably designed 
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laboratory and field experiments have shown that a substantial fraction of 
individuals is systematically willing to act against their narrow self-interest in 
order to influence the well-being of others, to comply with principles of 
fairness and reciprocity, and to promote the wider interests of the group. A 
variety of models of social preferences have in turn been proposed to organise 
the mounting experimental evidence within the framework of rational choice 
(for recent overviews of the experimental evidence and of the theoretical 
approaches flourished to organise it, see, e.g., Camerer, 2003; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2006). While differing in the characterization of the social motives 
driving the behaviour of the not exclusively self-interested individuals, all 
these approaches emphasise the importance of taking into account the existence 
of social preferences for understanding how the interaction of economic agents 
can give rise to outcomes that are sometimes substantially different from those 
predicted by standard economic theory. The four studies reported in this thesis 
build on this lesson and set out to investigate human behaviour in decision 
settings where the presence of socially motivated individuals may challenge 
theoretical predictions about economic outcomes, or may make theoretically 
irrelevant features of the environment (e.g. payoff irrelevant information) 
become an important determinant of behaviour in practice.  
All four chapters examine the effects of social preferences in settings 
where actors move in sequence. In one chapter we focus on first-movers 
behaviour in a setting where collective interest and self-interest are in conflict, 
and explore the importance of first-movers social motivation for successfully 
promoting socially efficient outcomes. In another chapter we examine a setting 
where standard economic theory predicts that sequential move orderings can be 
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detrimental for efficiency. Since theory also predicts that an inequitable 
distribution of earnings among individuals arises in equilibrium, it is not clear 
that the predicted outcomes will be observed in practice in the presence of 
agents motivated by more than their narrow self-interest. In the remaining two 
chapters we focus on second-movers behaviour in settings where they can 
observe how a first-mover treats other second-movers that are in a similar 
position, and how these other second-movers respond to the first-mover. We 
investigate how individuals social motivation is affected by the availability of 
such pieces of comparison information.  
All four chapters use novel laboratory experiments to address the 
proposed research questions. The use of the experimental method in empirical 
research is now well-established in economics (see Kagel and Roth, 1995, and 
Plott and Smith, 2008 for overviews of economic research using the 
experimental method). The general advantage of using laboratory data rather 
than happenstance data to answer the research questions proposed in our 
studies lies in the greater control over the data generating process which is 
guaranteed by the experimental method. In some of our studies (e.g. those 
examining how individuals social motivation is influenced by comparison 
information about similar others) inference based on happenstance data would 
hardly be possible because of measurement problems that limit the 
identification of these effects in natural, uncontrolled situations (see, e.g., 
Manski, 1993). Laboratory experiments are often criticised on the ground that 
behaviour is studied in highly stylised, abstract environments which lack 
several important elements of natural social situations. While it is clear that the 
set of controlled conditions defining an experimental environment poses limits 
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to the generalizability of the research findings to different environments, this 
should not be seen as a drawback of the methodology itself (see, e.g., Falk and 
Heckman, 2009). In fact, we see these considerations as a warrant for further 
experimentation to establish how research results obtained under a given set of 
experimental conditions extend to different conditions. Our two studies on the 
effects of comparison information on individuals social motivation represent a 
case in point: while previous experiments have provided ample evidence of the 
importance of social preferences in bilateral interactions between individuals 
(see, e.g., Camerer, 2003 for a review), there is little research on how these 
findings extend to situations where subjects do not interact in isolated pairs and 
receive information about the behaviour or treatment of other parties in similar 
circumstances. The two laboratory experiments reported in this thesis are 
precisely motivated by these considerations and set out to examine how 
individuals social motivation is affected in settings where the treatment and 
behaviour of others is observable, as it is in many natural social situations. 
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 contribute to the experimental literature on the 
private provision of public goods in settings where agents contribute in 
sequence. Most of the previous experimental literature on public goods 
provision has focused on linear public goods settings where group members 
make simultaneous contributions to a public good (for an overview of the early 
literature see Ledyard, 1995; the more recent literature is surveyed, e.g., in 
Gächter and Herrmann, 2009). Building on the usual linear setup a recent 
literature in experimental economics has started examining whether the 
presence of a first-mover who can commit to an initial contribution level may 
successfully lead the group to higher degrees of cooperation relative to the 
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simultaneous case (this literature is surveyed at some length in Koukoumelis et 
al., 2009). In chapter 2 we also use this type of setting, and focus on the 
importance of first-movers cooperativeness for successfully fostering 
cooperation within their group. In chapter 3 we use a different setup that builds 
on Varians (1994) theoretical model of sequential contributions to public 
goods. Differently from the usual setup, in this setting the availability of 
commitment opportunities is predicted to have a detrimental effect on public 
goods provision. Our laboratory experiment examines under which conditions 
we should expect the model predictions to hold in practice.  
In chapter 4 and chapter 5 we contribute to the economic literature on the 
effects of social comparison processes, i.e. processes through which individuals 
use information about referent others to draw judgements about the self. Social 
comparison processes are a prominent notion in the social sciences. A seminal 
theoretical contribution is the study by social psychologist Leon Festinger 
(1954). A recent review of the current state of research on social comparisons 
in social psychology is provided by Buunk and Gibbons (2007). In economics 
social comparison processes are central in the theoretical and empirical 
literature stressing the importance of relative income as a determinant of 
individuals utility (for a review see Clark et al., 2008). Social comparisons 
also feature prominently in recent models of social preferences in which the 
distribution of outcomes between the individual and relevant referent others is 
an important determinant of behaviour  e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000); Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The focus in this thesis is 
on how the presence of social comparison information (specifically, 
information about how similar others are treated or behave in similar 
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circumstances) affects individuals willingness to forgo material well-being to 
respond favourably or unfavourably to more or less generous actions by others. 
While there exists abundant experimental evidence showing that a substantial 
fraction of individuals are willing to engage in costly rewarding / punishment 
of favourable / unfavourable actions by others (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003), little 
is known about whether - and if so how - the presence of social comparison 
information affects such socially motivated behaviours in these settings. 
1.2 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 2, entitled Who Makes a Good Leader? Cooperativeness, Optimism 
and Leading-by-Example, uses a laboratory experiment to study a leader-
follower contribution game where the interest of the individual is in contrast 
with the interest of the group: in fact, group earnings are maximized when 
players contribute their whole endowment to a public good, whereas narrowly-
defined self-interest pulls each player to contribute nothing. Previous 
experiments with this type of setting have shown that individuals on average 
contribute positive amounts to the public good (although not sufficiently to 
maximize joint earnings), and that second-movers contributions are typically 
positively related to first-movers contributions: the higher is the leaders 
propensity to contribute to the public good, the higher is the followers 
propensity to contribute as well. In this context an important question is then 
which characteristics should a leader possess in order to better promote the 
collective interest of the group. In this study we focus on two characteristics: 
the leaders cooperativeness, and the leaders optimism about the 
cooperativeness of the follower. We find that leaders who are cooperatively 
inclined are most successful in serving the interest of the group: they make the 
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highest contributions to the public good and thus set a better example to 
followers than less cooperative leaders. Partly this is because they are 
intrinsically motivated to contribute higher amounts than less cooperative 
leaders, and partly because they are more optimistic that followers will follow 
their example. 
Chapter 3, entitled Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to 
Public Goods: Experimental Evidence, also studies a two-person contribution 
game where players make voluntary contributions to a public good. We use a 
setup based on Varians (1994) contribution model in which players have 
quasi-linear and asymmetric returns from public/private good consumption. 
We study different versions of the contribution game where we vary the order 
of moves and the degree of asymmetry in players returns from public/private 
good consumption. In all versions of the game standard theory predicts that one 
person free-rides off the other persons contributions in the unique (subgame 
perfect) equilibrium, and that this results in an inequitable distribution of 
earnings between players. In one version of the game standard theory predicts 
that a sequential contribution mechanism yields lower public good provision 
than a simultaneous mechanism: this is because in the sequential game a free-
rider can exploit a first-mover advantage by committing to a low initial 
contribution and letting the other agent provide the public good on her own. 
Given the importance of social preferences in such settings (e.g. reciprocity), it 
is not clear that these theoretical predictions will hold in practice: will 
individuals accept equilibria characterised by inequitable distributions of 
earnings and contributions, or will they rather be willing to forgo their private 
interest to resist unfair outcomes? In our laboratory experiment we observe that 
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outcomes are generally more equitable than predicted, especially when first-
movers are predicted to free-ride: in this case, second-movers are often willing 
to forgo part of their material interest to punish free-riders. Outcomes are 
instead more in line with theoretical predictions when second-movers are 
predicted to free-ride. Here, equity requires a rewarding type of behaviour, and 
it appears that this is a much less effective mechanism for moving outcomes 
away from (inequitable) equilibrium predictions. The theoretical prediction that 
sequential mechanisms may damage public good provision is borne out in the 
data. However, we also find that first-movers do not have any advantage in 
committing to free-ride because of the punishments inflicted by second-
movers: thus, it is questionable that (detrimental) sequential move orderings 
will emerge in practice in settings where individuals can choose whether to 
commit or not to initial contributions.  
Chapter 4, entitled The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity, 
reports a laboratory experiment that uses a three-person gift-exchange game 
where a first-mover (the employer) chooses the size of the gift (wage) she 
wishes to make to two other players (the employees). Employees learn the 
two wages that the employer has chosen, and then decide in sequence whether 
to engage in costly actions (effort) that reward the employer. In our setting 
the second employee in the sequence (labelled Employee 2 in our laboratory 
experiment) can observe the effort chosen by the first employee (labelled 
Employee 1) as well as the wages paid by the employer, while Employee 1 
only observes the two wages but not the effort of Employee 2. This setup 
allows us to study how receiving information about how similar others are 
treated (i.e. the wage the employer pays to the co-worker) and how similar 
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others behave (i.e. the effort decisions of Employee 1) affects the extent to 
which employees are willing to engage in favourable actions towards the 
employer. We find that information about how others are treated has no effect 
on employees willingness to expend effort for the employer. On the other 
hand, observing favourable behaviours on the part of the co-worker can 
strongly affect employees willingness to reward the employer: when both 
employees receive a high wage, Employee 2 is willing to behave favourably 
towards the employer only if Employee 1 is also willing to do so. 
Chapter 5, entitled The Impact of Pay Comparisons on Effort 
Behaviour, reports a laboratory experiment which further explores whether 
information about how others are treated has an impact on individuals 
behaviour. We use a three-person gift-exchange game similar to the one used 
in chapter 4, but where employees choose efforts simultaneously. Also 
differently from chapter 4, in this study we identify the effects of social 
comparison information by comparing a treatment where employees receive no 
information about the wage paid to their co-worker with treatments where the 
co-workers wage is publicly observable. We find evidence that social 
comparison information can be harmful for effort provision: employees 
respond less favourably to a given own wage offer when they learn to be paired 
with a highly-paid co-worker relative to the case where co-workers wages are 
not observable. The detrimental effects of social comparison information are 
amplified when the co-workers wage is not chosen by the employer, but is 
fixed exogenously by the rules of the experiment, suggesting that exogenous 
interventions into groups dynamics (e.g. labour market regulations shaping 
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firms wage policies) may strengthen the importance of horizontal comparisons 
and their relevance for feelings of entitlement. 
Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the results of chapters 2 to 5, 
pointing out their limitations and suggesting directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? 
COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM AND            
LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the challenges facing leaders is how to get followers to do something 
they otherwise would not do. In settings where followers are tempted to free-
ride on the contributions of others, the challenge is for leaders to somehow 
induce followers to eschew their narrowly-defined personal interests in order 
to promote the wider interests of the group. Such settings are commonplace in 
the workplace, and also in political and military organizations. One 
mechanism by which a leader may influence her followers is through leading-
by-example. Recent experimental research has shown that followers respond 
strongly to the example set by a leader (Gächter and Renner (2003); Gächter 
and Renner (2007), Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003); Arbak and Villeval 
                                                 
 
 
 This chapter is based on joint work with Simon Gächter, Elke Renner and Martin Sefton. A 
research paper companion to this chapter is forthcoming in Economic Inquiry.   
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(2007); Güth, et al. (2007); Levati, Sutter and van der Heijden (2007); 
Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2007); Kumru and Vesterlund (2008); Rivas 
and Sutter (2008); Pogrebna, et al. (2009)).  
In this chapter we report an experiment on a simple leader-follower game 
in which efficiency and self-interested behaviour are in conflict. More 
specifically, we study a sequential voluntary contributions game where each 
player has an endowment and can choose how much of this to contribute to a 
project. Joint earnings are maximized when each player contributes their full 
endowment, but if subjects maximize own-earnings they will contribute 
nothing. We focus on the question of who makes the best leader, in terms of 
promoting efficient outcomes. We focus on two factors: the individuals 
cooperativeness, as measured by her willingness to contribute to the project 
when others do so, and the individuals beliefs about the cooperativeness of 
others.1 
Previous experiments with this type of game show that subjects do make 
positive contributions, but, at the same time, contributions fall short of efficient 
levels. Moreover, there is substantial heterogeneity in decisions across subjects 
in both roles. Among followers, some maximize own earnings but others 
contribute substantial amounts. Moreover, followers contributions are heavily 
influenced by leaders contributions. In experiments with sequential prisoners 
dilemmas second movers often cooperate if the first mover cooperates, but 
                                                 
 
 
1 Of course there are many other aspects of leadership that we do not address in this chapter. 
See Yukl (1989) for a comprehensive treatment. In natural settings the role of a leader may 
encompass a broad range of activities  coordinating and organizing efficient allocation of 
individual tasks, mediating conflicts, designing incentive schemes, disciplining deviators, 
maintaining group relations, etc.  and these activities may require different (psychological) 
qualities. See Van Vugt and De Cremer (2002) for a social psychological perspective on 
aspects of leadership in social dilemma situations.   
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hardly ever if the first mover defects (Clark and Sefton (2001)), and in 
experiments with sequential contributions to a public good followers 
contributions tend to increase with leaders contributions (Gächter and Renner 
(2003); Gächter and Renner (2007)). Thus, cooperative behaviour by followers 
is often described as evidence of reciprocation or conditional cooperation 
(Keser and van Winden (2000); Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001); Frey 
and Meier (2004); Croson (2007); Glöckner, et al. (forthcoming)).  
The experiments also reveal variability in leaders decisions. Some 
leaders contribute nothing, almost certainly leading the group toward the 
lowest possible joint earnings. Other leaders contribute large amounts. If 
matched with a conditional cooperator this leads to high joint earnings, but 
there is also the possibility of being suckered when matched with a self-
interested player. Compared with followers decisions, it is more difficult to 
interpret leaders decisions. If a person contributes a lot in the role of leader is 
it because they are somehow cooperatively inclined, or simply because they are 
self-interested but optimistic about the prospects of meeting a cooperator? If a 
person contributes nothing is it because they are selfish, or are they cooperators 
who are pessimistic about the prospects of meeting another cooperator? And, 
what type of player is likely to set a better example as a leader? 
To answer these questions we present a new experiment based on a 
leader-follower game in which contribution decisions were elicited using the 
strategy method and subjects played in both roles. Using decisions in the role 
of follower we are able to classify players according to their degree of 
conditional cooperativeness. Correlating these measures with their own 
decisions in the role of leader allows a within-subject cross-tabulation of 
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leader-contribution against follower-type. Thus we are able to answer whether 
cooperators make better or worse leaders. In order to answer whether 
differences between leaders decisions reflect differing underlying social 
motivations or differing expectations about the follower we also have subjects 
predict what their opponent will do in the role of a follower. These predictions 
are used to gauge how optimistic subjects are about the chances of meeting a 
cooperator, and we then ask whether leaders decisions vary across followers 
types controlling for this degree of optimism. That is, we ask whether 
optimistic cooperators or optimistic self-interested non-cooperators make better 
leaders. 
From their decisions as follower we classify about half of our subjects as 
non-cooperative and about half as cooperative to some degree. In the role of 
leader we find that cooperators contribute substantially more than non-
cooperators. Although several variables help predict leaders decisions  for 
example economists contribute less than non-economists  the most useful 
variable for explaining leaders contributions is their degree of (conditional) 
cooperativeness. We find that part (roughly, a quarter) of the difference 
between the leader-contributions of Non-Cooperators and Strong 
Cooperators can be attributed to their differing beliefs. These differences in 
beliefs are consistent with a false consensus effect (Ross, Greene and House 
(1977)). Non-Cooperators tend to expect they will be paired with another Non-
Cooperator and thus contribute little, whereas Strong Cooperators are more 
optimistic about the prospect of being paired with another Strong Cooperator 
and so contribute more. Even so, after controlling for optimistic beliefs Strong 
Cooperator leaders still contribute substantially more than Non-Cooperator 
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leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader-contributions by differing 
types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations. Groups perform 
best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. 
Our study is related to a number of experimental papers that explore how 
social preferences affect play in social dilemmas by examining the correlations 
between decisions in the role of first mover, decisions in the role of second 
mover, and beliefs about opponents, in games where subjects play both roles 
(Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Vyrastekova and Garikipati (2005); Chaudhuri and 
Gangadharan (2007); Blanco, Engelmann and Normann (2008); Altmann, 
Dohmen and Wibral (2008); Blanco, et al. (2009); Bruttel and Eisenkopf 
(2009)). We discuss this related literature in the conclusions. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section 
we describe our experimental design and procedures. Section 2.3 presents our 
results. We offer concluding comments in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Experimental Design & Procedures 
2.2.1 The Experimental Game 
Our experiment is based on a simple two-player leader-follower game. Each 
player is endowed with 5 tokens, and must decide how many to contribute to a 
joint project. The Leader moves first and her contribution decision is revealed 
to the Follower before the Follower chooses her own contribution. After the 
Followers choice, the game ends and players earnings are determined. For 
each token contributed to the project both players receive £1, and for each 
token a player does not contribute to the project that player receives £1.50. 
Thus, player is earnings are given by: 
Si = 1.5 u (5  ci) + ci + cj 
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where ci, cj  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} represent the contribution decisions of player i  
and j , for i, j  {Leader, Follower} and i z j. 
In our experiment we implemented a one-shot version of this game and 
had subjects make decisions both in the role of Leader and Follower. 
Followers decisions were elicited using the strategy method (Selten (1967)), 
i.e. they had to specify complete strategies in the game-theoretic sense. Thus, 
participants in our experiments were asked to make in total seven contribution 
decisions: one contribution decision in the role of Leader and six contribution 
decisions in the role of Follower, one for each possible contribution by the 
Leader. Only after all decisions had been made were subjects assigned a role in 
the experiment and paid according to the decisions they made in that role: with 
probability one half they were assigned the role of Leader and with probability 
one half the role of Follower. Hence, all seven contribution decisions were 
elicited using monetary incentives. 
Subjects also had to complete a Prediction Task. In this task subjects 
were asked to predict the contribution decisions that the other person in their 
group had made in the role of Follower. Thus subjects made six point 
predictions, one for each contribution decision their opponent made in the role 
of Follower. Subjects earned £0.50 for each correct prediction. 
Immediately after having submitted their decisions, subjects were asked 
to complete a short post-experimental questionnaire asking for basic 
demographic and attitudinal information. This included a self-assessment of 
subjects risk attitudes, which were elicited using the question suggested by 
Dohmen, et al. (forthcoming). The question reads: Are you generally a person 
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?, and 
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subjects answered on a scale from 1 (unwilling to take risks) to 10 (fully 
prepared to take risk).2 To measure and control for inherent predisposition to 
self-interested behaviour we also employed the Machiavellian instrument 
(Christie and Geis (1970)), a psychometric test consisting of 20 statements  
such as anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble or it 
is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there  to which 
subjects were asked to agree or disagree using a 7-level Likert scale. Those 
who tend to agree with the statements score higher on the Machiavellian 
instrument, signalling a combination of selfishness, cynicism about human 
nature and manipulativeness.3 
2.2.2 Discussion of the Design 
Our main interest lies in exploring the relation between subjects contributions 
in the role of Leader, their own cooperation preferences and their expectations 
about others cooperation preferences. We measure subjects cooperation 
preferences by the extent to which they are conditionally cooperative in their 
follower-contribution response to the Leaders contribution decisions. Note 
that the Followers decision directly determines the distribution of earnings and 
thus provides a cleaner measure of cooperation preferences than the Leaders 
decision. It is possible that a Leader may contribute not because they are 
inherently cooperative, but rather because they expect a cooperative response 
                                                 
 
 
2 The average response was 6.05 (s.d. 2.10). 
3 Higher Machiavellian scores are generally associated with less generous offers in dictator 
games, but not in ultimatum games (see, e.g. Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen (2005); 
Carpenter, Verhoogen and Burks (2005); Spitzer, et al. (2007)). Meyer (1992) shows that 
subjects scoring high on the Machiavellian instrument are less likely to reject unfair offers in a 
one-shot ultimatum game with hypothetical payoffs. Burks, Carpenter and Verhoogen (2003) 
find that subjects with higher Machiavellian scores send less in trust games, while 
Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe and Smith (2002) find that subjects with higher Machiavellian scores 
are less likely to reciprocate trust. 
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that makes contributing pay. In order to measure a Followers degree of 
conditional cooperation we need to observe a followers response to different 
possible contribution decisions by the Leader.4 The use of the strategy method 
allows us to observe Followers contribution responses conditional on each 
possible Leaders contribution decision without either resorting to repeated 
play (which might induce strategic confounds) or using deception. Thus, from 
each subject we elicit in an incentive compatible way a complete vector of 
conditional contribution decisions that we then use to classify subjects into 
cooperation types according to their revealed (conditional) cooperativeness.  
Letting subjects play in both roles of the game allows us to correlate 
subjects cooperativeness (measured, as explained, by their conditional 
contribution decisions) with their (unconditional) contribution decision in the 
role of Leader. Thus, we can observe a within-subject cross-tabulation of 
Leaders contribution against Followers cooperation types that allows us to 
explore whether more cooperative types make better or worse Leaders.  
Since we are also interested in how subjects beliefs about others 
cooperation preferences relate to their leader-contributions and their 
cooperation types, we also have subjects predict what their opponent will do in 
the role of Follower. That is, from each subject we elicit a vector of predicted 
conditional contribution decisions. This allows us to measure how optimistic 
subjects are about the cooperativeness of the players they are matched with. 
Subjects were given monetary incentives for correctly predicting others 
                                                 
 
 
4 For example, observing a Follower that contributes zero tokens in response to a Leaders 
contribution of zero tokens does not reveal whether the subject is a conditional cooperator (and 
hence responds with low contributions to low leader-contributions) or whether he or she is 
motivated by own-profit maximization. What we need to observe is the Followers 
contributions in different subgames. 
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contributions and could earn up to £3 from the prediction task. Note that this 
gives subjects an incentive to predict the most likely response to each possible 
leader-contribution, rather than report their subjective probability distributions 
over possible responses. In order to elicit subjective probability distributions 
over possible responses in an incentive compatible manner subjects would have 
had to complete a 6x6 matrix, and we would have had to use a different scoring 
rule. This of course would only be incentive-compatible to the extent that 
subjects understand the mechanism. Our simpler Prediction Task has the 
advantage that it yields an operational measure of optimism while keeping the 
task manageable for subjects. 
Decisions in the role of Leader and Follower and beliefs were elicited using a 
single computer screen so that subjects could make and revise their choices in 
any order they liked.5 This design choice was motivated by a desire to avoid 
potential ordering effects which could have arisen had we prompted subjects to 
complete the three experimental tasks in a predetermined order. 
2.2.3 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham in autumn 2008 
using subjects recruited from a university-wide pool of students who had 
previously indicated their willingness to be paid volunteers in decision-making 
experiments.6 Six sessions were conducted, four with 18 participants, one with 16 
participants and one with 14 participants: thus, 102 subjects participated in total. 
                                                 
 
 
5 A screenshot of the computer screen used to elicit subjects decisions and beliefs was 
included in the instructions that were given to subjects, which are reproduced in Appendix A at 
the end of the chapter. 
6 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).  
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The average age was 19.7 years and 55% were male. No subject took part in more 
than one session.  
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were 
welcomed and randomly seated at visually separated computer terminals. 
Subjects were then given a written set of instructions that the experimenter read 
aloud. The instructions included a set of control questions about how choices 
translated into earnings. Subjects had to answer all the questions correctly 
before the experiment could continue. The instructions also included a 
screenshot of the screen on which subjects entered their decisions. The 
instructions did not use the labels Leader and Follower, but rather referred 
to First Movers and Second Movers. 
The decision-making phase of the session consisted of three tasks: two 
decision tasks and the prediction task. In the two decision tasks subjects were 
asked to make contribution decisions both in the role of Leader and in the role of 
Follower. Subjects were informed at the beginning of the experiment that they 
would have had to make contribution decisions in both roles and that only after 
all decisions had been made would they have been informed of their actual role. 
All decisions were made anonymously, and neither during nor after the 
experiment were subjects informed about the identity of the other person in their 
group. Once everyone in the room had completed the three tasks subjects were 
informed of their role. Decisions and predictions were then implemented and 
subjects paid accordingly.  
With our design players earnings can range from a maximum of £15.50 
(£12.50 if a player contributes 0 tokens to the joint project while her opponent 
contributes 5 tokens, plus £3 if she reports 6 correct predictions) to a minimum 
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of £5. In the experiment, subjects earnings ranged from £6.00 to £15.00, 
averaging £9.39 (at the time of the experiment £1 | $1.50). On average the 
experimental sessions lasted about 50 minutes, including the completion of a 
post-experimental questionnaire and the payments. 
2.3 Results 
The following analysis of data is structured around our main research questions: 
What type of player makes the best Leader? And, do different leader-contributions 
reflect differing underlying social motivations, or differing expectations about the 
Follower? To explore these questions: 
i. We first classify subjects cooperativeness according to the degree of 
conditional cooperativeness exhibited by their contribution responses in 
the role of Follower. 
ii. We then explore the relation between subjects cooperativeness and 
their (unconditional) contribution decisions in the role of Leader. Thus 
we will be able to answer whether more cooperative types make better 
or worse Leaders. 
iii. In a third step, we ask whether cooperativeness is systematically related 
to beliefs about the cooperativeness of others and whether differences 
in beliefs are related to differences in Leaders unconditional 
contribution decisions.  
2.3.1 Expressed Cooperation Preferences and Cooperation Types 
We measure subjects cooperativeness using their conditional contribution 
decisions in the role of Follower. Subjects are classified as Non-Cooperators 
(NC) if they contribute nothing in the role of Follower irrespective of the 
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Leaders contribution. Forty-six percent of our 102 subjects fall into the NC 
category. The remaining subjects are classified into three different cooperation 
types according to the following criterion. For each subject we computed how 
a (hypothetical) self-interested Leader would best-respond to the vector of 
conditional contribution decisions submitted by this subject.7 If even a self-
interested Leader would contribute her entire endowment as a best-response to 
the subjects vector of conditional contributions, we conclude that the subject 
must exhibit a strong degree of conditional cooperativeness. We classify such a 
subject as a Strong Cooperator (SC). Twenty-six percent of our subjects fall 
into this category. A subject is classified as a Weak Cooperator (WC) if, 
when matched with her, a self-interested Leader would find it optimal to 
contribute some, but not all, of her tokens. Twenty-two percent of the subjects 
can be classified as WC. Finally, if a subject submitted a vector of 
contributions that contains positive contributions in response to some of the 
Leaders contributions, but does not give an incentive to a self-interested 
Leader to contribute any token to the project, we classify the subject in the 
category Other. Only six percent of subjects fall into this category.8 
Figure 2.1 depicts  both separately for each preference type and 
aggregated across types  the average contribution decisions subjects made in 
the role of Follower as a function of the contribution level by the Leader.9 
                                                 
 
 
7 Should the Leader be indifferent between two or more contribution decisions, the largest 
contribution is used for computing the Leaders best-response. 
8 Half of these subjects are unconditional co-operators who contribute the same (non-zero) 
amount irrespective of the Leaders contribution. The other half contributes 1 or 2 tokens only if 
the Leader contributes 4 or 5 tokens. 
9 Note that the patterns of contribution decisions of NC, SC, WC and Other closely resemble 
the average contribution patterns typically found in linear public goods games for Free Rider, 
Conditional Cooperator, Hump-shaped and Other according to the classification system 
introduced by Fischbacher, et al. (2001). In fact the two classification systems are highly 
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Figure 2.1 Average Follower Contribution 
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2.3.2 Which Cooperation Type Makes a Better Leader? 
We next move to the analysis of the relation between subjects cooperativeness 
and their contribution decisions as Leaders. Figure 2.2 plots the average leader-
contribution decisions separately for the three major preference types.10 SC 
Leaders are those who contribute most to the public good (about 2.8 tokens on 
average), while NC Leaders contribute on average least (slightly more than 0.5 
tokens on average). WC Leaders contribution decisions fall midway between 
the contributions of NC and SC Leaders.  
                                                                                                                                 
 
 
consistent with one another: all NC and Other would be classified as Free Riders and Other 
respectively, 85% of SC subjects as Conditional Cooperators, and 64% of WC subjects as 
Hump-shaped Contributors. 
10 In the remainder of the chapter we will focus our analysis on the three major groups and ignore 
the subjects we classified as Other. With only six subjects in the Other category we would not be 
able to draw any valid inference from their behaviour and their inclusion in the analysis would 
only unnecessarily complicate the exposition of our results. All our findings are robust to whether 
we include or exclude these six subjects.  
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Figure 2.2 Average Contribution in the Role of Leader
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* Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
We can strongly reject the hypothesis that types contribute similar 
amounts (Kruskal-Wallis test: 2 (2 . .) 38.65, 0.001d f pF   ). Pair-wise two-
sided Mann-Whitney-U-tests reveal that NC Leaders contributions differ 
significantly from WC Leaders contributions ( 4.575, 0.001z p  ), which in 
turn differ significantly from SC Leaders contributions ( 2.065, 0.039z p  ). 
Regression analysis of Leaders contributions on a set of dummy 
variables identifying the three Leaders types shows that the results are 
substantially robust to a set of controls for individual and session effects (Table 
2.1).11 Models I to III build incrementally including personal characteristics 
(Models II and III) and controls for session effects (Model III). SC Leaders 
                                                 
 
 
11 Long (1997) (pp. 115-119) discusses the costs and benefits of using a linear regression 
model (LRM) instead of ordered regression models (ORM) when using ordinal dependent 
variables and concludes that in general the results of the LRM only correspond to those of 
the ORM if [the cut-points of an ORM] are all about the same distance apart (p. 119), i.e. if 
the intervals between adjacent categories of the dependent variable are equal, which is in fact 
the case for the variable Leaders contribution. Given their simpler interpretation, OLS 
estimates are reported hereafter. Any inference based on such estimates can be also derived 
using ORM estimation. 
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contributions exceed NC Leaders contributions by about two tokens in all 
regression models and the difference is always significant at the 1% level. WC 
Leaders also contribute about 1 token more than NC Leaders and the difference 
is highly significant in all models. Differences between the contributions of 
WC and SC Leaders are significant either at the 5% or 10% level depending on 
the regression model specification.12  
Table 2.1. Determinants of Leader Contributions 
 I II III 
1 if SC 
2.235***  
(0.345) 
2.078*** 
(0.364) 
1.928*** 
(0.384) 
1 if WC 
1.428***  
(0.320) 
1.400***  
(0.286) 
1.187*** 
(0.324) 
1 if Male  
0.287 
(0.284) 
0.401 
(0.301) 
1 if Area of Study is Economics  
-0.841*** 
(0.263) 
-0.876*** 
(0.287) 
Willingness to Take Risks  
-0.010 
(0.077) 
0.001 
(0.081) 
Machiavellian score  
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
-0.021* 
(0.010) 
Number of Known Others in 
Session 
  
-0.507** 
(0.237) 
Constant  
0.617*** 
(0.180) 
2.867*** 
(1.323) 
2.882** 
(1.386) 
Session dummies No No Yes 
N.  96 96 96 
F-statistic F(2,93) = 24.55 F(6,89) = 16.16 F(12,83) = 10.60 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2: 0.360 0.447 0.489 
OLS regressions. Dependent variable is Leaders contribution. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * 10.05. dd p ; ** 05.01. d p ; *** 01.p . 
Among the variables controlling for individual characteristics, the 
dummy identifying subjects studying Economics is highly significant in both 
the regression models where it is included: Leaders who study Economics 
appear to contribute significantly less than others. This result is consistent with 
findings from other laboratory experiments (e.g. Marwell and Ames (1981); 
                                                 
 
 
12 The p-values from the F-test for equality of coefficients on SC and WC are 0.045 (Model I), 
0.069 (Model II), and 0.051 (Model III). 
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Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993)), although there is an ongoing debate about 
the reasons for these differences in other-regarding behaviour (see, e.g., Frey 
and Meier (2003)). 
Also important is the Machiavellianism of the subject. The coefficient of 
the Machiavellian score (Christie and Geis (1970))  a psychometric test where 
higher scores signal a combination of selfishness and opportunism  is negative 
and statistically significant in both models: Leaders with high Machiavellian 
scores tend to contribute less than those who score low in Machiavellianism. 
This result is consistent with Burks, et al. (2003) who also find that first movers 
with a high Machiavellian score send less in a trust game where subjects played 
both roles.13  
We do not observe a clear gender effect. The regressions show that, after 
controlling for cooperativeness, males contribute more than females, although 
the difference is insignificant. Arbak and Villeval (2007) report a similar 
finding. This result compares also with findings on first-movers behaviour in 
trust games where men are sometimes found to send larger amounts than 
women (e.g. Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2008)) but the effect is often not 
significant (e.g. Croson and Buchan (1999)).14 
As commitment to a leadership contribution is a risky decision we may 
expect that Leaders who are more willing to take risks contribute more than 
those who are less prepared to make risky decisions. Our measurement of 
                                                 
 
 
13 Across the whole sample scores ranged from 67 to 136. The average score was 98.92 with a 
standard deviation of 14.11,which is similar to that reported in other experimental studies (e.g. 
Gunnthorsdottir, et al. (2002); Burks, et al. (2003); Carpenter, et al. (2005); Flues and Gächter 
(2008)).  
14 See Bohnet (2007) for a discussion of gender effects in trusting behaviour. Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) provide a general review of gender effects in experiments.  
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subjects willingness to take risks is instead negatively correlated with leader-
contributions in Model II, while it enters with a positive coefficient in Model III. 
In both cases the effect is not statistically significant (p = 0.896 in Model II; p = 
0.992 in Model III), suggesting that risk considerations are unimportant for 
leader decisions in our experiment. 
Model III includes session dummies (which are jointly insignificant) and 
the variable Number of Known Others in Session measuring the number of 
other participants in the session known to the subject. Although the 
overwhelming majority of participants were strangers to one another (on 
average a participant only knew 0.12 other participants), knowing other 
participants in the session reduces the amount a Leader is willing to contribute. 
To get a sense of the importance of assigning given cooperation types to 
the role of Leader we conducted a simple accounting exercise. For every 
possible pairing of subjects we calculated total contributions for both possible 
role assignments. We present the average of these by cooperation type 
combination in Table 2.2. For example, on average an SC Leader and NC 
Follower make a total contribution of 2.85 tokens. For a given Follower type 
contributions increase with the cooperativeness of the Leader, and for a given 
Leader type contributions increase with the cooperativeness of the Follower 
(with one exception: when an NC Leader is paired with a WC Follower 
contributions are higher than when paired with an SC Follower). Note also that 
when types differ, contributions are always higher when the more cooperative 
type occupies the role of Leader. Using the observed distribution of 
cooperation types we also compute the expected total contribution for each 
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Leader cooperation type. SC Leaders generate more than 4 times as many 
contributions as NC Leaders. 
Table 2.2. Total Contributions by Cooperation Types 
Type of Leader 
Type of Follower  
NC (n = 47) WC (n = 22) SC (n = 27) Expected* 
NC 0.63 1.24 1.17 0.92 
WC 2.05 3.66 3.70 2.87 
SC 2.85 4.40 5.32 3.89 
* The expected total contribution takes into account that a subject cannot be matched with 
oneself. For instance, for an NC Leader the expected total contribution is calculated as 
(0.63 u 46/95) + (1.24 u 22/95) + (1.17 u 27/95). 
2.3.3 Are Strong Cooperators Better Leaders Because They Are More 
Optimistic About Followers? 
So far we have shown that cooperation preferences, as measured by conditional 
contribution decisions, strongly correlate with leader-contributions: cooperative 
Leaders contribute significantly more than non-cooperative Leaders. 
However, the large difference in leader-contribution decisions between 
SC, WC and NC subjects observed in our experiment may not necessarily be due 
to differences in the underlying social motivations of these three types. SC, WC 
and NC subjects may instead hold different expectations about the Followers 
behaviour, which may in turn drive their contribution decisions. For example, 
NC subjects may believe that Followers are more likely to behave as a free-
riding NC type, while SC subjects may believe that free-riding behaviour is 
relatively less common and hence may expect a positive return from contributing 
to the project. Such a systematic bias in beliefs (and in particular the tendency to 
estimate ones own behaviour to be more common than it is estimated by those 
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who engage in alternative behaviours) is called the false consensus effect (Ross, 
et al. (1977)).15  
To verify whether a false consensus effect might be driving our results, 
we start by exploring the relation between subjects own preferences and their 
expectations about the cooperation preferences of their opponents, as elicited in 
the prediction task. As a first step in Figure 2.3 we draw  both separately for 
each preference type and aggregated across types  the average conditional 
contribution decisions that subjects predicted the other person in their group 
would have made in the role of Follower.  
Figure 2.3 Average Predicted Follower Contribution 
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15In the context of cooperation a seminal paper is Kelley and Stahelski (1970). Recent 
experimental studies finding evidence of a false consensus effect are Selten and Ockenfels 
(1998), Charness and Grosskopf (2001) and van der Heijden, Nelissen and Potters (2007). 
Engelmann and Strobel (2000) and Engelmann and Strobel (2007) discuss whether the 
consensus effect is truly false and show that the bias mitigates with the presentation of 
representative information (see also Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996)). 
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The most remarkable feature of Figure 2.3 is its similarity with Figure 
2.1, where we depicted subjects average own contribution decisions by 
cooperation type. SC and WC contribution decisions are almost identical to 
their beliefs about others contribution decisions. NC subjects predictions of 
others contribution decisions differ instead from their own contribution 
decisions, as these subjects seem to believe that others contributions increase 
in the Leaders contribution decisions whereas they always choose to 
contribute nothing irrespective of the Leaders decision.  
Overall, Figure 2.3 suggests that different cooperation types hold 
different beliefs about others cooperation types. To explore this issue further, 
we use subjects predictions about their opponents conditional contributions to 
classify subjects according to their predicted Follower type. Our classification 
method parallels the one we used to classify cooperation types. If a subject 
predicts that the opponent will contribute nothing to the project irrespective of 
the Leaders contribution we classify that subject as having a predicted Non-
Cooperator Follower.16 If a subject predicts that the Follower will contribute 
something in response to some contribution by the Leader, we classify the 
subject as having a predicted Other, Weak Cooperator, or Strong Cooperator 
Follower depending on whether a risk-neutral selfish Leaders optimal choice 
                                                 
 
 
16 One might worry that subjects may report biased beliefs in the Prediction Task in order to 
hedge against risk. For example, a Leader who contributes five tokens will receive a low 
payoff if the Follower contributes zero. Even if the Leader expects the Follower to reciprocate 
he may predict the Follower will contribute zero in order to insure against the worst possible 
case. If this were indeed the case, Leaders who contribute more would report more pessimistic 
beliefs about the Followers cooperativeness. In fact, Figure 2.3 suggests the opposite: more 
cooperative Leaders predict higher contributions by the Follower. More generally, we note that 
there is very limited evidence of hedging in sequential prisoners dilemma experiments when 
first-movers predict second-movers choices (see, e.g., Blanco, et al. (2010)).  
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would be to contribute zero, some, or all of her endowment to the project.17. 
Figure 2.4 shows  separately for each preference type  the proportion of 
Leaders who predict an NC, WC, SC or Other Follower.  
Figure 2.4 Proportions of Predicted Follower Type by each Type of Leader 
 
 
 
Clearly, subjects predictions about others preferences are strongly 
biased towards their own preference type: more than 60% of NC Leaders 
predict that they are matched with a NC Follower, more than 80% of WC 
Leaders predict they are matched with a WC Follower, whereas almost 80% of 
SC Leaders predict that the person they are matched with is also a SC type. We 
can strongly reject the hypothesis that the distribution of predicted cooperation 
                                                 
 
 
17 We thought it natural to convert the vector of predictions into a type using the same method 
as that used to convert the vector of Follower choices into a cooperation type. However, the 
predicted Follower type labels should interpreted with caution. The optimal contribution of a 
risk neutral selfish Leader depends on the expected responses to the six possible leader-
contributions and, as noted previously, our belief elicitation procedure gives subjects an 
incentive to reveal the most likely response to each leader-contribution. Thus a risk-neutral 
selfish Leader may not necessarily find it optimal to contribute five tokens against a predicted 
SC Follower type. 
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types is the same across the three Leader types: 2 (6 . .) 81.11, 0.001d f pF   . 
Pair-wise Fisher exact tests performed separately for each preference type are 
all significant at the 1% level. Thus, subjects predictions about others 
preference types are consistent with a false consensus effect.18 
Our next step is to explore whether such a false consensus effect is 
actually driving our results about differences in leader-contributions across 
preference types. It may be that differences in cooperation preferences are not 
the reason why SC subjects contribute more than NC subjects in the role of 
leader. Instead, SC subjects may choose to make larger leader-contributions 
than NC subjects because they are more optimistic that Followers will respond 
with positive contributions. If this is in fact the case, we would then expect 
that, for a given belief about the opponents type, leader-contributions would 
not be significantly different across Leaders preference types.  
To explore this issue we augment our regression analysis of Leaders 
contributions developed in Models I to III and reported in Table 2.1 with the 
variable Degree of Optimism. This variable measures the Leaders best-
response to his or her own predictions about the opponents conditional 
contribution decisions. The higher the Leaders best-response to his or her own 
beliefs, the more optimistic he or she is about the cooperativeness of their 
Follower: the most optimistic Leaders are those whose best-response is to 
                                                 
 
 
18 One may argue that such a strong bias towards the own preference type may be due to the 
fact that subjects do not report their beliefs truthfully but rather in a way that satisfies the need 
to see oneself behaving as others do and hence behaving appropriately. In fact, one potential 
explanation for the false consensus effect is based on such a motivational mechanism. 
However, if this is the case, one would also expect the bias to disappear or to be mitigated in 
the presence of financial incentives and to be stronger for answers to questions about socially 
desirable/undesirable activities. However, the false consensus effect has also been reproduced 
in the presence of monetary incentives, as in the present experiment. Moreover, a false 
consensus effect has been found also in studies employing morally neutral questions (see, e.g., 
Engelmann and Strobel (2000); Engelmann and Strobel (2007)). 
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contribute 5 tokens to the joint project because, as explained above, these 
Leaders predict that the Follower is a Strong Cooperator. The least optimistic 
Leaders are those whose best-response is to contribute nothing: these subjects 
predict that they are matched either with a Non-Cooperator or with a Follower 
that belongs to the category Other. Leaders whose best-response range from 1 
to 4 predict that they are matched with a Weak Cooperator.19  
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 2.3.20 The variable 
Degree of Optimism is significant and positive in all three models: consistent 
with a belief-based explanation of differing leader-contributions across types 
Leaders who are more optimistic about the cooperativeness of their Follower 
make higher contributions. Nevertheless, for a given degree of optimism, WC 
Leaders still contribute about one token more than NC Leaders, and SC 
Leaders contribute about 1 ½ tokens more than NC Leaders (both coefficients 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% or 5% level). Hence, Leaders 
with the same degree of optimism do make different contributions depending 
on their preference type.  
Our controls for individual characteristics and session effects 
substantially reproduce the same pattern of results observed in the regressions 
reported in Table 2.1: Leaders studying Economics contribute significantly less 
than others, as do Leaders with high Machiavellian scores, as do Leaders who 
know more other participants in the session. Session dummies, included in 
                                                 
 
 
19 Again, the caveat noted in footnote 17 applies. 
20 Because Leaders type and degree of optimism are correlated it may be difficult to identify 
the contribution of each factor to leader-contributions if there is a collinearity problem. 
However, checks for multicollinearity (based on variance inflation factor values) suggest that 
this is not the case for the Models reported in Table 2.3. 
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Model III, are jointly insignificant, as is the dummy controlling for gender and 
our measure of subjects risk attitudes.  
Overall, these results show that Leaders expectations about their opponents 
preference type are systematically biased towards their own preference type (i.e. 
they are influenced by a false consensus effect). However, the large differences in 
leader-contribution decisions between SC, WC and NC subjects that we observed 
in our experiment cannot be entirely explained in terms of systematic differences 
in expectations about others cooperation preferences, because for a given belief 
about the Followers cooperativeness, leader-contributions are still significantly 
different across Leaders preference types. 
Table 2.3. Leader Contribution and Degree of Optimism 
 
I II III 
1 if SC 
1.712***  
(0.497) 
1.503*** 
(0.462) 
1.427*** 
(0.524) 
1 if WC 
1.228***  
(0.344) 
1.193***  
(0.295) 
0.966** 
(0.375) 
Degree of Optimism 
0.167*  
(0.097) 
0.175**  
(0.084) 
0.159*  
(0.095) 
1 if Male  
0.265 
(0.266) 
0.349 
(0.280) 
1 if Area of Study is Economics  
-0.913*** 
(0.265) 
-0.925*** 
(0.286) 
Willingness to take risks  
-0.023 
(0.078) 
-0.011 
(0.084) 
Machiavellian score  
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
Number of Known Others in 
Session 
  
-0.417* 
(0.224) 
Constant  
0.414** 
(0.175) 
2.594* 
(1.345) 
2.523* 
(1.465) 
Session dummies No No Yes 
N.  96 96 96 
F-statistic F(3,92) = 20.16 F(7,88) = 14.30 F(13,82) = 10.54 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2: 0.390 0.479 0.510 
OLS regressions. Dependent variable is Leaders contribution. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * 10.05. dd p ; ** 05.01. d p ; *** 01.p . 
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2.4 Discussion & Conclusions 
We examine how cooperativeness and beliefs about the cooperativeness of 
others affect leadership contributions in a simple leader-follower game. The 
game uses the same type of earnings functions used in experiments examining 
voluntary contributions to a public good. Thus, a Followers contribution 
increases group earnings at the expense of the Followers narrow personal 
interests. Our experiment allows Leaders to attempt to induce such group-
oriented behaviour through leading-by-example: by contributing Leaders 
might, if the Follower is sufficiently conditionally cooperative, induce the 
Follower to contribute as well. Our focus is on the extent to which the Leaders 
willingness to lead-by-example depends on her own cooperation preferences, 
her beliefs about the cooperation preferences of her Follower, and other 
personal characteristics. 
As in previous experiments we find that many Followers are 
conditionally cooperative and are willing to reciprocate the Leaders 
contribution. About half of our subjects exhibit a degree of conditional 
cooperativeness such that it pays for a self-interested Leader to contribute 
something, and about half of these cooperators are classified as Strong 
Cooperators, as they are conditionally cooperative to the extent that a self-
interested Leader should contribute her entire endowment. These cooperation 
preferences are strongly correlated with (unconditional) Leaders decisions. For 
example Strong Cooperator Leaders contributed around 57% of their 
endowments, significantly more than Non-Cooperator Leaders who contributed 
only 12% of their endowments. Part of this effect can be explained by subjects 
personal characteristics. Economists contribute less as Leaders, as do those 
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who are more Machiavellian. However, even after controlling for these 
personal characteristics, Strong Cooperator Leaders contribute 40% more of 
their endowments than Non-Cooperator Leaders.  
Our finding that Strong Cooperators make higher leader-contributions than 
Non-Cooperators is in line with recent studies from trust and sequential social 
dilemma games where subjects play both roles. For example, Altmann, et al. 
(2008) and Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) both find that trustees who 
reciprocate more are more trusting in trust games. We see two main differences 
between trust games and our leader-follower game. First, our focus on leading-
by-example has guided our choice of a game where the leader and follower have 
identical choice sets and earnings functions, and so the leaders decision can be 
easily viewed as an example to the follower. In the trust game there is an 
asymmetry between roles that goes beyond the sequential structuring of choices, 
and this asymmetry makes it less clear that the trustor can lead-by-example. 
Second, in our game the followers decision affects group earnings, whereas in a 
trust game the second-movers decision is a pure transfer, only affecting the 
distribution of group earnings. 
Altmann, et al. (2008) speculate that a false consensus effect, whereby 
selfish subjects believe others are selfish and reciprocal subjects believe others 
are reciprocal, could explain why reciprocal trustees trust more in their 
experiment. The same effect may also explain why Strong Cooperators make 
higher leader-contributions in our experiment  they may be more optimistic 
about the cooperativeness of Followers. Similarly, this could explain the 
positive correlation between decisions as first-mover and second-mover 
reported in sequential social dilemma game experiments where subjects play 
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both roles (see, e.g., Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Blanco, Engelmann and 
Normann (2008); Bruttel and Eisenkopf (2009)). Differently from these 
studies, our design allows us to control for differences in beliefs, and we do 
indeed find a strong correlation between own cooperation preferences and 
beliefs about the cooperation preferences of others: Strong Cooperators are 
more optimistic than Non-Cooperators about the chances of being paired with 
another Strong Cooperator. However, even after controlling for optimism, 
Strong Cooperators contribute about 30% more of their endowment than Non-
Cooperator Leaders. Thus, differing degrees of optimism can only explain part 
of the difference between the leadership contributions of Non-Cooperators and 
Strong Cooperators and most of the difference reflects their differing social 
motivations.  
Our findings are comparable with those reported in a recent experiment by 
Blanco, et al. (2009). Their extensive design uses several treatments to examine 
the relationship between cooperativeness and beliefs in a sequential prisoners 
dilemma game experiment where subjects play both roles. In their Baseline 
treatment they do not elicit beliefs about second-movers' cooperativeness, and 
find, like the studies cited above, that a majority of subjects make the same 
choice as a first-mover and as a second-mover. The correlation between first- 
and second-movers decisions persists in a second treatment where, as in our 
experiment, they elicit subjects beliefs about second-movers cooperativeness. 
They find that beliefs about second movers cooperativeness are positively 
related to subjects own cooperativeness, which is consistent with a consensus 
effect. In a third treatment, Blanco, et al. (2009) provide subjects with feedback 
about the true distribution of second-movers cooperativeness before eliciting 
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their first-mover decisions. They find that the correlation between first-movers 
and second-movers decisions persists even when accurate feedback about 
second-movers cooperativeness is provided, suggesting that a consensus effect 
can only provide a partial explanation for the positive correlation between first-
movers and second-movers decisions observed in their experiments.21 Our 
findings are also consistent with those of Vyrastekova and Garikipati (2005): 
using a trust game, they correlate trustors decisions with their beliefs about the 
trustees decision and with their distributional preferences as measured using 
the Decomposed Game technique, an instrument developed by sociologists 
and social psychologists to assess individual value orientations (see, e.g., 
Liebrand, et al. (1986)). They find a strong relation between distributional 
preferences and trustors decisions even after controlling for beliefs. They also 
find that beliefs are strongly correlated with distributional preferences. 
We only address a narrow aspect of leadership: leading-by-example. 
Nevertheless our results are suggestive that effective leadership will depend on 
the Leaders cooperative preferences and beliefs. To the extent that a large part 
of the variation in Leaders contributions can be explained by cooperation 
preferences, even after controlling for optimism, this suggests that groups may 
perform better when led by individuals who are willing to sacrifice personal 
benefit for the greater good. Further, since beliefs are highly correlated with 
cooperation preferences, such individuals are more likely to have optimistic 
views about Followers that will reinforce their propensity to contribute. While 
                                                 
 
 
21 Note that their subjects are classified as cooperative or not according to whether, as second-
mover, they cooperate or defect in response to cooperate. Our second-movers fill in a 
contribution schedule indicating how may tokens they contribute (up to 5) for each possible 
contribution decision by the first-mover (again, a number from 0 to 5). We measure a subjects 
degree of cooperativeness based on the slope of this contribution schedule. 
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non-cooperative Leaders could, in principle, do anything that an optimistic 
cooperator does, their cooperation preferences and expectations about others 
may make them less likely to provide effective leadership.  
A natural question that follows from our findings and that may be 
particularly relevant in settings that involve repeated interactions is whether it 
is more beneficial for the group that the most cooperative individuals set an 
example by committing to an initial contribution, or whether it can be better to 
have other, less cooperative individuals move first and let strong cooperators 
observe their contributions and discipline them. Rivas and Sutter (2008) report 
on an experiment where they let leaders move after other subjects have made a 
contribution and find that this does not affect cooperation rates in a simple 
public good setting. However, they do not selectively choose the most 
cooperative types as leaders in their experiment. Moreover, leaders in their 
study can only discipline first-movers through their own contribution decisions. 
An interesting development, which we leave for further investigation, would be 
to assess how cooperativeness is affected when second-movers are given some 
form of sanctioning or rewarding power such that they can effectively 
discipline early contributors behaviour.  
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions  
 
 
Instructions 
General 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. It is important 
that you do not talk to any of the other participants until the experiment is over. If you 
have a question at any time, raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to 
answer it. 
In this experiment you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. The 
amount you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of the person you 
are paired with. You will not learn the identity of the person you are paired with, 
neither during nor after todays session. You will be paid in private and in cash at the 
end of the experiment. 
The Basic Decision Situation 
The basic decision situation is simple. In each pair one person is designated as the 
FIRST MOVER and the other as the SECOND MOVER. Each person is endowed 
with five tokens. The FIRST MOVER first decides how many of his or her tokens to 
contribute to a joint project. The SECOND MOVER is then informed of the FIRST 
MOVERs decision. The SECOND MOVER then decides how many of his or her 
tokens to contribute to the project.  
Earnings depend on the decisions as follows.  
For each token contributed to the project, the FIRST MOVER and the SECOND 
MOVER get £1 each.  
For each token a person does not contribute to the project, that person gets £1.50. 
So that everyone understands how choices translate into earnings we will give an 
example and a test. (The allocations of tokens used for the example and test are simply 
for illustrative purposes. In the experiment the allocations will depend on the actual 
choices of the participants.) 
Example: Suppose the FIRST MOVER contributes 2 tokens to the project, and the 
SECOND MOVER contributes 4 tokens to the project. Thus in total 6 tokens are 
contributed to the project. 
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The FIRST MOVER will earn 6 x £1 = £6 from the project and 3 x £1.50 = £4.50 
from the 3 tokens he or she has not contributed to the project. Thus, the FIRST 
MOVERs total earnings will be £6 + £4.50 = £10.50. 
The SECOND MOVER will earn 6 x £1 = £6 from the project and 1 x £1.50 = £1.50 
from the 1 token he or she has not contributed to the project. Thus, the SECOND 
MOVERs total earnings will be £6 + £1.50 = £7.50. 
Test: Before we continue with the instructions we want to make sure that everyone 
understands how their earnings are determined. Please answer the questions below. 
After a few minutes a monitor will check your answers. When everyone has answered 
the questions correctly we will continue with the instructions. Raise your hand if you 
have a question. 
1. Suppose the FIRST MOVER contributes 5 tokens to the project, and the 
SECOND MOVER contributes 5 tokens to the project. Thus, in total 10 tokens are 
contributed to the project. 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn from the project? ______ 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn from the tokens he or she 
does not contribute to the project?    ______ 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn in total?   ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn from the project?   
 ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn from the tokens he or she 
does not contribute to the project?     ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn in total?   ______ 
2. Suppose the FIRST MOVER contributes 0 tokens to the project, and the 
SECOND MOVER contributes 0 tokens to the project. Thus, in total 0 tokens are 
contributed to the project. 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn from the project? ______ 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn from the tokens he or she 
does not contribute to the project?    ______ 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn in total?   ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn from the project? ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn from the tokens he or she 
does not contribute to the project?     ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn in total?   ______ 
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3. Suppose the FIRST MOVER contributes 1 token to the project, and the 
SECOND MOVER contributes 4 tokens to the project. Thus, in total 5 tokens are 
contributed to the project. 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn from the project? ______ 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn from the tokens he or she 
does not contribute to the project?    ______ 
* How much will the FIRST MOVER earn in total?   ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn from the project? ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn from the tokens he or she 
does not contribute to the project?    ______ 
* How much will the SECOND MOVER earn in total?  ______ 
 
How You Make Decisions 
You will make decisions on the computer by completing a screen. The attached sheet 
shows what the screen will look like. We want to know what you would do in the role 
of the FIRST MOVER and what you would do in the role of the SECOND MOVER. 
Thus you will be prompted to make decisions in both roles. Only after you have made 
your decisions will the computer inform you of your actual role, FIRST MOVER or 
SECOND MOVER, and this will determine your relevant decisions for calculating 
earnings. The computer will select roles randomly: there is a 50% chance you will be 
the FIRST MOVER and the person you are paired with will be the SECOND 
MOVER, and a 50% chance you will be the SECOND MOVER and the person you 
are paired with will be the FIRST MOVER. 
DECISION TASK 1: In the first blank field you must enter your contribution 
decision in the role of the FIRST MOVER. You simply indicate how many tokens to 
contribute to the project. You can enter any whole number from 0 to 5 inclusive. 
DECISION TASK 2: The next set of blank fields is for your contribution decision in 
the role of the SECOND MOVER. We want to know what you as SECOND MOVER 
would do for any contribution that the FIRST MOVER might make. That is, we want 
to know: 
x what you would do if the FIRST MOVER contributed zero tokens to the 
project,  
x what you would do if the FIRST MOVER contributed one token,  
x what you would do if the FIRST MOVER contributed two tokens, etc.  
Thus the SECOND MOVER will be prompted to make a decision for every possible 
contribution by the FIRST MOVER. The relevant decision will be determined by the 
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FIRST MOVERs actual contribution. If the FIRST MOVER contributed zero tokens 
to the project, the SECOND MOVERs contribution will be the number he or she 
types in the first box. If the FIRST MOVER contributed one token to the project, the 
SECOND MOVERs contribution will be the number he or she types in the second 
box, and so on. In each box you can enter any whole number from 0 to 5 inclusive. 
The screen also has a final set of blank fields for a PREDICTION TASK. Here you 
must enter a prediction about what the other person enters for DECISION TASK 2.  
Once you have completed the decision and prediction tasks you should click on the 
Submit button. You will then be prompted to either change or confirm your 
decisions and predictions. At this point, if you want to you will be able to go back and 
change your entries. Once you confirm your decisions and predictions you cannot 
change them. When everyone in the room has submitted and confirmed their decisions 
and predictions earnings will be calculated. 
 
How Your Cash Earnings Are Determined  
First you will be informed of whether you are the FIRST MOVER or the SECOND 
MOVER. The computer then determines contributions from decisions as follows. 
If you are the FIRST MOVER your contribution is determined by what you entered in 
DECISION TASK 1. The other persons contribution is determined by what they 
entered in DECISION TASK 2 in the box corresponding to your contribution.  
If you are the SECOND MOVER the other persons contribution is determined by 
what they entered in DECISION TASK 1. Your contribution is determined by what 
you entered in DECISION TASK 2 in the box corresponding to the other persons 
contribution.  
From these contributions earnings are calculated. For each token you do not contribute 
to the project you get £1.50 and for each token contributed to the project the FIRST 
MOVER and the SECOND MOVER get £1 each. 
Bonus Earnings 
In addition, you can earn money from correctly predicting what the other person enters 
for DECISION TASK 2. Your predictions in the PREDICTION TASK will be 
compared with what the person you are matched with actually did in DECISION 
TASK 2. For each correct prediction you will receive 50p. 
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Beginning the Experiment  
Note: in this experiment you will complete ONLY ONE screen. After you submit your 
entries you will be prompted to confirm them. At this point, if you want to you will be 
able to change your entries. Once you confirm your entries you cannot change them, 
and these will be used for determining earnings. If you have a question at any time 
please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it. Now, please 
look at your computer screen and begin making your decisions and predictions. 
The Decision Screen 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
SEQUENTIAL VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS: 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In an important theoretical contribution to the literature on the voluntary 
provision of public goods Varian (1994) shows that, under appropriate 
assumptions, a sequential contribution mechanism elicits lower contributions 
than a simultaneous contribution mechanism. Key to this result is that under 
sequential moves a first-mover may enjoy a first-mover advantage by 
contributing zero, relying on other contributors to provide the public good on 
their own. We examine this and related predictions using a laboratory 
experiment. There is now a large body of evidence from a variety of 
experimental studies documenting the importance of concerns for fairness and 
reciprocity. Specifically, numerous public goods experiments have shown that 
many people are conditional cooperators, that is, they are willing to 
contribute to the public good but only if others do the same.22 Moreover, 
                                                 
 
 
 This chapter is based on joint work with Simon Gächter, Elke Renner and Martin Sefton. A 
research paper companion to this chapter is forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.   
22 See, e.g., Andreoni (1995); Keser and van Winden (2000); Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Croson 
(2007); Muller, et al. (2008); Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming). 
 55 
 
numerous experiments have also shown that people are prepared to punish 
decisions that lead to unfair outcomes (Fehr and Gächter (2000)). Since first-
movers may not want to exploit their first-mover advantage if they care about 
more than their narrow self-interest, and they may not be able to exploit their 
first-mover advantage if others are willing to eschew their private interests in 
order to resist unfair outcomes, it is unclear whether Varians theoretical 
comparative static results will hold in a laboratory setting. 
Our experiment focuses on the simplest version of Varians model with 
two players, quasi-linear returns from public/private good consumption, and 
complete information about returns from public/private good consumption. This 
differs from most previous experimental work on voluntary contributions in 
three important respects. First, we use a setup more aligned with the theoretical 
literature, where a selfish second-movers contribution is decreasing in the first-
movers contribution, rather than the usual setup where predicted contributions 
are independent of others contributions. Second, we use a setup where the 
returns from the public good vary across players, whereas the usual setup studies 
symmetric games. Third, whereas the usual setup has participants make 
simultaneous contributions, we also study sequential contribution mechanisms.23  
Previously Andreoni, et al. (2002) (ABV hereafter) studied a similar 
environment. They also compared simultaneous and sequential contribution 
games based on Varians model and concluded: while the pull of 
equilibrium is evident in early rounds  with the first-movers attempting to 
                                                 
 
 
23 There are some studies which look at the role of move structure for the provision of step-
level public goods (Erev and Rapoport (1990); Coats, et al. (2009)). For a general discussion of 
the importance of move structures in public good and other dilemma games and an overview of 
experimental findings, see Au and Budescu (1999).  
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exploit their advantaged position  the pull of fairness eventually dominates  
simultaneous and sequential play are very similar by the end of the 
experiment. (p. 19). Our experimental design (described in detail in the next 
Section) studies the robustness of these findings by examining two different 
parameterizations of Varians model.  
In one parameterization one player gets much lower returns from the 
public good than the other. ABV introduced minimal asymmetry between 
players, with the consequences that equal contributions resulted in roughly 
equal earnings, and predicted aggregate contributions varied by just one token 
across move orderings.24 By introducing a greater degree of asymmetry we 
increase the predicted effect of move order on aggregate contributions, and so 
the theoretical comparative static result may have a better chance of being 
observed in the data. By increasing the degree of asymmetry we also reduce the 
saliency of fairness: equal contributions generally lead to inequitable earnings 
and it is more difficult for players to identify equitable allocations. Thus, with 
this parameterization we can test whether the pull of fairness still dominates 
the pull of equilibrium in environments where there is no prominent 
contribution combination that can enforce an equitable distribution of earnings.  
Our second parameterization features an even greater degree of 
asymmetry in returns from the public good and extends ABVs study to a 
setting where the existence of commitment opportunities does not affect 
equilibrium outcomes: regardless of the move ordering, equilibrium predicts 
that the person with lowest returns will contribute nothing and all contributions 
                                                 
 
 
24 ABVs main focus is on comparing behaviour across games with similar equilibrium 
predictions in order to identify factors that may cause equilibrium predictions to work well or 
to fail, rather than on testing Varians theoretical comparative static results. 
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will be made by the person with highest returns. Under this parameterization 
we can study behaviour in a sequential game where in theory it is the second-
mover who free rides off the first-mover, and it is the first-mover who earns 
less in equilibrium. As a consequence, attaining fair distributions of earnings in 
this game requires second-movers, and not first-movers, to contribute more 
than predicted. Thus, this game illustrates a case where the pull of fairness 
relies on the use of rewards by second-movers, and not on first-movers 
generosity or fear of punishment.  
We report our results in Section 3.3. In our first parameterization we find 
that, consistent with comparative static predictions, aggregate contributions are 
lowest when the person with highest returns moves first. However, as in ABV, 
the extreme prediction that the first-mover free rides completely off the 
second-mover is not supported and the distribution of contributions is more 
compressed than predicted. A consequence of this is that we do not observe a 
predicted first-mover advantage. In our second parameterization we find that, 
contrary to Varians model predictions, move order matters. In the game where 
the pull of fairness relies on the use of rewards the equilibrium prediction is a 
very good approximation of actual behaviour, and the first-mover suffers low 
earnings as predicted. In the other move orderings we observe more equitable 
distributions of contributions and earnings than predicted. As a consequence 
we observe an unpredicted first-mover disadvantage. In Section 3.4 we discuss 
our results and conclude. 
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3.2 Experimental Design & Procedures 
3.2.1 The Experimental Game 
Our experiment is based on the following two-player game. Each player is 
endowed with 17 tokens, and must decide how many to place in a Private 
Account and how many to place in a Shared Account. For each token a player 
places in the Private Account that player receives 50 points. For each token 
placed in the Shared Account both players receive an additional amount of 
points, as shown in Table 3.1. 
In all treatments the LOW player receives a lower return from the Shared 
Account than the HIGH player. In our FMA (for First-Mover Advantage) 
treatments we use a set of parameters where theory predicts that each player 
prefers moving first to moving second in a sequential move game. In the 
sequential move game where LOW moves first (our LOW-FMA treatment) the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium involves LOW contributing 0 tokens and 
HIGH contributing 15 tokens, so that LOW earns 1555 and HIGH earns 1150. 
In the game where HIGH moves first (HIGH-FMA treatment) the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium has HIGH contributing 0 tokens and LOW 
contributing 6 tokens, so that HIGH earns 1340 and LOW earns 890. The 
HIGH-FMA treatment illustrates a case where sequential moves yield lower 
overall contributions (and earnings) than simultaneous moves  the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game (SIM-FMA treatment) is for 
HIGH to contribute 15 tokens and LOW to contribute 0 tokens (this is the same 
predicted outcome as LOW-FMA).25  
                                                 
 
 
25 For a full derivation of theoretical predictions see Appendix A at the end of the chapter. 
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Table 3.1. Returns from Shared Account* 
*The earnings were derived from a quadratic utility function of the form Si = 50(17  gi) + 
ti(68G  G
2), where gi represents is contribution to the Shared Account, G represents aggregate 
contributions, tHIGH = 1.32 and tLOW = 0.89 (FMA treatments) or 0.78 (NOFMA treatments). 
Earnings were then rounded to a multiple of 5 points. 
Tokens  
in the 
Shared 
Account 
HIGH PLAYER 
LOW PLAYER  
(FMA treatments) 
LOW PLAYER 
(NOFMA treatments) 
Earnings 
from the 
Shared 
Account 
Marginal 
return from 
the Shared 
Account 
Earnings 
from the 
Shared 
Account 
Marginal 
return from 
 the Shared 
Account 
Earnings 
from the 
Shared 
Account 
Marginal 
return from 
 the Shared 
Account 
0 0 - 0 - 0 - 
1 90 90 60 60 55 55 
2 180 90 120 60 110 55 
3 260 80 175 55 155 45 
4 340 80 230 55 200 45 
5 415 75 285 55 245 45 
6 490 75 340 55 290 45 
7 565 75 385 45 330 40 
8 635 70 430 45 370 40 
9 700 65 475 45 410 40 
10 765 65 520 45 450 40 
11 825 60 560 40 485 35 
12 885 60 600 40 520 35 
13 940 55 635 35 555 35 
14 995 55 670 35 590 35 
15 1050 55 705 35 620 30 
16 1095 45 740 35 650 30 
17 1140 45 770 30 675 25 
18 1180 40 800 30 700 25 
19 1220 40 830 30 725 25 
20 1260 40 855 25 750 25 
21 1295 35 880 25 770 20 
22 1330 35 900 20 790 20 
23 1360 30 920 20 805 15 
24 1385 25 940 20 820 15 
25 1410 25 960 20 835 15 
26 1435 25 975 15 850 15 
27 1455 20 990 15 860 10 
28 1470 15 1000 10 870 10 
29 1485 15 1010 10 880 10 
30 1500 15 1020 10 890 10 
31 1510 10 1025 5 895 5 
32 1515 5 1030 5 900 5 
33 1520 5 1035 5 905 5 
34 1525 5 1040 5 910 5 
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The other parameter set increases the asymmetry between players by reducing 
LOWs returns from the Shared Account. In this parameterization there is no 
predicted first-mover advantage and so we refer to these as our NOFMA 
treatments. For any move ordering the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium 
involves HIGH contributing 15 tokens and LOW contributing 0 tokens, 
yielding HIGH 1150 and LOW 1470. Note that the HIGH-NOFMA game 
differs from the other three sequential move games in that, in equilibrium, it is 
the first-mover, HIGH, who supplies the public good, while the second mover, 
LOW, free rides. Table 3.2 summarizes our design. 
Table 3.2.Overview of Treatments 
Treatment 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
Contributions Payoffs 
{HIGH, LOW}  {HIGH, LOW} 
LOW-FMA {15, 0} {1150, 1555} 
HIGH-FMA {0, 6} {1340, 890} 
SIM-FMA {15, 0} {1150, 1555} 
LOW-NOFMA {15, 0} {1150, 1470} 
HIGH-NOFMA {15, 0} {1150, 1470} 
SIM-NOFMA {15, 0} {1150, 1470} 
3.2.2 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using 192 
subjects recruited from a university-wide pool of students who had previously 
indicated their willingness to be paid volunteers in decision-making 
experiments.26 Twelve sessions were conducted (two per treatment) with 16 
participants per session. No subject took part in more than one session. Upon 
arrival, subjects were welcomed and randomly seated at visually separated 
                                                 
 
 
26 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). 
Experimental instructions and earnings tables are reproduced in Appendix B and C 
respectively. 
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computer terminals. Subjects were then given a written set of instructions that 
the experimenter read aloud. The instructions included a set of control 
questions about how choices translated into earnings. Subjects had to answer 
all the questions correctly before the experiment could continue. 
The session then consisted of 15 rounds of the game described above, 
where in each round subjects were randomly matched with another participant. 
Subjects were not informed of the identities of the other people in the room 
they were matched with, neither during nor after the experiment. Moreover, we 
did not make use of subject IDs, and so subjects decisions were not associated 
with identification numbers which could be used to establish reputations. The 
matching procedure worked as follows. At the beginning of each session the 
participants were randomly allocated to one of two eight-person matching 
groups. The computer then randomly allocated the role of HIGH to four 
subjects and the role of LOW to the other four subjects in each matching 
group. Subjects were informed of their role at the beginning of the first round 
and kept this role throughout the 15 rounds. At the beginning of each round the 
computer randomly formed pairs consisting of one HIGH and one LOW 
participant within each matching group. To ensure comparability among 
sessions and treatments, we randomly formed pairings within each matching 
group prior to the first session and used the same pairings for all sessions. 
Because no information passed across the two matching groups, we treat data 
from each matching group as independent. Thus our design generates four 
independent observations per treatment. Repetition of the task was used 
because we expected that subjects might learn from experience. However, our 
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desire to test predictions based on a one-shot model led us to use the random 
re-matching design in order to reduce repeated game effects. 27 
Subjects were paid based on their choices in one randomly-determined 
round. At the end of round fifteen a poker chip was drawn from a bag 
containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The number on the chip determined 
the round that was used for determining all participants cash earnings. At the 
end of the experiment subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire 
asking for basic demographic information and were then privately paid 
according to their point earnings in the round which had been randomly 
selected at the end of round fifteen. Point earnings were converted into British 
Pounds at a rate of £0.01 per point. Subject earnings ranged from £8.50 to 
£17.50, averaging £12.69 (at the time of the experiment £1 § $1.61), and 
sessions lasted about 75 minutes on average. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Aggregate Contributions 
Figure 3.1 displays aggregate contributions in the six treatments. In all 
treatments contributions fall in the first five rounds before stabilizing from 
round six onwards. In the SIM-FMA and LOW-FMA treatments equilibrium 
aggregate contributions are predicted to be 15 tokens. On average, pairs 
contributed 14.3 tokens per game in SIM-FMA compared with 13.3 in LOW-
FMA  this difference is not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.457).28 In 
                                                 
 
 
27 Subjects were informed that they would be randomly matched with another person in the 
room in each round, but the details of the matching procedure were not specified. For details 
see the instructions reproduced in Appendix B. 
28 All p-values are based on two-sided randomization tests applied to 4 independent 
observations per treatment, unless otherwise stated. Summary data on individual and group 
contributions are given in Appendix E. 
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HIGH-FMA contributions are predicted to be lower, 6 tokens. Although on 
average pairs contribute more than this, 10.2 tokens per game, this is 
significantly lower than in the other FMA treatments (HIGH-FMA vs. SIM-
FMA: p = 0.029; HIGH-FMA vs. LOW-FMA: p = 0.029). Similar results are 
obtained if we focus on the last five rounds: contributions in SIM-FMA and 
LOW-FMA are not significantly different (p = 0.457), but contributions in 
HIGH-FMA are significantly lower than in SIM-FMA (p = 0.029) or LOW-
FMA (p = 0.086). 
Figure 3.1. Aggregate Contributions across Rounds
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In the NOFMA treatments, consistent with equilibrium predictions, 
aggregate contributions do not differ significantly across move orderings (p > 
0.457 in all pair-wise comparisons, whether we focus on all rounds or the last 
five rounds). All three treatments track the prediction quite well: average 
contributions across all three treatments are 14.3 tokens per game compared 
with the predicted 15 tokens per game.  
In summary, our data are consistent with comparative static predictions 
regarding aggregate contributions. In particular, in the FMA treatments 
aggregate contributions are lower when the person with highest returns from 
the public good moves first. By comparison, ABV found that aggregate 
contributions were slightly lower in their sequential treatment, and noted that 
while players of a given role should behave differently across simultaneous and 
sequential move games, by the end of the experiment they are behaving, on 
average, similarly in the two games.29 It is interesting that in their experiment 
differences across treatments disappeared with repetition, whereas our 
treatment effect is robust across rounds. First, it may be that our predicted 
effect is sufficiently large that fairness considerations can lead to deviations 
from equilibrium outcomes without overcoming the comparative static result. 
Second, fairness considerations may be less relevant in our experiment simply 
because the degree of asymmetry makes it difficult to identify fair allocations. 
                                                 
 
 
29 ABV do not report formal statistical comparisons of aggregate contributions across move 
orderings, but using their data we found that aggregate contributions were significantly 
different at the 10% level when one looks at all rounds (p = 0.100), but not significantly 
different in the last five rounds (p = 0.800). These p-values are based on randomization tests 
treating aggregate contributions in a session as the unit of observation, and so are based on 
comparisons of two sets of three observations. One can also use a less conservative approach 
and treat each game in a round as an independent observation. Doing this we found that 
contributions were often significantly different in early rounds, but not significant in any of the 
last five rounds (p > 0.204 for the last five rounds). We thank the authors for making their data 
available at http://econlab.ucsd.edu/getdata/. 
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Further evidence on this comes from examining the distribution of 
contributions. 
3.3.2 Individual Contributions 
ABV found that players contributed almost equal amounts (especially in their 
simultaneous treatment), in contrast to the extreme theoretical prediction that 
one player would free ride completely off the other. Figure 3.2 displays 
individual contributions in our FMA treatments. For the sequential game 
treatments black bars indicate second-mover contributions consistent with a 
best response, light grey bars contributions in excess of the best response, and 
dark grey bars contributions below the best response. The results are 
qualitatively similar to ABV (c.f. their Figures 3a and 3b). In SIM-FMA only 
4% of games correspond to the equilibrium prediction and the data are 
relatively disorganized. The major difference from ABV is that contributions 
are more asymmetric in our experiment: HIGH contributes 10.5 tokens on 
average compared with LOWs 3.8 tokens.  
In the sequential move treatments, first note that although few games 
result in the subgame perfect equilibrium (7% in HIGH-FMA and 4% in LOW-
FMA), a substantial portion lies along the diagonals corresponding to the 
predicted aggregate (24% in HIGH-FMA and 21% in LOW-FMA). Thus, when 
the predicted aggregate is observed it usually involves both players sharing the 
burden of providing the public good, rather than the predicted allocation where 
one player free rides off the other. 
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Figure 2. Individual contributions (FMA treatments)
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Moreover, while second-movers often play a best-response to the first-
movers contribution (60% in HIGH-FMA, 25% in LOW-FMA), in a large 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.2. Individual Contributions (FMA treatments) 
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number of games second-movers choose to reward first-movers by contributing 
above the best response (in 31% of games in HIGH-FMA, in 26% of games in 
LOW-FMA), or to punish them by contributing below (in 9% of games in 
HIGH-FMA, in 49% of games in LOW-FMA).30 Notably, 65% of the games 
involving punishment occur when the first-mover contributes between 0 and 2 
tokens, but games involving rewards are not clustered at any specific interval of 
the first-movers contributions. Moreover, the pattern of rewards and punishment 
changes across rounds: focusing on the last five rounds, deviations from best-
responses are just as frequent as in earlier rounds, but they are more likely to be 
deviations below the best-response function. Thus, as subjects gain experience 
with the experimental setting the incidence of punishment increases, while 
rewarding behaviour tends to diminish. 
Figure 3.3 displays individual contributions in our NOFMA treatments. 
Again, only 6% of simultaneous move games result in the equilibrium outcome, 
and there is considerable dispersion in outcomes. As in the sequential FMA 
treatments there is a clustering of data in LOW-NOFMA where many games result 
in the predicted aggregate contribution of 15 tokens (41%). Again, however, only 
6% of games correspond to the predicted extreme allocation. As in the sequential 
FMA treatments we observe both punishing (32% of all games and increasing 
over time) and rewarding behaviour (27% of all games and decreasing over time). 
                                                 
 
 
30 For expositional purposes we refer to a second-mover contribution below the best response 
as a punishment (since, relative to the best response, it reduces the first-movers payoff at a 
cost to oneself) and a contribution above the best response as a reward (since it raises the first-
movers payoff at a cost to oneself). Of course a variety of other motives, or even error, could 
account for deviations from best responses. We describe later temporal patterns in punishment 
that suggest limited scope for interpreting punishments as due to error. See also Gächter, et al. 
(2008) who observe punishment even after 50 rounds of experience with a public goods game. 
 68 
 
Thus the general patterns in these two treatments are similar to those observed in 
the FMA treatments.  
Figure 3. Individual contributions (NOFMA treatments)
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Taken together these five treatments provide little support for the 
extreme theoretical prediction, and suggest that fairness considerations are 
Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.3. 
Individual 
Contributions 
(NOFMA 
treatments) 
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relevant in our experiment. Contributions are less asymmetric than predicted 
and in the sequential games fairer allocations are supported by punishment 
strategies whereby second-movers react to low first-mover contributions by 
contributing less than the best-response. All of this is qualitatively similar to 
the results in ABV.  
Finally, the last panel of Figure 3.3 shows the HIGH-NOFMA treatment. 
The picture is remarkably similar to the outcomes of a third best shot ABV 
treatment, where the only point of any significance is the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. They attribute the difference between their sequential and best 
shot treatments to the difference in payoff possibilities: equilibrium works well 
in the best shot game because players cannot reduce inequality and at the same 
time increase the payoff of the disadvantaged party. While we do not doubt that 
this is an important factor in determining when an equilibrium prediction 
works well, this cannot account for the difference we observe across NOFMA 
treatments. In all move orderings, there are deviations from equilibrium that 
enable players to attain more equal payoffs and at the same time increase the 
payoff to the disadvantaged party. Thus it is unclear why fairness 
considerations that are relevant in the other treatments appear less important in 
HIGH-NOFMA.  
This treatment differs from the other sequential treatments in that theory 
predicts the first-mover is the disadvantaged party. Reducing inequality and 
increasing the disadvantaged partys payoff requires second-movers to contribute 
more than predicted. In particular, attaining the same distribution of payoffs as 
observed in LOW-NOFMA requires the first-mover to contribute less than 15 
tokens and the second-mover to reward. In contrast, in the other sequential 
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treatments the second-mover is disadvantaged in equilibrium, and for inequality 
to be reduced while increasing the second-movers payoff the first-mover must 
contribute more than predicted. Even a selfish first-mover might be willing to do 
so if they anticipated that selfish behaviour would be punished (as in fact it is). 
Thus, in the other sequential treatments the anticipation of punishment is 
sufficient to reduce inequality and benefit the disadvantaged party.31 The 
ineffectiveness of rewards relative to punishment for moving first-mover 
behaviour from the theoretical prediction is reminiscent of results from the 
proposer-responder games reported in Andreoni, et al. (2003).32  
3.3.3 Earnings 
Table 3.3 shows how the compression of contributions in the FMA treatments 
leads to compression of earnings. Although the models comparative static 
prediction about aggregate earnings is borne out  earnings in HIGH-FMA are 
significantly lower than in other treatments (focusing on all rounds: HIGH-
FMA vs. SIM-FMA: p = 0.029; HIGH-FMA vs. LOW-FMA: p = 0.029: 
focusing on the last five rounds; HIGH-FMA vs. SIM-FMA: p = 0.029; HIGH-
FMA vs. LOW-FMA: p = 0.086)  there are some important deviations from 
                                                 
 
 
31 Another structural feature of the HIGH-NOFMA treatment that distinguishes it from the 
other sequential treatments is that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is also the unique 
Nash equilibrium outcome, whereas in the other treatments there are (imperfect) Nash 
equilibria where aggregate contributions are the same as in the subgame perfect equilibrium, 
but the first-mover makes positive contributions. For example, a second-mover might threaten 
to contribute 0 tokens if the first-mover contributes less than a threshold value ƣ and to best-
respond if and only if g . ƣ Given this threat the first-mover may find it optimal to choose ƣ. 
32 Sefton, et al. (2007) also find that the opportunity to reward by itself is insufficient to sustain 
contributions in a public goods game, whereas the opportunity to punish is a more effective 
mechanism for sustaining cooperation. In addition, a wide range of experiments find positive 
reciprocity to be weak relative to negative reciprocity (see, e.g., Abbink, et al. (2000); or 
Offerman (2002)). 
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comparative static predictions. In particular HIGH earns less in HIGH-FMA 
than in the other move orderings.33  
Table 3.3. Earnings
*
 
 
HIGH LOW AGGREGATE 
Predicted 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds Predicted 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds Predicted 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
SIM-
FMA 
1150 
1289 
(169.8) 
1235 
(172.0) 
1555 
1311 
(193.7) 
1291 
(214.6) 
2705 
2601 
(244.9) 
2525 
(306.3) 
LOW-
FMA 
1150 
1293 
(202.6) 
1220 
(174.3) 
1555 
1269 
(202.4) 
1289 
(197.4) 
2705 
2562 
(262.3) 
2509 
(272.3) 
HIGH-
FMA 
1340 
1203 
(168.8) 
1166 
(154.1) 
890 
1228 
(234.2) 
1172 
(259.2) 
2230 
2431 
(270.9) 
2338 
(301.9) 
SIM-
NOFMA 
1150 
1230 
(162.1) 
1197 
(122.4) 
1470 
1302 
(178.7) 
1336 
(154.3) 
2620 
2532 
(203.1) 
2533 
(182.3) 
LOW-
NOFMA 
1150 
1321 
(189.1) 
1232 
(138.5) 
1470 
1219 
(194.9) 
1277 
(182.8) 
2620 
2540 
(203.9) 
2509 
(233.0) 
HIGH-
NOFMA 
1150 
1164 
(104.2) 
1151 
(53.4) 
1470 
1373 
(162.3) 
1416 
(109.2) 
2620 
2537 
(184.8) 
2568 
(144.0) 
* The table shows average point earnings per game. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Likewise, in the NOFMA treatment aggregate earnings are, as predicted, 
invariant to move ordering (p > 0.371 in all pair-wise comparisons, whether we 
focus on all rounds or the last five rounds), but, in contrast to predictions, the 
distribution of earnings varies across treatments. Here we observe a first-mover 
disadvantage: both players earn most when they move second and least when 
they move first. The differences in earnings between LOW-NOFMA and 
HIGH-NOFMA are significant for both types of player (p = 0.029 in both 
comparisons).34 
                                                 
 
 
33 An inspection of ABVs data reveals that their HIGH player earned slightly more when they 
moved first than moving simultaneously, although the difference is insignificant. 
Randomization tests applied to the two sets of three observations, where each observation is 
average HIGH player earnings within a session yields p = 0.800. Restricting attention to the 
last five rounds yields p = 0.400. A less conservative approach treating each HIGH player as an 
independent observation yields p = 0.949 (last five rounds p = 0.206). 
34 The result holds for LOW even in the last five rounds (p = 0.029). HIGH earnings are still 
higher in LOW-NOFMA than in HIGH-NOFMA in the last five rounds, but the difference is 
just insignificant (p = 0.114). 
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3.4 Discussion & Conclusions 
This chapter reports an experiment examining the effects of move structure in a 
quasi-linear public good setting. Previously Andreoni, et al. (2002) (ABV) 
studied a similar setting, and we extend their experimental analysis by 
considering two different sets of parameters. In our FMA treatments the 
asymmetry between players is more pronounced than in ABV, and in terms of 
equilibrium incentives our design creates greater separation between 
equilibrium aggregate contributions across move structures. At the same time, 
while in ABVs design equal contributions lead to almost-equal earnings, our 
design makes it more difficult for players to identify fair allocations. Our 
results are qualitatively similar to ABVs in that individual contributions are 
not as asymmetric as predicted, and when first-movers free ride second-movers 
often punish them by contributing less than their best response. However, 
whereas in their experiment any differences between aggregate contributions in 
simultaneous and sequential games disappeared by the end of their experiment, 
in ours we find robust support for the theoretical comparative static prediction 
that aggregate contributions are lower in a sequential move ordering when the 
person who values the public good most moves first. On the other hand, we do 
not observe the first-mover advantage predicted by the model. 
In a second parameter set (our NOFMA treatments) differences in returns 
from the public good are so large that, in theory, the player with the highest 
returns from the public good supplies the public good regardless of move 
ordering. Thus, we study three games that differ only in terms of move 
orderings: in each game the players action sets are the same, the players 
payoff functions are the same, and the equilibrium allocations are the same. 
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Here we find the distribution of contributions varies across move structures and 
in fact equilibrium predictions work remarkably well in one game but not in 
the others. This allows us to refine ABVs explanation for why equilibrium 
provides a good approximation to behaviour in some games but not in others. 
Move orderings matter because they determine what mechanism is required in 
order to achieve more equitable allocations. Consistent with findings from 
experiments in other settings, punishment, or merely the anticipation of 
punishment, can be an effective mechanism for moving outcomes away from 
equilibrium predictions toward more equitable outcomes, whereas rewards are 
much less effective. In the NOFMA treatments earnings are predicted to be 
independent of move ordering, but we observe a first-mover disadvantage. 
Our results on the distribution of contributions and earnings have 
important policy implications. First, if a fundraiser is choosing between a 
sequential and simultaneous solicitation mechanism the optimal choice may 
depend on the distribution of contributions as well as the level of overall 
contributions. Although aggregate contributions follow theoretically predicted 
directions, the distribution of contributions does not. When the person with 
lowest returns from the public good moves first aggregate contributions are 
never lower and the distribution of contributions is also more even. Thus, this 
sequential move ordering may be quite acceptable on many normative criteria, 
and may even be preferred to a simultaneous move structure. An implication of 
our results on earnings is that there is not much of an advantage to committing 
to being a free-rider, and this in turn may have important implications for 
endogenous move structures. In naturally occurring settings the move structure 
is not exogenously imposed, but rather emerges endogenously, and this process 
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typically reflects how alternative move structures reward participants. Since no 
first-mover advantage is actually attained it is unclear whether the detrimental 
move ordering would emerge in practice. 
Taken together these results suggest that commitment opportunities may 
be less damaging than previously thought. ABV show that when there is 
limited asymmetry in players preferences the existence of commitment 
opportunities does not exacerbate the free rider problem as the pull of fairness 
ends up dominating the pull of equilibrium, and, as a consequence, sequential 
and simultaneous mechanisms do not lead to dramatically different levels of 
public good provision. When the asymmetry in players preferences is very 
large aggregate contributions are predicted to be the same in sequential and 
simultaneous move games and the data from our NOFMA treatments confirm 
this prediction. Thus, only when players preferences are sufficiently different, 
but not too different, does Varians theoretical result that sequential 
mechanisms yield lower provision than simultaneous mechanisms seem to 
hold, as confirmed by our FMA treatments. However, even in this case, the 
absence of a first mover advantage makes it questionable whether the 
sequential move ordering would emerge naturally. 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Background 
 
This appendix outlines the theoretical background underlying the payoff 
functions used in the experiment. For further details and discussion of the 
model refer to Varian ( 1994, Journal of Public Economics 53, 165-186). The 
payoff functions are based on a simple two-player quasi-linear model. The two 
players have different preferences over the public good. We refer to the player 
who enjoys a higher return from the public good as the HIGH player, and the 
player who enjoys a lower return as the LOW player. 
Player i, i  {HIGH, LOW}, is endowed with wealth wi and contributes 
an amount 0 d gi d wi to a public good. The remainder is allocated to private 
good consumption. The total amount of the public good provided is G = gHIGH + 
gLOW. Player is payoff is given by:  
Si = wi  gi + fi(G) 
where individual is return from the public good, fi(G), is increasing and 
strictly concave. 
If the other agent contributes zero, player is best response is her stand-
alone contribution ƣi. We assume that wi > ƣi so that the first order condition 
for an interior optimum is satisfied: 
f ci(ƣi) = 1. 
If player j contributes gj > ƣi then is marginal return from contributing gi 
is f ci(gj + gi)  1 < 0. Thus is best response is gi = 0. If player j contributes gj d 
ƣi, then is best response satisfies: 
f ci(gi + gj) = 1. 
Comparing this with the first-order condition for an interior optimum we have:  
f ci (gi + gj) = f ci (ƣi) 
or 
gi = ƣi  gj. 
Thus, is best response function is: 
gi = max{ƣi  gj, 0}. 
Figure AA.1 shows the best response functions. With simultaneous 
moves, the unique Nash Equilibrium is the intersection of the best response 
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functions: gHIGH = ƣHIGH, gLOW = 0. Thus LOW contributes zero and HIGH makes 
her stand-alone contribution.  
Figure AA.1 Best-response functions 
 
 
Next, suppose LOW moves first. In a subgame perfect equilibrium the 
second-movers strategy is given by her best response function: gHIGH = 
max{ƣHIGH  gLOW, 0}. LOWs subgame perfect equilibrium strategy results 
in her most preferred point on the HIGHs best response function. Suppose 
gLOW > ƣHIGH so that HIGH then contributes zero. LOW could reduce gLOW so 
that HIGH still contributes zero, but LOW moves closer to her stand-alone 
contribution (which is her optimal contribution given that gHIGH = 0). Thus, 
LOWs payoff increases as she moves down the vertical part of HIGHs 
best response function. Now suppose that 0 < gLOW d ƣHIGH so that HIGH 
responds by ensuring that G = ƣHIGH. LOW player can reduce her first-mover 
contribution and HIGH will compensate by increasing her second-mover 
contribution so that overall provision remains at G = ƣHIGH. Thus LOWs 
payoff continues to increase as she moves down HIGHs best response 
function. Her most preferred point is where gLOW = 0 and HIGH responds by 
choosing gHIGH = ƣHIGH. Thus, when LOW moves first she contributes zero, 
free riding off the second movers stand-alone contribution. This outcome is 
the same as with simultaneous moves.  
If HIGH moves first she could also commit to contributing zero and 
rely on LOW to contribute ƣLOW, giving her a payoff of wHIGH + fHIGH(ƣLOW). If 
gHIGH ƣHIGH ƣLOW 
ƣLOW 
ƣHIGH 
gLOW(gHIGH) 
gHIGH(gLOW) 
gLOW 
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she were to contribute a small amount LOW would reduce her contribution 
to the public good so that total provision remains at ƣLOW. Thus HIGHs 
payoff would decrease, as she would enjoy a lower level of private good 
consumption and the same level of public good consumption. If HIGH 
contributes more than ƣLOW then LOW contributes zero and HIGHs payoff 
will be wHIGH  gHIGH + fHIGH(gHIGH). In this range her payoff is maximized by 
her stand-alone contribution, ƣHIGH, leading to a payoff of wHIGH  ƣHIGH + 
fHIGH(ƣHIGH). HIGHs optimal first-mover contribution depends on the 
comparison between her payoff when she contributes zero, wHIGH + 
fHIGH(ƣLOW), and her payoff when she makes her stand-alone contribution, 
wHIGH  ƣHIGH + fHIGH(ƣHIGH). 
Figure AA.2 displays HIGHs payoff as a function of her contribution 
for each of the two cases. In the No First Mover Advantage case 
(NOFMA), with fHIGH(ƣHIGH)  fHIGH(ƣLOW) > ƣHIGH, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is for HIGH to choose gHIGH = ƣHIGH and the LOW player responds 
with gLOW = 0. Again, the outcome is the same as with simultaneous moves. 
However, in the First Mover Advantage case (FMA) where fHIGH(ƣHIGH)  
fHIGH(ƣLOW) < ƣHIGH, the subgame perfect equilibrium is for HIGH to choose 
gHIGH = 0 and LOW responds with gLOW = ƣLOW. Here, since ƣLOW < ƣHIGH public 
good provision is lower than with simultaneous moves. If the players have 
similar preferences ƣHIGH will be similar to ƣLOW and so fHIGH(ƣHIGH)  fHIGH(ƣLOW) 
will be close to zero, and we are in the FMA case. Thus when preferences are 
not too different and HIGH moves first, contributions are lower than with 
simultaneous moves. 
The earnings tables used in the experiment were derived from a quadratic 
utility function of the form Si = 50(17  gi) + ti(68G  G2), where tHIGH = 1.32 
and tLOW = 0.89 (FMA treatments) or 0.78 (NOFMA treatments), and earnings 
were then rounded to a multiple of 5 points. The rounding preserved the key 
features of the Varian model predictions. HIGHs stand-alone contribution is 
ƣHIGH = 15, and her best response function is gHIGH = max{15  gLOW, 0}. 
LOWs stand-alone contribution is ƣLOW = 2 (NOFMA) or ƣLOW = 6 (FMA). 
In the simultaneous move games the unique Nash equilibrium is ƣHIGH = 15, 
gLOW = 0. In the sequential games the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is 
for the first-mover to contribute zero and the second-mover to best respond, 
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except for HIGH-NOFMA, where the first-mover makes her stand-alone 
contribution, ƣHIGH = 15, and the second-mover best responds (and in 
equilibrium contributes zero). 
Figure AA.2. HIGH players payoff as a function of her first-mover 
contribution 
 
 
SHIGH 
gHIGH ƣLOW ƣHIGH 0 
gHIGH ƣLOW ƣHIGH 0 
No first mover advantage: fHIGH (ƣHIGH)   fHIGH (ƣLOW) > ƣHIGH
First mover advantage: fHIGH (ƣHIGH)   fHIGH (ƣLOW) < ƣHIGH
SHIGH 
wHIGH  ƣHIGH + fHIGH (ƣHIGH)
wHIGH  ƣLOW + fHIGH (ƣLOW)
wHIGH  ƣHIGH + fHIGH (ƣHIGH)
wHIGH  ƣLOW + fHIGH (ƣLOW)
wHIGH + fHIGH (ƣLOW)
wHIGH + fHIGH (ƣLOW)
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 
Instructions 
General 
Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision 
making. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. The 
amount you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions 
carefully. It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants until the 
experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and a monitor 
will come to your desk to answer it. 
The experiment will consist of fifteen rounds. There are sixteen participants in this 
room. Before the first round begins the computer will randomly assign the role of 
RED to eight participants and the role of BLUE to eight participants. You will be 
informed of your role, either RED or BLUE, at the beginning of round one and you 
will keep this role throughout the fifteen rounds. In each round the computer will 
randomly form eight pairs consisting of one RED and one BLUE participant. Thus, 
you will be randomly matched with another person in this room in each round, but this 
may be a different person from round to round. You will not learn who is matched 
with you in any round, neither during nor after todays session.  
Each round is identical. In each round you and the person you are matched with will 
make choices and earn points. The point earnings will depend on the choices as we 
will explain below. At the end of the experiment one of the fifteen rounds will be 
selected at random. Your earnings from the experiment will depend on your point 
earnings in this randomly selected round. These point earnings will be converted into 
cash at a rate of 1p per point. 
How You Earn Points 
At the beginning of the round you will be given an endowment of 17 tokens. You have 
to decide how many of these tokens to place in a Private Account and how many to 
place in a Shared Account.  
For each token you place in your Private Account you will earn 50 points, as shown in 
Table 1. 
For each token placed in the Shared Account you will earn an additional amount, 
regardless of whether the token was placed by you or the person you are matched 
with. Likewise, for each token placed in the Shared Account the person you are 
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matched with will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether the token was 
placed by you or them. Earnings from the Shared Account are shown in Table 2. 
Your point earnings for the round will be the sum of your earnings from your Private 
Account and your earnings from the Shared Account. 
So that everyone understands how choices translate into point earnings we will give an 
example and a test. Please note that the allocations of tokens used for the example and 
test are simply for illustrative purposes. In the experiment the allocations will depend 
on the actual choices of the participants. 
[NOFMA treatments: 
Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the 
Shared Account, and BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in 
the Shared Account. In this example there are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared 
Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 1050 points from 
the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his 
Private Account, plus 620 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1120 points. ] 
[FMA treatments: 
Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the 
Shared Account, and BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in 
the Shared Account. In this example there are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared 
Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 1050 points from 
the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his 
Private Account, plus 705 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1205 points.] 
 
Test: Before we continue with the instructions we want to make sure that everyone 
understands how their earnings are determined. Please answer the questions below. 
Raise your hand if you have a question. After a few minutes a monitor will check your 
answers. When everyone has answered the questions correctly we will continue with 
the instructions. 
Suppose RED allocates 11 tokens to his Private Account and 6 tokens to the 
Shared Account, and BLUE allocates 5 tokens to his Private Account and 12 
tokens to the Shared Account. 
1. What will be REDs point earnings from his private account? __________ 
2. What will be REDs point earnings from the shared account? __________ 
3. What will be REDs point earnings for the round?  __________ 
4. What will be BLUEs point earnings from his private account? __________ 
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5. What will be BLUEs point earnings from the shared account? __________ 
6. What will be BLUEs point earnings for the round?  __________ 
 
How You Make Decisions 
[Sequential treatments: 
At the beginning of a round BLUE will make a decision about how to allocate his or 
her endowment by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. 
BLUE can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will 
then automatically place the remainder of BLUEs endowment in BLUEs Private 
Account.  
The computer will then inform RED of BLUEs decision.  
After RED has seen how many tokens BLUE has allocated to the Shared Account, 
RED will decide how to allocate his or her endowment. RED will do this by typing in 
a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. RED can enter any whole number 
between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then automatically place the remainder 
of REDs endowment in REDs Private Account.  
After RED has made his or her decision the computer will then show an information 
screen to both RED and BLUE. This screen will display the total number of tokens 
placed in the Shared Account and the earnings of each person for that round.] 
[Simultaneous treatments: 
At the beginning of a round you will make a decision about how to allocate your 
endowment by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. You can 
enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then 
automatically place the remainder of your endowment in your Private Account.  
At the same time, the person with whom you are matched will be deciding how many 
tokens to place in the Shared Account by entering a number between 0 and 17 
inclusive.  
After you and the person you are matched with have both made your decisions the 
computer will then show an information screen to both RED and BLUE. This screen 
will display the total number of tokens placed in the Shared Account and the earnings 
of each person for that round.] 
After you have read the information screen, you must click on the continue button to 
go on to the next round.  
How Your Cash Earnings Are Determined  
At the end of round fifteen there will be a random draw to select the round for which 
you will be paid. A poker chip will be drawn from a bag containing chips numbered 
from 1 to 15. The number on the chip will determine the round that is used for 
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determining all participants cash earnings. Your point earnings in this randomly 
selected round will be converted into cash at a rate of 1p per point. You will be paid in 
private and in cash. 
 
Beginning the Experiment  
Now, please look at your computer screen and begin making your decisions. If you 
have a question at any time please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your 
desk to answer it. 
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Appendix C: Earnings Tables 
This appendix contains the earnings tables given to subjects. 
 
FMA treatments: 
EARNINGS TABLES 
Table 1. Earnings from Your  
Private Account   
Table 2. Earnings from the Shared 
Account
TOKENS IN 
YOUR PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT 
YOUR POINT 
EARNINGS 
FROM THE  
PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT 
 
TOKENS 
IN THE 
SHARED 
ACCOUN
T 
REDS POINT 
EARNINGS FROM 
THE SHARED 
ACCOUNT 
BLUES POINT 
EARNINGS FROM 
THE SHARED 
ACCOUNT 
      
0 0  0 0 0 
1 50  1 90 60 
2 100  2 180 120 
3 150  3 260 175 
4 200  4 340 230 
5 250  5 415 285 
6 300  6 490 340 
7 350  7 565 385 
8 400  8 635 430 
9 450  9 700 475 
10 500  10 765 520 
11 550  11 825 560 
12 600  12 885 600 
13 650  13 940 635 
14 700  14 995 670 
15 750  15 1050 705 
16 800  16 1095 740 
17 850  17 1140 770 
   18 1180 800 
   19 1220 830 
   20 1260 855 
   21 1295 880 
   22 1330 900 
   23 1360 920 
   24 1385 940 
   25 1410 960 
   26 1435 975 
   27 1455 990 
   28 1470 1000 
   29 1485 1010 
   30 1500 1020 
   31 1510 1025 
   32 1515 1030 
   33 1520 1035 
   34 1525 1040 
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NOFMA treatments 
EARNINGS TABLES 
 
Table 1. Earnings from Your  
Private Account  
Table 2. Earnings from the Shared 
Account 
TOKENS IN 
YOUR 
PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT 
YOUR 
POINT 
EARNINGS 
FROM THE  
PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT 
 
TOKENS 
IN THE 
SHARED 
ACCOUN
T 
REDS POINT 
EARNINGS FROM 
THE SHARED 
ACCOUNT 
BLUES POINT 
EARNINGS FROM 
THE SHARED 
ACCOUNT 
      
0 0  0 0 0 
1 50  1 90 55 
2 100  2 180 110 
3 150  3 260 155 
4 200  4 340 200 
5 250  5 415 245 
6 300  6 490 290 
7 350  7 565 330 
8 400  8 635 370 
9 450  9 700 410 
10 500  10 765 450 
11 550  11 825 485 
12 600  12 885 520 
13 650  13 940 555 
14 700  14 995 590 
15 750  15 1050 620 
16 800  16 1095 650 
17 850  17 1140 675 
   18 1180 700 
   19 1220 725 
   20 1260 750 
   21 1295 770 
   22 1330 790 
   23 1360 805 
   24 1385 820 
   25 1410 835 
   26 1435 850 
   27 1455 860 
   28 1470 870 
   29 1485 880 
   30 1500 890 
   31 1510 895 
   32 1515 900 
   33 1520 905 
   34 1525 910 
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Appendix D: Screenshots of the decision screens used 
by subjects in the experiment 
 
 
Screenshot of the decision screen used by a first-mover in a sequential 
treatment. 
 
 
 
Screenshot of the decision screen used by a second-mover in a sequential 
treatment. 
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Appendix E: Average Contributions per treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AE.1. Average Contributions in SIM-FMA 
 
AGGREGATE HIGH LOW 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 1 12 10.2 
 
     
   5 5 4 1 4 1 
   6 5.1 3.2 2 11.3 4 
   7 12.2 12.8 3 0.3 0.6 
   8 9.3 9.4 4 0.8 6 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 2 15.4 13.7 
 
  
 
  
   13 12.3 13.8 9 1.1 0 
   14 6.3 1.2 10 0.3 6.4 
   15 17 17 11 1 0 
   16 12.7 13.6 12 2.8 3 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 1 13.7 12.8 
 
  
 
  
   5 15.7 13 1 2 4.4 
   6 9.9 8.4 2 2.7 2.4 
   7 8.8 8.2 3 1.9 0 
   8 11.1 14.4 4 0.4 0.4 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 2 16.1 13.5 
 
  
 
  
   13 7.9 3.2 9 4.7 6 
   14 6.3 5 10 5.8 6 
   15 10.9 10.2 11 0.3 5 
   16 17 17 12 1.3 1.8 
MEAN 14.3 12.6 
      
MEDIAN 15 13       
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Table AE.2. Average Contributions in LOW-FMA 
 
AGGREGATE HIGH LOW 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 1 14.1 12.2 
 
     
   5 6.1 6 1 7.3 7 
   6 11.6 12.4 2 5.5 1 
   7 8.7 8.8 3 3.3 0.4 
   8 9.3 8.4 4 4.6 5 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 2 15 13 
 
  
 
  
   13 10.2 12.4 9 3.6 0.2 
   14 12.1 10.6 10 4.5 4.2 
   15 8.5 10.8 11 6.7 4.8 
   16 8.7 5.6 12 5.8 3.6 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 1 12.5 11.8 
 
  
 
  
   5 15.5 15 1 4.6 3.6 
   6 6.5 5.2 2 2.3 2.4 
   7 11.6 13.2 3 0.6 0 
   8 7.2 7.2 4 1.8 0.6 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 2 11.7 8.7 
 
  
 
  
   13 8.3 7.4 9 4.3 1 
   14 9.7 11.2 10 4.6 3 
   15 4.1 1.2 11 0.7 0.2 
   16 11.9 10 12 3.1 1 
MEAN 13.3 11.5 
      
MEDIAN 15 12.5       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AE.3. Average Contributions in HIGH-FMA 
 
AGGREGATE HIGH LOW 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 1 10.7 9.2 
 
     
   5 4.3 0.8 1 3.1 0.6 
   6 16.4 17 2 3.4 4.2 
   7 7.3 7.8 3 2.2 1.2 
   8 3.6 3.4 4 2.6 2 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 2 8.7 7.8 
 
  
 
  
   13 4.8 4 9 1.1 1 
   14 6.5 5.2 10 3.3 3.2 
   15 6.5 5 11 3.6 2.8 
   16 7.9 8.2 12 1.1 1.8 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 1 10.6 7.3 
 
  
 
  
   5 2.9 0 1 4.4 1.8 
   6 9.1 5.4 2 3.6 4.2 
   7 6.9 5.2 3 3.1 3 
   8 10.3 8.8 4 2.1 0.8 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 2 10.8 9.4 
 
  
 
  
   13 12 15 9 2.2 4.8 
   14 4.3 0 10 0.5 0 
   15 6.5 0 11 3.5 3 
   16 14.1 15 12 0.1 0 
MEAN 10.2 8.4 
      
MEDIAN 9 6       
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Table AE.4.Average Contributions in SIM-NOFMA 
 
AGGREGATE HIGH LOW 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 1 16.2 15.3 
 
     
   5 14.8 15 1 4 4 
   6 12.3 10.4 2 11.3 9.2 
   7 7.1 8.2 3 0.3 0 
   8 14.3 14.4 4 0.8 0.2 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 2 15 15 
 
  
 
  
   13 13 14 9 1.1 0 
   14 17 17 10 0.3 0 
   15 13.1 16.6 11 1 0 
   16 11.6 10.8 12 2.8 1.6 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 1 13.5 12.5 
 
  
 
  
   5 11.3 11.2 1 2 2 
   6 8.2 7.8 2 2.7 0 
   7 12.2 13.2 3 1.9 1.2 
   8 15.3 14.6 4 0.4 0 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 2 13.4 12.6 
 
  
 
  
   13 10.7 11.2 9 4.7 4.6 
   14 15.3 15 10 5.8 2.8 
   15 3.7 1.6 11 0.3 0 
   16 12.1 15 12 1.3 0.4 
MEAN 14.5 13.9 
      
MEDIAN 15 14       
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Table AE.5. Average Contributions in LOW-NOFMA 
 
AGGREGATE HIGH LOW 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 1 13.4 10.3 
 
     
   5 11.1 13 1 5.3 1.6 
   6 10.8 6.4 2 5.4 0.2 
   7 12.6 14 3 3 2.8 
   8 3.6 1.6 4 1.9 1.6 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 2 14.9 12.9 
 
  
 
  
   13 10.9 13.6 9 7.7 2.6 
   14 7.8 7.2 10 2.9 2 
   15 13.1 14 11 2.9 1 
   16 8.3 10.4 12 5.8 1 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 1 14.9 14.4 
 
  
 
  
   5 12.1 11.6 1 2.3 1 
   6 12.6 12.8 2 0 0 
   7 7.2 8.4 3 6.7 6.4 
   8 16.3 16.4 4 2.3 1 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 2 14.3 14.5 
 
  
 
  
   13 7.6 8.2 9 4.8 0.6 
   14 9.3 11.2 10 3.7 3.2 
   15 10.2 11.6 11 7 7 
   16 9.2 11.2 12 5.4 5 
MEAN 14.4 13 
      
MEDIAN 15 15       
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Table AE.6. Average Contributions in HIGH-NOFMA 
 
AGGREGATE HIGH LOW 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Subject 
ID 
All 
Rounds 
Last 5 
Rounds 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 1 16.3 14.3 
 
     
   5 15 15 1 0.3 0 
   6 11.8 11.4 2 1.9 1.8 
   7 13.5 14.4 3 5.8 0 
   8 14.2 13.6 4 2.5 1.2 
Session 1, 
Matching 
Group 2 13 13.9 
 
  
 
  
   13 14.8 16 9 1.4 1.6 
   14 6.1 7.4 10 0.1 0 
   15 14.3 15 11 0.3 0 
   16 14.9 15 12 0.3 0.8 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 1 12.2 12.9 
 
  
 
  
   5 14.7 15 1 0.1 0 
   6 13.1 15 2 0.3 0 
   7 8.5 12.8 3 0.7 0 
   8 10.3 9 4 1.2 0.8 
Session 2, 
Matching 
Group 2 14.9 15 
 
  
 
  
   13 14.5 15 9 0.3 0 
   14 15.5 15 10 0 0 
   15 15.3 15 11 0 0 
   16 13.1 15 12 0.9 0.2 
MEAN 14.1 14.1 
      
MEDIAN 15 15       
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL COMPARISONS ON 
RECIPROCITY 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Reciprocity can have an important influence on economic behaviour, as 
demonstrated in a wide range of experiments where many individuals forgo 
some of their own earnings to reward the generosity of others.35 Much of this 
evidence, however, comes from stylized social environments which lack 
important elements of naturally occurring social situations. In natural settings 
interactions between individuals are often non-anonymous and contextualized, 
and the treatment and behaviour of similar others in similar circumstances is 
often observable. This chapter investigates how exposure to social comparison 
information about referent others (i.e. learning what similar others do and how 
                                                 
 
 
 This chapter is based on joint work with Simon Gächter and Martin Sefton.   
35 For reviews and discussions of the relevance of reciprocity in economics, see Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002). For general overviews of the importance of reciprocity 
in social interactions, see Cialdini (2001) and Gintis et al. (2005). 
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they are treated) influences the extent to which individuals comply with norms 
of positive reciprocity. 
The next section discusses the related literatures in detail. We note that 
evidence of reciprocity is largely based on bilateral interactions as represented by 
gift-exchange, investment and sequential dilemma games. Naturally occurring 
interactions, on the other hand, take place in complex social environments where 
individuals are typically exposed to considerable amounts of social information 
about similar others, which can ultimately affect their attitudes and behaviour. For 
example, in natural social situations individuals can often observe how similar 
others behave in similar circumstances, and this may in turn provide valuable 
guidance in understanding how one is expected to behave. Moreover, in natural 
social environments information about others material well-being is also 
sometimes available and may influence the way individuals evaluate their own 
well-being (Fliessbach et al. (2007)), and hence their behaviour. Such pieces of 
social comparison information may be particularly salient in the workplace. In 
natural organizations a worker can observe the relationship between other 
workers and the employer, i.e. workers can observe how similar others are 
rewarded by the employer (pay comparison information) and how they behave 
and perform (effort comparison information). The availability of such pieces of 
social information may in turn affect a workers attitude towards the employer 
and the extent to which he or she complies with norms of vertical reciprocity.  
Section 4.3 describes our experimental design. Our paradigm for studying 
how social comparisons influence reciprocal behaviour is the gift-exchange 
game. In a standard bilateral gift-exchange game a first-mover decides on the 
size of the gift she sends to a second-mover, who can in turn reciprocate by 
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choosing costly actions that reward the first-mover. In standard gift-exchange 
game experiments many second-movers are willing to eschew their private 
interests to reciprocate first-movers gifts. In particular, the larger the gift, the 
stronger is the second-movers reciprocation. In this chapter we extend the 
standard bilateral setting to a three-person gift-exchange game with a labour 
market frame. In our experiment subjects are grouped in experimental firms 
composed of three members, labelled Employer, Employee 1 and 
Employee 2. The game begins with the Employer choosing wages (gifts) for 
each employee, which are then publicly observed. A key feature of the game is 
that the two employees then choose costly efforts sequentially: thus, while both 
have full information about relative wages at the time they make effort choices, 
only Employee 2, who moves last, has access to information about the co-
workers effort. Hence, Employee 1s behaviour reveals how pay comparison 
information in isolation from effort comparison information influences effort 
choices and reciprocity, while from Employee 2s decisions we can study the 
effects of the concurrent availability of pay and effort comparison information. 
We report our results in Section 4.4. The four main findings from our study 
are as follows. 1) As in many other gift-exchange game experiments we also 
observe a strong, positive own wage-effort relationship: employees reciprocate 
higher own wages with higher effort. 2) Exposure to pay comparison 
information has little impact on the observed wage-effort relationship: while own 
wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, co-workers wages have virtually 
no effect. 3) When the wage for both employees is high, the effort level for 
Employee 2 is sensitive to the effort provided by Employee 1: if Employees 2 
receive a high wage but observe that their co-worker who is also paid generously 
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chooses minimal effort, they tend to expend low effort. If Employees 2 receive a 
high wage and observe that the highly paid co-worker expends high effort, they 
also strongly reciprocate generous wage offers. When Employee 2s wage is 
high and Employee 1s wage is low, there is a slight negative relationship 
between own effort and the co-workers effort. When Employee 2s wage is low, 
the co-workers effort does not affect own effort. 4) On average the Employer 
does worse when both pay and effort information are provided, suggesting that 
social comparisons have an overall detrimental impact on reciprocity. 
We discuss these results in Section 4.5. We believe that our findings 
extend beyond the labour market context used in our experiment. Because 
reciprocity has been observed in many games (see below), our results suggest 
that social comparisons may play an important role in shaping reciprocal 
relationships whenever reciprocity is relevant in natural social environments. 
Our finding that, on average, social comparison information undermines 
reciprocity is related to other recent findings which suggest that individuals tend 
to evaluate the social information available in the environment in a way 
beneficial to their self-interest. However, we also find that social information 
sometimes has beneficial effects, and we suggest that group composition may 
be an important tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparisons. 
4.2. Related Literature 
Numerous studies have shown the importance of positive reciprocity for 
economic behaviour. Using simple bilateral games such as investment (Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)), sequential prisoners dilemma (Clark and Sefton 
(2001)) and gift-exchange games (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)), 
numerous experimental studies have shown that people are willing to incur costs 
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to reward kind actions, even in non-repeated and anonymous interactions where 
there are no positive future consequences associated with reciprocal behaviour. 
A particularly suitable framework for our research question is the gift-
exchange game (GEG). This game reproduces a contractually incomplete 
labour relation where an employer makes a wage offer to an employee 
who, upon acceptance, chooses how much costly effort to supply. GEG 
experiments have been extensively used to examine the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis formulated in the seminal work by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). 
According to this hypothesis labour relations can be described as a reciprocal 
gift exchange: employees are willing to gift harder work effort to their 
employers in exchange for a fair wage. Consistent with the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis, many GEG laboratory experiments, including some with one-shot 
situations where decisions are made anonymously and pure self-interest would 
lead employees to shirk, have shown that employees systematically choose to 
reciprocate generous wage offers with higher effort (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger 
and Riedl (1993); Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997); Gächter and Falk 
(2002); Brandts and Charness (2004); Charness (2004); Maximiano, Sloof and 
Sonnemans (2007) - for a recent review of the experimental literature see Fehr et 
al., 2009)). Thus, positive reciprocity has been extensively documented in 
many simple GEG studies, providing support for the relevance of the norm of 
reciprocity in these social situations.36  
                                                 
 
 
36 Evidence of varying degrees of reciprocal gift-exchange has been also found in numerous 
field studies and real effort experiments, see, e.g., Fehr and List (2004), Gneezy and List 
(2006); Falk (2007); Maréchal and Thöni (2007); Cohn, Goette and Fehr (2008); Bellemare 
and Shearer (2009); Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2010); Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and 
Sadrieh (forthcoming). 
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However, we note that settings where reciprocity may be important are 
often complex social systems, hardly resembling the stylized environments 
studied in standard GEG experiments where subjects interact in isolated pairs. 
For example, in workplaces employers typically interact with many employees 
at the same time and individuals are typically exposed to considerable amounts 
of social information about how similar others are treated by the employer (pay 
comparison information) and about how they behave (effort comparison 
information). The availability of such pieces of social information may in turn 
influence individuals compliance with norms of vertical reciprocity 
systematically.  
A number of recent studies suggest in fact that information about the 
behaviour and treatment of others can systematically affect individuals 
behaviour in a variety of settings. For example, a number of dictator game 
experiments have shown that dictators tend to behave more (less) generously 
towards recipients when they are informed about generous (selfish) choices 
made by other participants (Cason and Mui (1998); Bicchieri and Xiao (2009); 
Krupka and Weber (2009)). Analogous evidence on the importance of social 
information comes from ultimatum game experiments (Knez and Camerer 
(1995); Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004)) and public goods game experiments 
(Carpenter (2004); Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005); Sausgruber (2009)).37  
The relevance of pay comparison information in the workplace is 
suggested by abundant survey and case-study evidence pointing to the 
importance of horizontal fairness concerns (i.e. fairness between employees) in 
                                                 
 
 
37 An exception appears to be Brandts and Fatás (2004), who do not find any significant impact 
of social information on behaviour in a two-person public goods game. 
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labour relations (e.g., Campbell III and Kamlani (1997); Bewley (1999)). 
Furthermore, pay comparisons constitute a central component in a number of 
theoretical approaches which build on equity theory (Adams (1965)) to 
improve the understanding of labour relations. In fact, the fair wage in 
Akerlof and Yellens model is defined in relative terms, as employees compare 
their own pay with their peers to judge how fairly they are being treated by the 
employer. Nevertheless, empirical support for the notion that pay comparisons 
systematically influence employees behaviour remains weak at best, both in 
the field and in the lab. Field studies exploring the relation between pay 
dispersion within an organization and its performance have produced mixed 
results (see, e.g., Leonard (1990); Cowherd and Levine (1992); Main, O'Reilly 
and Wade (1993); Eriksson (1999); Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999); 
Hibbs and Locking (2000); Martins (2008)). The empirical evidence from 
laboratory experiments is scarce and equally inconclusive, as some 
experiments report that horizontal fairness concerns can have a negative impact 
on work effort (Gächter and Thöni (2009); Abeler et al. (forthcoming); Clark, 
Masclet and Villeval (forthcoming)), while in others such effects are weak or 
absent (Güth et al. (2001); Charness and Kuhn (2007)).  
A possible explanation for these mixed findings is that the prominence of 
horizontal fairness considerations may crucially depend on the concurrent 
availability of pay and effort comparison information. Konow (1996, p. 22) 
makes the general point that information plays an important role in 
determining the extent to which, indeed whether, a situation will be judged fair 
or unfair, and in the context of multi-worker firms individuals may struggle 
to develop clear judgments of what constitutes a fair distribution of earnings 
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when they know what their co-workers are paid but have incomplete 
information about how they perform.  
Moreover, effort comparison information may have an important 
influence on behaviour per se, independently of pay comparison processes: the 
ability to observe how similar others behave in a given situation may in fact 
provide informative cues about how one is expected to behave (see, e.g., 
Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren (1990), and Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2008)). 
A number of recent field studies and real effort experiments have shown that 
individual effort behaviour can be systematically affected by information about 
the effort behaviour of others (see, e.g., Falk and Ichino (2006); Mas and 
Moretti (2009); Bellemare, Lepage and Shearer (2010)).  
In summary, while there is large body of evidence on the importance of 
reciprocal considerations in a variety of settings and social situations, there is 
also some evidence that individuals behaviour can be systematically affected by 
social information about the behaviour and treatment of others. We argue that 
exposure to social comparison information is typical in natural environments, 
and hence we believe that studying the behavioural effects of social comparisons 
can add in important ways to the understanding of reciprocal relationships in 
natural social situations. In this study our focus is inspired by behaviour in 
workplaces, where two pieces of social information that may be particularly 
salient are pay and effort comparison information. We note that the weak 
empirical evidence for pay comparison effects may be because clear judgments 
of what constitutes a fair distribution of earnings fail to emerge when individuals 
know what others are paid but have incomplete information about how they 
perform. To gauge the plausibility of this argument, in our experiment we study 
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the impact of pay comparison information on effort behaviour both when effort 
comparison information is concurrently available, and when instead it is not 
available. Effort comparison information may also have important effects on 
behaviour independently of pay comparison processes: a number of field and 
real effort studies have shown that individual effort behaviour is systematically 
affected by the effort behaviour of similar others. A potential difficulty with the 
use of field or real effort data is that it is generally hard to strip down the 
mechanics of effort comparison processes because a number of different forces 
(e.g. social pressure, learning, social preferences, self-motivation considerations) 
may simultaneously operate in these settings, potentially confounding the 
interpretation of results. Our laboratory experiment is based on a tightly 
controlled abstract setting where subjects interact once and anonymously, and 
make decisions that lead to quantifiable payoff consequences. Thus, our design 
allows us to isolate a pure, preference-based form of effort comparisons, 
separately from the (potentially confounding) effects of social pressure, self-
motivation considerations and knowledge spillovers.  
4.3. Experimental Design & Procedures 
4.3.1. The Experimental Game 
Our aim is to set up a GEG where we can study how the combination of pay 
and effort comparison information affects employees reciprocal behaviour. To 
achieve this aim, we adapt the payoff structure from the experiment by Fehr, 
Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) and modify the GEG used in Fehr et al. 
(1998). In our experiment each firm is composed of three members: Employer, 
Employee 1 and Employee 2. All players move sequentially: the Employer 
moves first and chooses a wage ^ `32,16iw  for each Employee ^ `2,1i . The 
 104 
 
Employer can (but does not have to) choose different wages for different 
employees. Employee 1 observes both wages and then chooses an effort level 
^ `4,3,2,11 e . Employee 2 observes both wages and the effort chosen by 
Employee 1 and then chooses an effort level ^ `4,3,2,12 e . After Employee 2s 
choice, the game ends and the Employers earnings are computed as: 
  212110 wweeER  S  
and employee is earnings are computed as: 
 15  iii ewS . 
Our implementation of the game used the strategy method (Selten 
(1967)), i.e. subjects had to specify complete strategies in the game-theoretic 
sense. Participants in the role of Employee 1 specified four effort choices, one 
for each wage combination that could possibly be chosen by the Employer. 
Participants in the role of Employee 2 specified sixteen effort choices, one for 
each of the sixteen possible combinations of wages and effort chosen by the 
Employer and Employee 1 (four possible wage combinations times four 
different possible effort choices by Employee 1).  
We implemented a one-shot version of this experimental game. The game 
was described to subjects using the same labour market frame that we use 
throughout the text. 
4.3.2. Discussion of the Design 
There are a number of reasons why we use the GEG to address the questions 
we are interested in. First, as discussed in the previous section, positive 
reciprocity has been documented extensively in many GEG experiments, 
providing support for the relevance of the norm of reciprocity in these social 
situations. Second, also as argued earlier, individuals are typically exposed to 
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considerable amounts of social information about similar others in naturally 
occurring organizations, and hence our three-person GEG provides the minimal 
environment to study how social comparisons influence behaviour. Lastly, the 
particular GEG we use in our experiment, as compared to other experimental 
settings, provides a cleaner environment for studying the pure effects of 
social comparison information on reciprocity. On this last point, while some 
environments are simply not suitable to study positive reciprocity (e.g. the 
dictator game), in others (e.g. public good games) actions of other players have 
a direct impact on ones own monetary payoffs and hence on reciprocal 
considerations: thus, reactions to information about others contributions to a 
public good may reflect direct reciprocation (i.e., a reaction to a kind or unkind 
act by another) rather than the effect of social information per se.38 In our 
three-person GEG, on the other hand, the wage the employer pays to the co-
worker and the co-workers effort do not directly affect an employees payoff 
and hence cannot be used to develop pure reciprocal considerations. 
The fully sequential structure of the constituent game allows us to 
observe effort decisions in environments which contain different amounts of 
social information. Subjects in the role of Employee 1 move after the Employer 
and before subjects in the role of Employee 2: thus they can condition their 
effort on both the level of the own wage and the level of the co-workers wage, 
but not on the co-workers effort. Hence, they have access to pay comparison 
information, but not effort comparison information, and their effort choices can 
be represented by an effort function  211 , wwfe  . Subjects in the role of 
                                                 
 
 
38 Brandts and Fatás (2004) and Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) propose experimental designs 
that allow to overcome this identification problem in voluntary contribution games.  
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Employee 2 move last and are fully informed about the co-workers effort as 
well as about relative wages, and their effort choices can be represented by an 
augmented effort function ),,( 1122 ewwge  , which describes how social 
information affects reciprocity when both pay and effort comparison 
information are available.  
We believe that the use of the strategy method in our experiment is 
necessary because it allows us to observe subjects behaviour across all the 
information sets they control in the game without either using deception or 
resorting to repeated play, which might induce strategic confounds and still 
does not guarantee the collection of a sufficient number of observations in all 
the different wage and/or effort combinations for all employees. With the 
strategy method we are able to elicit from each employee a complete effort 
function,  211 , wwfe   or ),,( 1122 ewwge  , which fully specifies how 
individuals respond to changes in the own wage, and in the co-workers wage 
and effort: thus, we are able to measure own wage-effort relations at the 
individual level, and to investigate how these are affected by social comparison 
information. Moreover, at the time a player makes decisions, she is not 
informed of the actual decisions of any other player, and so this feature of the 
design also preserves the statistical independence of each subjects decisions 
vis-à-vis those of other subjects.39 
                                                 
 
 
39 The use of the strategy method in experiments has undergone a (still open) methodological 
debate. The question is whether behavioural responses differ when they are elicited in a hot 
version of the game (i.e., when subjects directly respond to decisions made by other players) rather 
than in a cold version (i.e., when the game is played with the strategy method). The issue has 
been addressed in a number of experimental studies with mixed results: some authors find 
evidence for the existence of a hot-cold empathy gap (e.g., Güth, Huck and Muller (2001); 
Brosig, Weimann and Yang (2003); Casari and Cason (2009)), while in other studies behaviour 
does not seem to be sensitive to the elicitation method (e.g., Cason and Mui (1998); Brandts and 
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Given that our main interest is to isolate the impact of social information 
on reciprocal behaviour, we kept the structure of the decision situation as 
simple as possible. In particular our setting involves no productivity 
differences or technological interdependences between employees. One could 
argue that the absence of productivity differences might reduce the scope for 
observing wage differences between employees, thus posing a threat to the 
interpretability of subjects responses to seemingly arbitrary unequal wage 
offers. Although productivity differences between employees constitute an 
important reason why employers may want to introduce pay differentials, there 
also exist other rationales for unequal wage offers. For example, employers 
may find it optimal to choose unequal wages if they believe workers will 
supply high effort only if they are paid more than co-workers. We implemented 
a one-shot version of our game in order to study the mechanics of social 
comparisons in a stripped-down environment which mutes the (confounding) 
influence of strategic considerations that may arise due to repeated play.  
4.3.3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using subjects 
recruited from a university-wide pool of students who had previously indicated 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Charness (2000); Oxoby and McLeish (2004); Solnick (2007); Muller et al. (2008)). See Brandts 
and Charness (2009) for a survey of the experimental literature. We believe that the use of the 
strategy method is unlikely to distort behaviour in our experiment. The study by Cason and Mui 
(1998) provides support for the behavioural validity of the strategy method in experimental 
situations where individuals are exposed to social information. Moreover, the literature 
suggests that the hot-cold empathy gap may be particularly relevant for negative reciprocity, 
while positive reciprocity appears to be less sensitive to the elicitation method (see, e.g., 
Brosig, Weimann and Yang (2003)). If anything, the use of the strategy method appears to dampen 
reciprocal responses (e.g, Casari and Cason (2009)); Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming)), 
and thus our experiment can be thought as a tool that defines a lower bound to the reciprocal 
relationships we are interested in. 
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their willingness to be paid volunteers in decision-making experiments.40 Six 
sessions were conducted with a total of 84 participants, 28 in each role. The 
average age was 20 years and 58 percent were male. No subject took part in 
more than one session.  
Upon arrival, subjects were welcomed and randomly seated at visually 
separated computer terminals. Subjects were given 15 minutes to read through 
the instructions, and then the experimenter read aloud a briefer précis outlining 
the most important points contained in the instructions.41 Subjects were then 
randomly assigned to a group and a role. All decisions were made 
anonymously, and neither during nor after the experiment were subjects 
informed about the identity of the other members of their firm. Before 
proceeding to the decision stage, subjects were guided through two role-
specific video presentations which carefully illustrated the main features of the 
decision screens they were going to use during the experiment.42 The first 
video presentation explained the functioning of an on-screen electronic 
calculator (the What-if-calculator) that subjects could use to compute their and 
other players payoffs. At the end of the first video presentation, subjects were 
asked to solve a set of control questions and they could not enter the decision 
stage unless they had solved all the questions correctly. The second video 
presentation showed subjects how to enter their choices in a Decision Table 
and explained once again the structure of the game and the strategy method.  
                                                 
 
 
40 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 
(2007)). Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 
(2004)). 
41 The experimental instructions and the précis are reproduced in Appendix A and Appendix B 
at the end of this chapter. 
42 Video presentations were shown to subjects individually in z-Tree. Video presentations and 
the software are available upon request. 
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On average the experimental sessions lasted about one hour, including the 
reading of the instructions and of the précis and the completion of a post-
experimental questionnaire. All participants were endowed with an initial 
amount of 95 points, and earnings from the decision task (which could be 
negative) were added to this initial amount.43 At the end of the session, the 
final point earnings were converted into British Pounds at a rate of £0.10 per 
point. Subjects were paid in private and in cash at the end of each session. 
Subject earnings ranged from £5.10 to £12.70, averaging £10.30 
(approximately $21 at the time of the experiment).  
4.4. Results 
In our experiment employers can choose from four possible wage 
combinations. Of the 28 employers, 6 (21 percent) paid the high wage to both 
employees, 7 (25 percent) paid different wages, and 15 (54 percent) paid the 
low wage to both employees. In the rest of this section we examine how 
employees reacted to the different wage combinations. We start by exploring 
whether pay comparison information affects effort behaviour among 
Employees 1, i.e. when employees can access it in isolation from effort 
comparison information. We then turn to Employees 2 and explore the impact 
on effort of the simultaneous exposure to pay and effort comparison 
information. Lastly, we compare behaviour in the two environments to assess 
the overall impact of social comparisons on reciprocity. 
                                                 
 
 
43 Note that subjects in the role of the Employer could incur losses from the decision task. The 
initial endowment outweighed any possible losses.  
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4.4.1. Social Comparisons and Effort among Employees 1 
Figure 4.1 displays the average effort expended by the twenty-eight Employees 
1 who participated in our experiment. The two bars in the front row represent 
the wage combinations where the employee gets a low (16 points) own wage, 
while the bars at the back correspond to the two cases where the own wage is 
high (32 points). Darker bars represent wage combinations where the co-
worker gets a low wage, while lighter bars correspond to the two cases where 
the co-worker is paid a high wage.  
Figure 4.1. Average Effort - Employees 1  
 
An immediately apparent feature of Figure 4.1 is that Employees 1 
expend more effort when they are paid a high wage. In fact, employees 
average effort when the own wage is high exceeds the effort exerted when the 
own wage is low by around 0.714 when the co-workers wage is low, and by 
0.750 when the co-workers wage is high. Both differences are highly 
significant ( 001.0p  in both cases).44 This pattern reproduces the standard 
                                                 
 
 
44 All p-values are based on two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests, unless 
reported otherwise. 
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reciprocity result documented in the GEG literature: employees reciprocate 
higher wages with higher effort. 
Another noticeable feature of Figure 4.1 is that social information has 
virtually no effect on Employee 1s effort choices: for a given own wage, they 
expend roughly the same effort irrespective of the wage the Employer pays to 
the co-worker ( 000.1 p  when the own wage is low, and 739.0 p  when the 
own wage is high). We conclude that Employees 1 reciprocate high wages with 
higher effort, but pay comparison information has no impact on effort 
decisions. 
4.4.2. Social Comparisons and Effort among Employees 2 
We now turn the attention to our twenty-eight Employees 2, who were 
simultaneously exposed to pay and effort comparison information. Figure 4.2 
shows Employee 2s average effort and is divided in two panels. Panel A has 
the same structure of Figure 4.1 above and shows average effort per wage 
combination, aggregating across different levels of the co-workers effort. 
Panel B disaggregates the average efforts of Panel A by the four different 
levels of the co-workers effort.  
A first feature which is apparent in both panels of Figure 4.2 is that also 
Employees 2 increase their effort when they are paid the high wage. Ignoring for 
a moment the effects of social information and averaging across contingencies 
where the own wage is the same (i.e. across rows in Figure 4.2), we note that 
Employee 2s effort increases on average by about 0.495 and the effect is highly 
significant ( 001.0p ). In fact, for each combination of the co-workers wage 
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and effort shown in Panel B of Figure 4.2, the mean increase in effort of 
Employee 2 after an increase in the own wage differs from zero at p < 0.058.45 
Figure 4.2. Average Effort - Employees 2 
 
 
The figure shows Employee 2s average effort. Panel A shows average effort per wage 
combination, aggregating across different levels of the co-workers effort. Panel B 
disaggregates effort choices by different levels of the co-workers effort.  
A second notable feature of Figure 4.2 is that, as with Employees 1, 
information about the co-workers wage has on average no effect on Employee 
2s effort. This is particularly evident in Panel A of Figure 4.2: for a given own 
wage, Employees 2 expend roughly the same effort irrespective of the wage the 
                                                 
 
 
45 The p-values range from 0.0578 for the case where the co-worker is paid a high wage and 
supplies minimal effort to 0.0004 for the case where the co-worker is paid a high wage and 
supplies maximal effort. 
Panel A 
Panel B 
 113 
 
Employer pays to the co-worker ( 0.740p   when the own wage is low, and 
0.639p   when the own wage is high). Thus, pay comparisons do not seem to 
affect effort decisions even when effort comparison information is concurrently 
available. 
The most noteworthy feature of Figure 4.2 can be found in Panel B, 
which clearly shows that effort comparison information can substantially affect 
Employee 2s effort decisions. In the wage combination where the Employer 
pays a high wage to both employees the magnitude of Employees 2s effort 
crucially depends on the co-workers effort: employees strongly increase their 
effort as the co-workers expend higher effort. When Employee 2 is paid a high 
wage and the co-workers wage is low information about the co-workers effort 
seems to have a slightly negative effect on Employee 2s effort. When 
Employee 2s wage is low there is no clear relation between Employee 2s 
effort and the co-workers effort. 
We examined the impact of effort comparison information on Employee 
2s effort decisions using the regression model 
2 0 1 2 1 3 1* * * *e high wage e high wage eD D D D H      
where the explanatory variable  wagehigh  is a dummy variable which 
assumes the value 1 when the own wage is high and 0 otherwise. Note that this 
models 2e  as a linear function of 1e , where the marginal impact of 1e on 2e is 
2D  (when own wage is low) or 32 DD   (when own wage is high). We used 
OLS to estimate separate models for the cases where the co-workers wage is 
low or high and report the results in Table 4.1.  
In both models the estimate of 2D  is very close to, and not significantly 
different from, zero, showing that no relation between employees effort exists 
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when the Employer pays a low wage to Employee 2. When the co-worker is 
paid a low wage the estimate of 32 DD   is negative. This reflects the decline 
in effort that is apparent in Panel B of Figure 4.2 (bars corresponding to own 
wage = 32, co-workers wage = 16). However, the estimate is low and not 
significantly different from zero ( 73.0)27,1(  F ; 401.0 p ). In contrast, 
when the co-worker is paid a high wage the estimate of 32 DD   is positive and 
statistically significant ( 24.7)27,1(  F ; 012.0 p ). Thus, when the Employer 
pays a high wage to both workers, Employees 2 systematically increase their 
effort when the co-worker also does so. The impact of this effect on effort is 
remarkable. When the co-worker receives a high wage and chooses minimal 
effort, the Employer elicits only a small amount of extra effort (about 0.15) 
from Employees 2 by increasing their wage from 16 to 32. On the other hand, 
if the co-worker chooses maximum effort Employees 2s reciprocal response is 
about five times this (about 0.77). Thus, the own wage-effort relationship is 
significantly affected by effort comparison information. 
Table 4.1. Employee 2s Effort Regressions 
 
co-worker’s wage is LOW co-worker’s wage is HI GH 
high wage 0.643
* * *
 
(0.169)  
-0.054 
(0.147)  
e1 
-0.011 
(0.052)  
0.000 
(0.037)  
e1 *  high wage -0.046 (0.049)  
0.207* * *  
(0.067)  
constant   1.214
* * *
 
(0.145)  
1.196* * *  
(0.122)  
N.  224 224 
F-stat ist ic F(3,27)  =  5.48 F(3,27)  =  6.69 
Prob >  F 0.004 0.002 
R2:  0.110 0.134 
Dependent variable is Employee 2s effort. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
adjusted for intragroup correlation (subjects are used as independent clustering units). 
*** .01p  . 
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4.4.3. The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 
Our results show that social comparisons can shape the intensity of employees 
reciprocal responses towards the employer in important ways. In particular, 
whereas information about the co-workers wage has little impact on effort 
choices, we find that the availability of information about the co-workers 
effort can be a crucial piece of social information in our setting: when the 
Employer offers a high wage to both Employees, Employees 2s reciprocal 
behaviour depends on the reciprocal behaviour of the co-worker. 
A natural question is then whether an employer could in principle exploit 
this dependency in employees reciprocal responses, by adopting a policy of 
paying equally generous wages and making information on co-workers efforts 
available. Would such a policy make the employer better off on average, 
strengthening the reciprocity of those employees who observe reciprocal 
behaviour on the part of others? Or would any positive effect of social 
information be rather outweighed by the negative effects which may occur 
when reciprocally motivated employees observe that others do not comply with 
norms of reciprocity?  
To answer these questions, we investigate whether the availability of 
effort comparison information had on average a beneficial or detrimental effect 
on employees reciprocity in our experiment. We do so by comparing the 
average reciprocal response of Employees 1, who were just exposed to pay 
comparison information, with the reciprocal response of Employees 2, who had 
access to both pay and effort comparison information. As we are interested in 
the impact of effort comparison information on reciprocity, we focus on non-
selfish employees, i.e. those employees who made at least one non-minimal 
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effort choice in the experiment. Out of our 56 employees, 32 (57 percent) are 
non-selfish: 16 Employees 1 and 16 Employees 2. Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2 
restrict attention to these employees. The figure shows the effort expended on 
average by non-selfish Employees 1 (dark bars) and Employees 2 (light bars) 
in the four wage combinations possibly chosen by the Employer.46  
On average, Employees 1s effort exceeds Employees 2s effort in each 
given wage combination. Moreover, Employees 1 appear to be decidedly more 
responsive to own wage increases than Employees 2, irrespective of the co-
workers wage. Thus, on average the availability of effort comparison 
information seems to have a detrimental effect on effort behaviour and 
employees reciprocal response.47 
 
The figure shows average effort by non-selfish Employees 1 (n=16, dark bars) and 
non-selfish Employees 2 (n=16, light bars). 
                                                 
 
 
46 As in Panel A of Figure 4.2, an Employee 2s average effort in each wage combination is 
simply the average effort choice across the four co-workers effort contingencies. 
47 It should be noted that another difference between Employee 1s and Employee 2s decision 
environments is that Employees 1 know that their behaviour will be observed by Employees 2. 
In contrast, Employees 2s behaviour is not known to Employees 1. Thus an alternative 
explanation for the differences in effort between Employees 1 and Employees 2 could be that 
Employees 1 expend higher effort because of an audience effect. 
Em ployees 1  Em ployees 2  
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How much reciprocal effort does the Employer lose on average when 
effort comparison information is made available? Table 4.2 answers this 
question and reports the magnitude of Employee 1s and Employee 2s average 
reciprocal responses for the various co-workers wages and (where applicable) 
effort levels. Reciprocal responses are computed as the change in own effort 
after an own wage rise ceteris paribus, i.e. holding constant the co-workers 
wage and (for Employees 2) effort.48  
Table 4.2. Social Comparisons and Reciprocity 
 
 Average Reciprocal Response 
 
 
co-worker’s wage is 
LOW 
co-worker’s wage is 
HI GH 
Employees 1  1.250 (0.856)  
1.312 
(0.704)  
Employees 2 when 1e is 1 
1.000 
(0.816)  
0.375 
(0.719)  
 
when 1e is 2 
0.937 
(0.929)  
0.562 
(0.727)  
 
when 1e is 3 
1.062 
(0.929)  
0.812 
(0.910)  
 
when 1e is 4 
0.687 
(1.138)  
1.500 
(0.966)  
 
overall 0.922 (0.780)  
0.812 
(0.574)  
The table shows average reciprocal responses of Employees 1 and Employees 2 with 
standard deviations in parentheses. 
Aggregating across the four co-workers effort contingencies, Employees 
2s average reciprocal response is substantially lower than Employees 1s, both 
when the co-workers wage is high (0.812 vs. 1.312), and when the co-
workers wage is low (0.922 vs. 1.25). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test detects a 
significant difference in both cases: 0.055p   when the co-workers wage is 
                                                 
 
 
48 More formally, we compute Employee 1s reciprocal responses as 
),16(),32( 21211 wwfwwfe    '  and evaluate them for different values (low or high) of the 
co-workers wage. Employee 2s reciprocal response is computed as 
),,16(),,32( 1121122 ewwgewwge    '  and evaluated for different values of the co-workers 
wage and effort. 
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high, and 0.025p   when the co-workers wage is low. While reciprocal 
responses are generally lower among Employees 2 than among Employees 1 
when the co-workers wage is low, Employees 2s reciprocity in the 
contingencies where the co-workers wage is high clearly depends on the co-
workers effort. Employees 2 respond to an own wage increase by expending 
only 0.375 additional units of effort if they observe that the co-worker expends 
minimal effort, but they increase effort by 1.5 units when the co-worker 
expends maximum effort. Thus, the Employer could in principle extract more 
effort from Employees 2 than from Employees 1, provided that Employees 2 
are paired with a sufficiently reciprocal co-worker. Nevertheless, our data 
suggest that on average reciprocity towards the employer is weakened by 
exposure to both pay and effort comparison information relative to the case 
when only pay comparison information is available. 
4.5. Discussion & Conclusions 
We have designed an experimental situation to study reciprocal behaviour in an 
environment where subjects can observe the treatment and behaviour of similar 
others before deciding on their reciprocal response. We argue that exposure to 
these pieces of social information is typical in naturally occurring social 
environments (e.g. in the workplace) and hence we believe that studying the 
behavioural effects of social comparison information can add in important 
ways to the understanding of individual decisions in social situations.  
In our experiment we find strong evidence of reciprocity: employees 
expend higher effort when they are offered higher wages. However, the 
strength of the own wage-effort relationship is significantly affected by social 
comparison information, although a distinction has to be made between the 
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effects of pay and effort comparison information. On the one hand, as in some 
previous studies (e.g., Charness and Kuhn (2007)), exposure to pay comparison 
information does not seem to have a significant impact on individual 
behaviour: effort choices respond strongly to own wage considerations, but not 
to information about the co-workers wage. This is true whether or not effort 
comparison information is concurrently available to employees. On the other 
hand, we find that the own wage-effort relationship is significantly affected by 
effort comparison information, in a way which is dependent on relative pay 
conditions. When the employer pays equal and generous wages to both 
employees, reciprocal responses are conditional on the reciprocal behaviour of 
others. Employees are reluctant to increase their effort in response to a 
generous wage offer if their co-worker does not increase effort as well. On the 
other hand, employees strongly respond to generous wage offers if they 
observe reciprocal behaviour on the part of the co-worker. The magnitude of 
the effect is considerable: relative to the case where the co-worker chooses 
minimal effort, effort responses are five times stronger when the co-worker 
chooses maximum effort. Effort behaviour appears instead less sensitive to 
social information when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees, or 
when the own wage is low: in these circumstances effort choices do not depend 
significantly on the effort expended by the co-worker.  
Our results show that the strength of reciprocal relations can be 
substantially eroded, or amplified by the ability to observe reciprocal behaviour 
on the part of others. What is then the average impact of social comparisons on 
reciprocity? Our data suggest that, although social information can have a 
positive effect on reciprocity in some circumstances, this positive impact tends to 
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be outweighed by its negative effects: on average Employee 2s reciprocal 
responses are less intense that Employee 1s. Such results appear in line with the 
recent findings by Thöni (2005) and Mittone and Ploner (2009), which also 
report an overall negative impact of social information on reciprocal behaviour 
in related laboratory experiments. One explanation for these findings could be 
that individuals tend to use the social information available in the environment in 
a way beneficial to their self-interest. Indeed, other studies have argued that 
when the informational structure of a social situation leaves room for ambiguity 
about appropriate behaviour, or makes different and perhaps competing norms of 
conduct salient, individuals tend to comply with the behavioural motivation that 
best suits their own self-interest (e.g. Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007); Xiao and 
Bicchieri (forthcoming)).49 In our setting, Employees 2 face a relatively complex 
social environment where a number of relevant motivational forces are salient. In 
some cases these motivational tendencies pull in different directions: consider 
the case of an employee receiving a high wage and observing the equally well-
paid co-worker expending little effort. Vertical reciprocity would require that the 
employee expends high effort to repay the employers generous wage offer. 
Nevertheless the employee may dislike earning less than the co-worker and 
hence may prefer to reduce her reciprocal response in order not to fall behind. 
Conformism considerations may also induce the employee to match the co-
workers low effort. What should one do in the face of such competing norms of 
                                                 
 
 
49 Other related studies also point to the existence of a self-serving or egocentric bias when 
ones self-interest is at stake. See Konow (2005) for an overview and related literature. For an 
exploration of this phenomenon in the context of the gift exchange game, see Charness and 
Haruvy (2000). 
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behaviour? Under such circumstances our subjects tended to disregard vertical 
reciprocity and choose low effort, a choice which is also payoff-maximizing.  
Nevertheless, our finding that there exist circumstances where social 
comparisons have beneficial effects on reciprocity points to the importance of 
devising mechanisms that can reshape the social environment such that social 
information may end up fostering reciprocal behaviour. We propose that 
selective group composition may be one such mechanism. We see considerable 
heterogeneity across players: some appear reciprocally motivated whereas 
others choose uniformly low effort. An employer choosing employees should 
avoid low effort providers for two reasons. First, such employees cannot be 
motivated to supply high levels of effort, since they respond to high wages by 
shirking. Second, as we have stressed, they also undermine the employers 
ability to induce gift exchange from reciprocally motivated employees. In fact, 
social information within heterogeneous groups tends to undermine 
performance, as observation of shirkers tends to induce team players to adopt 
more selfish behaviours.50 Similarly, employers should find reciprocally 
motivated employees attractive for two reasons. They can be motivated to 
supply high levels of effort, and as our study shows, they induce higher levels 
of reciprocity from other employees. Thus homogeneous groups of reciprocally 
motivated employees may provide the best environment for harnessing the 
positive effects of social comparisons. This argument is complementary to 
those made by the business executives interviewed by Bewley (1999, p. 16): in 
                                                 
 
 
50 A similar process has been observed in public goods experiments, where it has also been 
suggested that selective group composition may foster cooperation, see for example Burlando and 
Guala (2005); Gächter and Thöni (2005); Gunnthorsdottir, Houser and McCabe (2007); and Ones 
and Putterman (2007). 
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their view layoffs do less damage to work morale and performance than pay 
cuts, because layoffs get the misery out the door while pushing the remaining 
workers to work harder in order to avoid future dismissal, whereas pay cuts 
have a negative impact on all workers motivation. In addition, our results 
suggest that if layoffs target less productive workers this has the further 
advantage of reducing the heterogeneity of the workforce thus strengthening 
the effort responses of reciprocally motivated employees. 
To conclude, while we have used a labour market context to fix ideas, we 
believe that our results extend beyond this context because reciprocity is an 
important social norm in many situations. Our study shows that in settings 
where social comparison information about referent others is available the 
extent to which individuals are willing to comply with norms of positive 
reciprocity depends systematically on the extent to which similar others are 
willing to comply with these norms as well. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment on decision-making that 
has been financed by various foundations for research promotion. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can  depending on your 
decisions  earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important 
to read these instructions with care. 
During this experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other 
participants in any way. If you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and the experimenter will come to your desk. If you violate this rule, you will 
be excluded from the experiment and from all payments. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. You will 
receive an initial endowment of 95 points, which will be enough to cover any 
loss that might occur during the experiment. The points you lose will be 
subtracted from your endowment.  
At the end of the experiment we will convert your point earnings into money at 
the following rate: 
1 Point = 10 Pence 
Your total money earnings will be paid out to you in private and in cash at the 
end of the experiment. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this experiment you will be randomly matched with two other participants to 
form a group of three persons. We will refer to each group as a firm, and to 
the three group members as Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2. You 
will be assigned to a firm and a role entirely at random, and the computer will 
inform you of your role before the decision-making part of the experiment 
begins. You will not be informed about who of the other participants are in 
your firm, either during or after the experiment. Therefore, all decisions are 
made anonymously. 
2. Decisions within a Firm  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
X First, the Employer chooses the wages to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) 
and Employee 2 (Wage2). The Employer can choose between two wage 
levels, 16 or 32. If he or she wants to, the Employer can choose 
different wages for different Employees.  
X Next, Employee 1 learns the wages the Employer pays to each 
Employee, and then chooses an effort level (Effort1), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
X Finally, Employee 2 learns the wages the Employer pays to each 
Employee, and also the effort decision of Employee 1. Employee 2 then 
chooses an effort level (Effort2), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
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3. Distribution of earnings within a Firm 
Earnings within the Firm are determined according to the following rules: 
 
Employer 
The Employer receives revenue from the effort chosen by the two Employees, 
and incurs costs from the wages paid to the two Employees. The revenue 
produced by each Employee equals 10 times the effort he or she chooses. The 
costs are simply the sum of the two wages the Employer pays to the 
Employees. The Employers earnings are therefore: 
 
Employers Earnings = 10 * (Effort1 + Effort2)  Wage1  Wage2  
 
The Employers earnings increase with higher effort levels. The higher the 
wages the Employer pays to the two Employees, the lower are the Employers 
earnings. Note that the Employers earnings could be negative. 
Employee 1 
Employee 1 receives the wage from the Employer as revenue, and may incur 
an effort cost. The minimum effort choice of 1 is costless. Each additional unit 
of effort costs 5 points to the Employee. Therefore the effort cost is calculated 
as: 5 * (Effort  1). The earnings of Employee 1 are therefore: 
 
Employee 1s Earnings = Wage1  5 * (Effort1  1) 
 
The earnings of Employee 1 only depend on his or her own wage and effort. 
The higher the wage, the higher are the earnings. The higher the effort he or 
she chooses, the lower are the earnings. 
Employee 2 
The earnings of Employee 2 are calculated in the same way as those of 
Employee 1, except, of course, that Employee 2s earnings depend on his or 
her own wage (Wage2) and his or her own effort choice (Effort2): 
 
Employee 2s Earnings = Wage2  5 * (Effort2  1) 
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HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES 
 
ASSUME THAT THE EMPLOYER CHOOSES THE FOLLOWING 
WAGES FOR HIS OR HER EMPLOYEES: 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 1 = 32 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 2 = 16 
THE EMPLOYEES CHOOSE THE FOLLOWING EFFORT: 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 1 = 2 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 2 = 3 
THIS SITUATION RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING EARNINGS: 
 
EMPLOYERS EARNINGS: THE EMPLOYER RECEIVES REVENUE 
FROM THE EFFORT OF THE TWO EMPLOYEES, I.E.: 10*(2 + 3) = 50. 
THE EMPLOYER PAYS A TOTAL OF 48 POINTS TO THE 
EMPLOYEES. 
THE EARNINGS OF THE EMPLOYER ARE: 50  48 = 2. 
 
EMPLOYEE 1S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 1 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 
32. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 2 HAS A COST OF 5*(2  1) = 5. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 1 ARE: 32  5 = 27. 
 
EMPLOYEE 2S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 2 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 
16. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 3 HAS A COST OF 5*(3  1) = 10. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 2 ARE: 16  10 = 6. 
 
4. The Decision Task 
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one 
described above, in this experiment we ask you to take a decision for each 
possible situation that may arise. Please note that one of these situations will be 
actually relevant, so make your choices carefully. 
The situations you face when making your decisions will depend on your role. 
If you are an Employer you must choose two wages, one for each Employee 
within the Firm. The Employer can choose between: 
o Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 16; 
o Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 32; 
o Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 16; 
o Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 32. 
Depending on the choice of the Employer one of four situations will arise: 
o Employee 1 and Employee 2 could both have a wage of 16; 
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o Employee 1 could have a wage of 16 while Employee 2 has a wage of 
32; 
o Employee 1 could have a wage of 32 while Employee 2 has a wage of 
16; 
o Employee 1 and Employee 2 could both have a wage of 32. 
If you are Employee 1 you will be in one of these four situations. However, 
before knowing which of these situations you are actually in, you will be asked 
to indicate what you would do for each of the four possible situations you 
may be in. You will see a decision screen like the one below: 
 
Each box represents one of the four possible situations you may be in. In each 
of these boxes, you must enter an effort choice, either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Your actual 
effort choice will depend on which of these four possible situations will 
actually realise, i.e. on the wage combination actually chosen by the Employer. 
Depending on the choices of the Employer and Employee 1 one of sixteen 
situations may arise:  
o Employer could choose Wage1= 16 and Wage2 =16 while Employee 1 
chooses 1 unit of effort; 
o Employer could choose Wage1= 16 and Wage2 =16 while Employee 1 
chooses 2 units of effort; 
o .and so on. 
If you are Employee 2 you will be in one of these sixteen situations. However, 
before knowing which of these situations you are actually in, you will be asked 
to indicate what you would do for each of the sixteen possible situations 
you may be in. You will see a decision screen like the one below: 
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Each box represents one of the sixteen possible situations you may be in. In 
each of these boxes, you must enter an effort choice, either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Your 
actual effort choice will depend on which of these sixteen possible situations 
will actually realise, i.e. on the wage combination actually chosen by the 
Employer and on the effort actually chosen by Employee 1. 
 
More information about how to solve your specific Decision task will be 
provided to you via computer later on during the experiment, once your role 
has been determined. 
 
You have to perform this task only once. 
 
5. How do we determine your actual earnings? 
Although Employee 1 will take four effort decisions, only one will be relevant 
in determining the earnings of members of the Firm. Similarly, only one of the 
sixteen effort decisions made by Employee 2 will be actually used in the 
earnings computation. 
Which decision is actually relevant will be determined at the end of the 
experiment, once everyone in the firm has taken his or her decisions: the actual 
wage combination chosen by the Employer will determine which of the four 
possible situations is relevant for Employee 1. Employee 1s choice in this 
relevant situation will determine which of the sixteen possible situations is 
relevant for Employee 2. 
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6. What happens next? 
I. When the experiment starts you will be informed about whether you are 
an Employer or an Employee in this experiment. In case you are an 
Employee, it will be specified whether you are Employee 1 or Employee 
2.  
II. When you press the Continue button, a screen with a brief video-
presentation about the main features of the experiment will appear. In this 
video-presentation you will receive some information about the What-if-
calculator, a tool you can use during the experiment to facilitate your 
computations. It is important to note that no other participant will be 
informed about your calculations and that these calculations do not have 
any effect on your earnings. 
III. After this brief video-presentation, you will access a new screen where 
you will be asked to answer a few questions. You will have to calculate 
the earnings of all members of your Firm for five hypothetical scenarios, 
with the help of the What-if-calculator. Press Check when you have 
answered all the questions. You will be informed about whether your 
answers are correct. 
IV. Once you have answered all the questions correctly, you will be guided to 
a new short video-presentation that will give you specific information 
about how to enter your decisions into the Decision Table. 
V. After that, you will finally enter the Decision Task screen. Depending on 
whether you are an Employer or an Employee you will have to choose 
wages or effort levels. In this screen, you will again have the possibility 
to use the What-if-calculator. 
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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Appendix B: Experimental Précis 
I will now briefly summarize the content of the instructions you have just read. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly matched with two 
other participants to form a group of three people and you will be randomly 
assigned a role within this group, which we will call firm. You will be either 
the Employer or Employee 1 or Employee 2.  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
First, the Employer chooses one wage to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and one 
wage to pay to Employee 2 (Wage2).  
Next, Employee 1 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee, and 
then chooses an effort level (Effort1). 
Finally, Employee 2 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee 
and also the effort decision of Employee 1, and then chooses an effort level 
(Effort2). 
The Employers earnings increase with higher effort levels and decrease with 
higher wages. 
The Employees earnings increase in the wage they receive and decrease with 
higher effort. The earnings of each Employee only depend on his or her own 
wage and effort.  
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one I 
have just described, in this experiment we ask you to take a decision for 
each possible situation that may arise. This is a crucial point, so make sure 
you have understood it correctly. 
The possible situations you will face when making your decisions will depend 
on your role. 
If you are an Employer you must choose two wages, one for each Employee 
within the Firm. Thus, depending on the choice of the Employer one of four 
situations will arise: 
o Both Employees could get a wage of 16; 
o Both Employees could get a wage of 32; 
o And the two situations where one Employee gets a wage of 16 while 
the other Employee gets a wage of 32; 
 
If you are Employee 1 you must indicate an effort choice for each of these four 
possible situations, before knowing which one you are actually in. Remember, 
one of these four decisions will be the one that is actually relevant, so make 
your choice carefully. 
Depending on the choices of the Employer and Employee 1 one of sixteen 
situations may arise:  
o Both Employees get a wage of 16 and Employee 1 chooses 1 unit of 
effort 
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o Both Employees get a wage of 16 and Employee 1 chooses 2 units of 
effort; 
o .and so on  
Since there are 4 possible levels of effort and 4 possible wage combinations, 16 
situations in all may arise. 
If you are Employee 2 you must indicate an effort choice for each of the 
sixteen possible situations. Remember, one of these sixteen decisions will be 
the one that is actually relevant, so make your choice carefully. 
Which decision is actually relevant will be determined at the end of the 
experiment, once everyone in the firm has taken his or her decisions: the actual 
wage combination chosen by the Employer will determine which of the four 
possible situations is relevant for Employee 1. Employee 1s choice in this 
relevant situation will determine which of the sixteen possible situations is 
relevant for Employee 2. Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF PAY COMPARISONS ON EFFORT 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Naturally occurring interactions between individuals take place in complex 
social environments which typically contain considerable amounts of social 
comparison information about referent others (i.e. information about how 
similar others behave or are treated in similar circumstances). The availability 
of information about others treatment and behaviour can affect the way 
individuals evaluate their own treatment and behaviour, and this may 
ultimately influence their actions.51 These effects may be particularly 
prominent in workplaces, where employees are often aware of co-workers pay 
and may use this information to evaluate the fairness of their own pay. 
                                                 
 
 
51 For example, Fliessbach et al. (2007) show that reward-related brain processes are 
significantly influenced by information about the treatment of comparison others in a 
neuroimaging experiment. 
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Employees may feel treated unfairly if they discover to be paid less than co-
workers who are in comparable positions within the firm. This may in turn 
affect their work morale and performance negatively. This type of argument is 
often invoked to justify firms preference for wage secrecy norms. Moreover, it 
constitutes a central component in a number of theoretical approaches to labour 
market relations (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), and to social relations more 
generally (e.g., Adams, 1965). Surprisingly, empirical studies have produced 
weak evidence that pay comparisons have a systematic influence on work 
behaviour.52 
This chapter uses laboratory experiments to study pay comparison effects 
in a multilateral version of the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1993). In the 
standard bilateral gift-exchange game a first-mover (the employer) decides on 
the size of the gift (wage) she sends to a second-mover (the employee), who 
can in turn reciprocate by choosing costly actions (effort) that reward the 
first-mover. A typical result of bilateral gift-exchange game experiments is that 
employees are often willing to incur costs in order to reward employers who 
have treated them favourably (see Fehr et al., 2009 for a recent review of the 
experimental literature). In the multilateral version of the game used in this 
study the employer interacts with two employees at the same time, and has to 
pay a wage to each of them. Employees receive their wage and then 
independently choose an effort level. We observe effort choices in three 
different conditions. In a first condition employees only learn their own wage 
while co-workers wages remain secret. We use this benchmark condition to 
                                                 
 
 
52 Survey and case-based studies have instead found some support for the importance of pay 
comparison effects at workplaces (see, e.g., Campbell III and Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 1999). 
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assess how employees respond to given levels of their own wage in the absence 
of pay comparison information. In two other treatments employees have full 
information about co-workers wages at the time they choose effort. We use 
these treatments to study how information about co-workers wages affects 
employees willingness to expend effort in response to own wage offers. The 
two public wages treatments differ in how co-workers wages are determined. 
In one treatment the employer can choose which wage to pay to the co-worker, 
while in the other treatment co-workers wages are mandated exogenously. We 
use the former treatment to study pay comparison effects in settings where the 
employer has full discretion on the firms wage structure, while the latter 
treatment allows us to study employees reactions to pay comparison 
information in settings where an employers wage policy is partly constrained 
by exogenous labour market regulations. Such exogenous constraints to firms 
wage policies are commonplace in natural workplaces (e.g. minimum wage 
laws; centralized pay regulations; etc.), and previous experimental research has 
shown that they can affect workers pay fairness considerations and effort 
behaviour in important ways.53 Differently from previous studies, which either 
focused on bilateral labour relations or studied multilateral relations where 
workers received no information about the treatment of co-workers, in our 
experiment we can observe how employees effort is affected by labour market 
                                                 
 
 
53 For example, Falk et al. (2006) show that introducing a nonbinding wage guideline in a 
previously unregulated experimental labour market shifts employees perceptions of what 
constitutes a fair wage and increases their reservation wages considerably. The effect is even 
stronger if the same wage level chosen for the wage guideline is set as a (binding) minimum 
wage. On the impact of minimum wages on effort in gift-exchange games see also Brandts 
and Charness (2004) and Owens and Kagel (forthcoming).  
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regulations that affect the wage of their co-workers, and we can thus study how 
these effects extend to horizontal pay fairness considerations. 
The three main results from our study are as follows. 1) As in many 
other related gift-exchange game experiments, in all treatments we observe a 
strong positive own wage-effort relation: employees in our experiment 
reciprocate high wages with higher effort. 2) Pay comparisons have an overall 
detrimental effect on the own wage-effort relation: employers trigger higher 
effort from employees when they cannot observe what the co-worker earns 
than when co-workers wages are public. 3) The negative effects of pay 
comparisons are amplified in the treatment where co-workers wages are fixed 
exogenously. Here employees respond negatively to pay comparison 
information regardless of whether they learn that the co-worker is paid an 
exogenously low or high wage, while in the treatment where employers can 
choose the level of the co-workers wage marked responses are only detected 
when the employer chooses a high wage for the co-worker. 
This study is related to a small but growing literature that uses 
experiments to study how effort behaviour is affected by information about 
others pay relative to situations where co-workers pay is secret. Güth et al. 
(2001) study a setting where a principal has to design separate contracts for 
two agents who differ in productivity. They compare a treatment where agents 
only learn their own contract with a treatment where agents also learn the 
contract offered to the other agent. While principals in their experiment 
anticipate the existence of pay comparison effects and offer less asymmetric 
contracts in the treatment where contracts are public information, there is only 
weak evidence that pay comparisons actually affect agents behaviour. 
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Charness and Kuhn (2007) use a multilateral version of the gift-exchange game 
where one employer interacts with two differently productive employees. They 
compare effort choices across treatments that vary in whether co-workers 
wages are public or secret and find that pay comparisons have negligible 
effects on effort behaviour.54 Differently from these studies, employees in our 
experiment do not differ in their productivity: thus, in our setting unequal pay 
decidedly implies unfair treatment on the part of the employer.  
A few other experimental studies investigate pay comparison effects by 
examining how employees effort decisions change across situations that differ 
in the wage the employer pays to the co-worker. These studies do not include 
explicit comparisons of treatments differing in whether co-workers wages are 
secret or public. Results from these experiments are mixed: in some cases 
information about co-workers wages systematically affects employees effort 
decisions (Gächter and Thöni, 2009; Abeler et al., forthcoming), while in other 
cases such effects are weak or absent (Gächter et al., 2009). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next 
Section we discuss our experimental design and procedures. Section 5.3 
presents our results. We offer concluding comments in Section 5.4.  
                                                 
 
 
54 Pay comparison effects are also absent in the real effort experiment by Hennig-Schmidt et al. 
(forthcoming). However, employees in their experiment are also unwilling to provide high 
effort in return for high own wages. Subsequent laboratory experiments (where no pay 
comparisons were possible) revealed that this was due to the lack of surplus information, which 
limited the scope for employees to develop adequate fairness attributions. Clark et al. 
(forthcoming) use standard bilateral gift-exchange games that vary in whether employees 
receive information about the wages offered in four other firms present in the market (i.e. they 
study inter-firm pay comparison effects as compared to the intra-firm comparison effects 
studied here). They find that effort choices are significantly affected by how the own wage is 
ranked relative to others wages. 
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5.2. Experimental Design & Procedures 
5.2.1. The Constituent Game 
Our experiment is based on the following three-person game. At the 
outset of the game an Employer is endowed with £22 from which she pays a 
wage to two Employees, labelled RED and BLUE. The wages REDw  and BLUEw  
can take three values: £1, £4 or £7. Employees are paid their wage and then 
select simultaneously an effort level. Each Employee ^ `BLUEREDi ,  can 
choose an effort ie  among three possible levels: low (-1), medium (0) or high 
(+1). The effort technology is adapted from Charness and Levine (2007). Low 
effort costs an employee £1 and reduces the Employers earnings by £4. 
Medium effort is costless and does not affect the Employers earnings. High 
effort costs an employee £1 and increases the Employers earnings by £4. Note 
that, differently from the usual setup where employees can only decide whether 
to reward or not to reward the Employer, the effort technology used in our 
study allows both rewarding (when employees choose high effort) and 
punishments (when employees choose low effort) of fair/unfair wage offers. 
Also note that employees are ex ante symmetric as they do not differ in their 
productivity at the time the Employer sets wages. After employees have chosen 
their efforts the game ends and earnings (in British Pounds) are computed as: 
  BLUEREDBLUEREDER wwee  422S  
for the Employer, and  
 2iii ew  S  
for Employee ^ `BLUEREDi , . 
In our experiment subjects played a one-shot version of the game, which 
was described to them using the same labour market frame that we use 
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throughout the text. The implementation of the game used the strategy method 
(Selten, 1967), i.e. subjects had to specify complete strategies in the game-
theoretic sense.  
5.2.2. The Experimental Treatments 
Our constituent game was implemented in three different treatments which 
vary along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether wages are public 
(both employees learn both wages before making an effort choice) or private 
(each employee learns only her own wage). The second dimension is whether 
the Employer can choose both the wages she pays to the employees, or whether 
she can instead choose only one wage, while the other wage is fixed 
exogenously. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the treatments used in the 
experiment.  
Table 5.1. Overview of Treatments 
Wages both determined by the Employer one determined exogenously 
public PUBLIC  
/ £1
/ £7
PUBLIC EXO
PUBLIC EXO
­®¯  
private SECRET  - 
In our SECRET treatment the Employer chooses a wage for the RED 
Employee and a wage for the BLUE Employee. Each employee then learns her 
own wage but is not informed of the wage that the Employer chose for the co-
worker: thus, co-workers wages are secret. 
In our PUBLIC treatment wages are also determined by the Employer, 
but they are public information as employees are informed of both wages 
before they choose effort. 
In our PUBLIC/EXO treatment wages are also public information, but the 
Employer chooses only one of the two wages she pays to the employees, 
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namely the wage for the BLUE Employee. The wage for the RED Employee is 
instead determined exogenously by the experimenter. We conducted two 
versions of the PUBLIC/EXO treatment where the RED Employees wage was 
either fixed equal to £1 (PUBLIC/EXO £1) or equal to £7 (PUBLIC/EXO £7). 
The level of the RED wage was mandated using a neutral language: in the 
instructions (reproduced in Appendix A) subjects were simply told that the 
Employer must pay a £1 [£7 in PUBLIC/EXO £7] wage to the Red Employee, 
while he/she can decide on what wage (£1, £4 or £7) to pay to the Blue 
Employee. (emphasis in original). 
5.2.3. Discussion of the Design 
The aim of our experiment is to assess the impact of pay comparison 
information on effort behaviour. We study a setup where employees are ex ante 
symmetric such that any pay differential between employees has a 
straightforward interpretation in terms of pay fairness. We compare effort 
choices made in a treatment where co-workers wages are not observable (the 
SECRET treatment) with choices made in two different public wages 
treatments where co-workers wages are observable. In the PUBLIC treatment 
co-workers wages are freely chosen by the employer. This is the type of 
environment that has also been studied in previous experiments on pay 
comparison effects. In the PUBLIC/EXO treatment co-workers wages are 
mandated exogenously, and we can thus study pay comparison effects in 
environments where the employer is constrained by external regulations to pay 
a given wage to a portion of the workforce.  
It is not clear a priori whether the presence of exogenous constraints on a 
firms wage structure may strengthen or weaken pay comparison effects. On 
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the one hand, the fact that co-workers wages are not determined by the 
employer in PUBLIC/EXO may actually reduce the scope for effective pay 
comparisons, as only wages actively chosen by employers may be considered 
as relevant for pay fairness attributions. Indeed, Gächter and Thöni (2009) find 
reduced pay comparison effects in their Non-intentional treatment where a 
random device chooses employees wages on behalf of the employer. 
Nevertheless, we note that, differently from Gächter and Thöni (2009), 
employers in our PUBLIC/EXO treatment do have some discretion over wages 
as they can set the level of the BLUE wage: hence in our game the Employer is 
responsible for any wage inequality within the firm, as she can always treat 
employees symmetrically if she wishes to do so. Moreover, the RED wages in 
PUBLIC/EXO are not determined by a random mechanism: they are fixed 
exogenously by the rules of the experiment, and workers may view the 
realization of a random process differently from an exogenous wage mandated 
by the experimenter. In fact, similarly to how the introduction of an exogenous 
minimum wage shifted workers perceptions of what is a fair wage in previous 
experimental studies (e.g., Falk et al., 2006), our exogenous intervention on 
RED wages in PUBLIC/EXO may end up increasing the prominence of co-
workers wages as a reference point for what constitute a fair wage in an 
experimental firm, and thus promote the use of horizontal pay comparisons in 
pay fairness evaluations.55  
                                                 
 
 
55 This may be particularly true for settings where the exogenous constraints contain value-
laden elements that may speak to workers feelings of entitlement. On this respect, it should be 
noted that we opted for a conservative approach to mandate the levels of the RED wage in 
PUBLIC/EXO rather than for more value-laden interventions, e.g. one where the experimenter 
somehow justifies the choice of the RED wage level. 
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Pay comparison effects in PUBLIC/EXO are studied focusing on two 
extreme levels of the co-workers wage, £1 and £7. These seem the most 
attractive cases to isolate pay comparison effects: it appears in fact unlikely 
that we would observe any effect of moderate amounts of wage inequality had 
we failed to observe reactions to larger amounts. 
We collected employees effort decisions using the strategy method. We 
believe that the use of the strategy method in our experiment is necessary 
because it allows us to observe effort behaviour across all possible paths of 
play without either using deception or resorting to repeated play, which does 
not guarantee the collection of a sufficient number of observations for all 
information sets in the game and can introduce strategic confounds in the 
design. With the strategy method we can observe how each employee in our 
experiment chooses his or her effort for all possible combinations of the own 
wage and the co-workers wage, and we can thus measure the impact of pay 
comparisons on effort at the individual level.56 
Note that the number of effort decisions that employees have to submit 
with the strategy method depends on the treatment they are playing, as they 
control a different number of information sets in different treatments. In the 
PUBLIC treatment employees control nine information sets, one for each wage 
combination that could possibly be chosen by the Employer: thus, we collect 
nine effort choices from RED and BLUE Employees in the PUBLIC treatment. 
                                                 
 
 
56 The use of the strategy method in economic experiments has undergone a methodological debate 
about whether behavioural responses differ when they are elicited in a hot version of the game 
(i.e., when subjects directly respond to decisions made by other players) rather than in a cold 
version (i.e., when the game is played with the strategy method). The issue has been addressed in a 
number of experimental studies suggesting that the use of the strategy method is unlikely to distort 
behaviour in experiments (see Brandts and Charness, 2009 for a review). 
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In the PUBLIC/EXO treatment the RED Employees wage is exogenously 
fixed at either £1 or £7 depending on which version of the treatment is 
implemented. Thus, only three wage combinations are actually feasible, and 
vary in the wage the Employer chooses for the BLUE Employee. Thus, we 
collect three effort choices from BLUE and RED Employees in our two 
versions of the PUBLIC/EXO treatment. Lastly, because in the SECRET 
treatment employees only learn their own wage and not the co-workers wage, 
they control three information sets corresponding to the three wage levels that 
could possibly be paid to them by the Employer. Thus, we collect three effort 
choices from employees in the SECRET treatment. 
5.2.4. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using subjects 
recruited from a university-wide pool of students who had previously indicated 
their willingness to be paid volunteers in decision-making experiments.57 
Twelve sessions with a total of 180 participants were conducted: we had 30 
subjects participate in two sessions of the PUBLIC treatment, 30 subjects 
participate in two sessions of the SECRET treatment, and 120 subjects 
participate in eight sessions of the PUBLIC/EXO treatment, equally divided 
between its two versions PUBLIC/EXO £1 and PUBLIC/EXO £7. No subject 
took part in more than one session. The average age of participants was 20.7 
years, and 52% of them were male.  
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were 
welcomed and randomly seated at visually separated computer terminals. 
                                                 
 
 
57 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
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Subjects were then given a written set of instructions that the experimenter read 
aloud. Subjects were also given a set of Earnings Distributions tables 
(reproduced in Appendix B for the PUBLIC treatment), showing Employers 
and Employees earnings for all combinations of efforts and wages. Subjects 
were then randomly assigned to a group and a role (Employer, RED Employee 
or BLUE Employee), and were asked to solve a set of control questions to 
corroborate their understanding of the experimental game. Subjects had to 
answer all questions correctly before the experiment could continue. The 
decision-making phase of the session consisted of a one-shot play of the 
relevant experimental game. All decisions were made anonymously: neither 
during nor after the experiment were subjects informed about the identity of the 
other people in the room they were matched with. 
At the end of the experiment subjects completed a short post-
experimental questionnaire. Subjects were then privately paid a £3 show-up fee 
plus their earnings from the experimental game. Subject earnings, inclusive of 
the show-up fee, ranged from £3 to £27, with an average of £10.12 and a 
standard deviation of £6.95. Sessions lasted about 50 minutes on average.  
5.3. Results 
Our data analysis will be focused on employees effort behaviour across the 
three treatments used in the experiment. We start by comparing effort 
behaviour across our SECRET and PUBLIC treatments. We then turn to a 
comparison of effort choices made in SECRET and PUBLIC/EXO. Because 
the focus of our study is on the impact of pay comparisons on own wage-effort 
reciprocal relations, only the effort decisions made by BLUE Employees are 
relevant to the analysis of effort choices made in PUBLIC/EXO: since RED 
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Employees wage was exogenously mandated by the experimenter their effort 
responses cannot be interpreted as a form of reciprocation towards the 
employer. Though not the focus of the experiment, we will briefly discuss the 
effort chosen by RED Employees in PUBLIC/EXO at the end of this section. 
Employers wage decisions will also be briefly presented there.  
5.3.1. SECRET vs. PUBLIC 
Figure 5.1 reports the proportions of low effort choices (punishments) and high 
effort choices (rewards) made by employees in SECRET and PUBLIC for 
different levels of the own wage. In PUBLIC, for any given level of the own 
wage, we also differentiate the effort choices made when the co-workers wage 
was low (PUBLIC £1), medium (PUBLIC £4) or high (PUBLIC £7). Effort 
rates for SECRET are not disaggregated according to the co-workers wage as 
this was not known to employees at the time they made an effort choice. 
Figure 5.1. Low and High Effort Rates: SECRET vs. PUBLIC
* 
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SECRET PUBLIC 
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* Medium effort is the omitted category, thus % low effort + % high effort + % medium 
effort = 100%. Bars are based on choices made by 20 employees in each treatment. 
A first evident feature of Figure 5.1 is that, in both treatments, employees 
expend higher effort when they are paid a high wage. Employees rarely reward 
the employer with high effort when the own wage is £1, but the proportion of 
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high effort choices when the own wage is £7 varies from 20% to 45% 
depending on the treatment and the relative pay conditions. Conversely, there 
are virtually no low effort choices when the own wage is £7, while a £1 wage 
triggers punishment between 15% and 25% of the times. Thus, in these two 
treatments, as in many other related gift-exchange game experiments, a 
positive own wage-effort relation emerges whereby employees are willing to 
expend more effort to reciprocate generous wage offers made by the employer. 
A second noticeable feature of Figure 5.1 is that, irrespective of the own 
wage level, employees respond more favourably to the employers wage offers 
in SECRET than in PUBLIC. For any given level of the own wage, and 
irrespective of the level of the co-workers wage, reward rates are highest in 
SECRET. Punishment rates are generally lower in SECRET than in PUBLIC. 
This detrimental impact of pay comparison information in PUBLIC appears to 
be sensitive to relative pay conditions: when the own wage is low or medium 
employees generally respond less favourably to the employers wage offers the 
higher is the wage paid to the co-worker. Thus, pay comparisons are mostly 
detrimental when a worker is paired with a co-worker who receives a £7 wage. 
The pattern is somewhat reversed when the own wage is high: here employees 
tend to act less favourably towards the employer when the latter discriminate 
against the co-worker.  
We corroborate these observations by performing a regression analysis of 
effort behaviour in the two treatments. In a first model (Model I) we regress 
effort on a variable measuring the different levels of the own wage (Own 
wage) and on dummy variables measuring the different levels of the co-
workers wage: PUBLIC £1, PUBLIC £4 and PUBLIC £7. These dummies 
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assume value 1 for effort choices made in wage combinations where the co-
worker earns respectively £1, £4 or £7, and 0 otherwise. Notice that the 
baseline category is represented by effort choices made in the SECRET 
treatment. Dummy variables controlling for individual characteristics (gender 
and field of study) are added as regressors in Model II, while Model III 
expands Model II by including interaction terms between the Own wage 
variable and the co-workers wage dummies. Ordered probit estimations of the 
three regression models are reported in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2. Effort Behaviour in SECRET and PUBLIC 
 I II III 
Own wage 
0.186***  
(0.050) 
0.195***  
(0.052) 
0.205**  
(0.088) 
PUBLIC £1 
-0.436  
(0.290) 
-0.301  
(0.305) 
-0.064 
(.510) 
Own wage * PUBLIC £1 - - 
-0.059 
(0.102) 
PUBLIC £4 
-0.486** 
(0.245) 
-0.352 
(0.261) 
-0.219 
(0.463) 
Own wage * PUBLIC £4 - - 
-0.033 
(0.103) 
PUBLIC £7 
-0.584** 
(0.247) 
-0.460*  
(0.262) 
-0.683  
(0.434) 
Own wage * PUBLIC £7 - - 
0.055  
(0.096) 
1 if Male - 
-0.710*** 
(0.274) 
-0.712*** 
(0.277) 
1 if studies Social Sciences (incl. Economics) - 
0.109  
(0.271) 
0.110  
(0.272) 
N.  240 240 240 
Pseudo R2: 0.100 0.147 0.152 
Ordered probit regressions. Dependent variable is effort. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses adjusted for intragroup correlation (individuals are used as independent 
clustering units). * 10.05. d p ; ** 05.01. d p ; *** 01.dp . 
Starting with Model I, the coefficient on the Own wage variable is 
positive and highly significant, confirming the existence of a positive own 
wage-effort relation in our experiment: own wages are a powerful determinant 
of effort. Consistent with our second observation, the coefficients on the three 
dummies for the PUBLIC treatment are all negative: employees expend more 
effort when co-workers wages are secret. The effect is significant at the 5% 
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level for medium and high levels of the co-workers wage (p = 0.048 for 
PUBLIC £4; p = 0.018 for PUBLIC £7).  
In Model II we add controls for gender and field of study. The coefficient 
on the Own wage variable remains positive and highly significant. The 
coefficients on the three dummies for PUBLIC remain negative, but only the 
coefficient on the dummy controlling for the highest co-workers wage 
(PUBLIC £7) is now significantly different from zero (p = 0.079). The 
coefficients on the two other co-workers wage dummies fall instead short of 
conventional significance levels (p = 0.323 for PUBLIC £1; p = 0.178 for 
PUBLIC £4).  
The gender dummy enters significantly in the regression: men expend 
lower effort than women and the difference is significant at the 1% level. This 
result compares with findings on second-movers behaviour in related trust and 
sequential prisoners dilemma games, where men are sometimes found to act 
more selfishly than women (e.g., Croson and Buchan, 1999), although the 
effect is not always significant (e.g. Clark and Sefton, 2001).58 
Model III extends Model II by introducing interactions between the Own 
wage variable and the co-workers wage dummies. None of the coefficients on 
the interaction terms differ significantly from zero. Thus, pay comparisons do 
not alter the shape of the own wage-effort relationships, but do induce lower 
effort levels irrespective of own wage.  
Overall these findings show that the availability of pay comparison 
information does generally depress employees willingness to provide costly 
                                                 
 
 
58 For a review of gender effects in experiments see Croson and Gneezy (2009). 
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effort relative to the case where no pay comparison information is available, and 
that the effect is particularly marked for high levels of the co-workers wage. 
5.3.2. SECRET vs. PUBLIC/EXO 
We now turn to effort choices made in PUBLIC/EXO. Figure 5.2 reports the 
proportions of low and high effort choices made by BLUE employees in 
PUBLIC/EXO for different levels of the own wage. We distinguish between 
effort choices made in sessions where the co-workers wage was low 
(PUBLIC/EXO £1) and sessions where the co-workers wage was high 
(PUBLIC/EXO £7). For comparison, effort choices made in SECRET are also 
included. As in Figure 5.1 we do not disaggregate effort choices in SECRET 
according to the co-workers wage. 
Figure 5.2. Low and High Effort Rates: SECRET vs. PUBLIC/EXO
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* Medium effort is the omitted category, thus % low effort + % high effort + % medium effort 
= 100%. Bars are based on choices made by 20 employees in SECRET and by 20 BLUE 
Employees in each version of the PUBLIC/EXO treatment. 
As in PUBLIC and SECRET, also in PUBLIC/EXO a positive own 
wage-effort relation emerges from the data: irrespectively of the wage of the 
co-worker, higher own wage levels decrease the frequency of low effort and 
increase the frequency of high effort (in fact, high effort is only chosen when 
the own wage is £7). A second important feature of Figure 5.2 is that also in 
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PUBLIC/EXO the availability of pay comparison information appears to have 
a marked negative impact on effort choices. While in SECRET employees 
choose high effort in response to low or medium own wages between 10% and 
20% of the times, the same level of the own wage only triggers medium or low 
effort in PUBLIC/EXO. High own wage offers also trigger less generous 
responses from employees in PUBLIC/EXO than in SECRET.  
Table 5.3 reports a regression analysis of effort behaviour in 
PUBLIC/EXO and in SECRET. Similarly to the analysis performed in the 
previous sub-section, in a first model (Model I) we regress effort on a variable 
for the own wage (Own wage) and on dummies for different levels of the co-
workers wage, PUBLIC/EXO £1 and PUBLIC/EXO £7, assuming value 1 for 
effort choices made in sessions where the co-worker earns £1 and £7 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. In Model II we add controls for individual 
characteristics, while in Model III we add interaction terms between the Own 
wage variable and the co-workers wage dummies. 
Table 5.3. Effort Behaviour in SECRET and PUBLIC/EXO 
 
I II III 
Own wage 
0.246***  
(0.052) 
0.248***  
(0.052) 
0.222**  
(0.096) 
PUBLIC/EXO £1 
-0.654***  
(0.227) 
-0.611***  
(0.214) 
-0.559  
(0.518) 
Own wage * PUBLIC/EXO £1 - - 
-0.016 
(0.115) 
PUBLIC/EXO £7 
-0.761***   
(0.254) 
-0.745***   
(0.262) 
-1.169** 
(0.535) 
Own wage * PUBLIC/EXO £7 - - 
0.103  
(0.111) 
1 if Male - 
0.137 
(0.208) 
0.140 
(0.209) 
1 if studies Social Sciences (incl. Economics) - 
0.186 
(0.207) 
0.196  
(0.206) 
N.  180 180 180 
Pseudo R2: 0.164 0.169 0.176 
Ordered probit regressions. Dependent variable is effort. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
adjusted for intragroup correlation (individuals are used as independent clustering units).           
* 10.05. d p ; ** 05.01. d p ; *** 01.dp . 
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The coefficient on the Own wage variable in Model I to III is positive 
and significant and the interaction terms added in Model III are all 
insignificant: this confirms that the level of the own wage is an important 
determinant of effort choices also in PUBLIC/EXO. The dummies controlling 
for pay comparison effects in PUBLIC/EXO are negative and highly 
significant both in Model I and in Model II: the availability of information 
about the co-workers wage is detrimental for effort behaviour, regardless of 
the level of the co-workers wage. Contrary to the results reported in Table 5.2, 
the coefficient on the gender dummy is positive and insignificant in both 
models presented in Table 5.3, showing that overall we do not observe a clear 
gender effect in our experiment. The dummy for field of study also falls short 
of statistical significance in both models where it is included.  
Overall, these results confirm that pay comparisons have a detrimental 
impact on effort. In fact, the negative effects of pay comparisons appear even 
more marked in PUBLIC/EXO: here employees are less willing to act 
favourably towards the employer regardless of relative pay conditions, while in 
PUBLIC the detrimental impact of pay comparisons was only detected for high 
levels of the co-workers wage. Hence, the presence of exogenous constraints to a 
firms wage structure seems to amplify the importance of relative wages for pay 
fairness considerations. 
5.3.3. RED Employees Effort in PUBLIC/EXO and Employers Wage Choices 
Though not the focus of the experiment, our design also delivers data on wage 
choices by Employers across the three treatments, and on effort responses to 
fixed wages by RED Employees in PUBLIC/EXO. Here we briefly present 
these data for completeness. 
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In PUBLIC/EXO, RED Employees knew that their wage had been fixed 
exogenously by the experimenter at either £1 (PUBLIC/EXO £1 sessions) or 
£7 (PUBLIC/EXO £7 sessions), and were asked to make an effort choice for 
each possible level of the BLUE wage chosen by the Employer. Figure 5.3 
shows the proportions of low and high effort choices made by RED employees 
in the PUBLIC/EXO sessions for different levels of the BLUE wage.  
Figure 5.3. Low and High Effort Rates: RED Employees in PUBLIC/EXO
*
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Medium effort is the omitted category, thus % low effort + % high effort + % medium 
effort = 100%. Bars are based on choices made by 20 RED Employees in each version of 
PUBLIC/EXO. 
It is interesting to note how RED Employees willingness to punish the 
Employer decreases and their willingness to reward the Employer increases as 
the Employer pays higher wages to the BLUE Employee. Thus, while as 
outlined in the previous sub-sections co-workers wages have an overall 
negative impact on the effort decisions of those employees whose wage was 
actively chosen by the Employer, the same wage inequalities seem to have a 
positive impact on the effort of RED employees, whose wage was not chosen 
by the Employer. A second interesting pattern emerging from Figure 5.3 is that 
RED Employees seem to expend higher effort when paid a £1 wage than a £7 
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wage. Thus, a negative relation between own wage and effort seems to exist 
when own wages are not chosen by the Employer. 59 
Turning to Employers wage choices, Table 5.4 shows the combinations 
of wages paid by Employers across the three treatments of our experiment. The 
most noticeable feature of the Table is the high frequency of unequal wages 
choices made by Employers across the three treatments (55% of the cases). 
Unequal wages were chosen more often in PUBLIC/EXO (about 72% of the 
cases) than in the two other treatments (20% of the cases).  
Table 5.4. Frequencies of Employers Wage Choices across Treatments 
(SECRET / PUBLIC / PUBLIC/EXO) 
 BLUE wage = £1 BLUE wage = £4 BLUE wage = £7 
RED wage = £1 6 / 5 / 8 0 / 1 / 11 0 / 0 / 1 
RED wage = £4 2 / 1 / - 2 / 2 / - 0 / 0 / - 
RED wage = £7 0 / 0 / 11 0 / 0 / 6 0 / 1 / 3 
5.4. Discussion & Conclusions 
This study reports an experiment designed to examine the impact of pay 
comparison information on effort behaviour in a multilateral version of the 
gift-exchange game. We compare effort choices made by employees in a 
treatment where they receive no information about the wage paid to their co-
worker, with effort choices made in two treatments where co-workers wages 
are public information. The two public wages treatments vary in whether co-
                                                 
 
 
59 To explore these patterns we ran an ordered probit regression (clustering on individuals) of 
RED Employees effort on a dummy variable assuming value 1 for the sessions where the RED 
wage was £7, and on two co-workers wage dummies assuming value 1 when the BLUE wage 
was either £4 or £7 respectively. The co-workers wage dummies were both significant (the £4 
dummy at the 10% level, the £7 dummy at the 1% level), revealing that RED Employees 
expended more effort when the Employer paid a medium or high wage to the co-worker 
relative to the case where the co-worker was paid a £1 wage. The own wage dummy was 
negative and significant at the 10% level. 
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workers wages are chosen by the employer, or fixed exogenously by the 
experimenter.  
In all treatments of our experiment employees reciprocate high wages with 
high effort: a strong positive own wage-effort relationship exists in our setting, 
as it has been observed in many other gift-exchange game experiments (e.g., 
Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1997; Gächter and Falk, 2002; Charness, 2004). 
Pay comparison information is found to be detrimental for the own wage-effort 
relation. In the treatment where co-workers wages are chosen by the employer 
we find that learning that the co-worker is paid the highest wage reduces an 
employees willingness to expend high effort relative to the treatment where co-
workers wages are secret. Pay comparison effects are instead weaker for 
medium or low co-workers wage levels. These findings compare with those by 
Gächter and Thöni (2009), who also observe stronger pay comparisons effects 
when employees are paired with a highly-paid co-worker. Pay comparison 
effects are amplified in the treatment where the employer is forced to pay an 
exogenously fixed wage to a portion of the workforce. Here the detrimental 
effects of pay comparisons are found regardless of the level of the co-workers 
wage. These findings suggest that the presence of exogenous constraints to a 
firms wage policy may increase the prominence of relative pay comparisons as 
a useful source of information about what constitutes a fair wage, thus 
strengthening the importance of horizontal fairness concerns for pay fairness 
evaluations. 
Overall, our results show that the presence of information about others 
well-being and the resulting ability to discover interpersonal inequalities can do 
substantial harm to reciprocal relations and to pro-social behaviours more in 
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general: for any given level of the own wage, employees in our experiment are 
less willing to reward the employer and more willing to incur costs to reduce her 
earnings when co-workers wages are public than when they remain undisclosed. 
That the ability to contemplate income inequalities can be detrimental for social 
behaviours has also been found in a variety of experimental settings. For 
example, it has been found that having subjects start the experiment with 
unequal distributions of endowments can reduce cooperativeness in public goods 
experiments (e.g., Anderson et al., 2008) and harm trust and trustworthiness in 
investment and trust games (e.g., Greiner et al., 2007; Hargreaves-Heap et al., 
2009), although the effects are not always marked (see e.g., Anderson et al., 
2006). Overall, these findings lend support to the argument (sometimes invoked 
to explain firms preferences for wage secrecy) that the confidentiality of 
earnings within groups of individuals can effectively minimize the losses that 
arise due to negative reactions to observed inequalities and, more generally, to 
the dampening of their pro-social inclinations.  
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
 
In this Appendix we report the instructions used in the PUBLIC/EXO £7 
sessions. Instructions used in the PUBLIC/EXO £1 sessions are identical with 
the exception that RED Employees wage was fixed at £1. Any difference 
between the instructions used in the PUBLIC/EXO sessions and those used in 
the SECRET and PUBLIC sessions is italicized and reported in square 
brackets. 
 
Instructions 
Welcome!  
You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision 
making. This experiment is run by the Centre for Decision Research and 
Experimental Economics and has been financed by various foundations for 
research promotion. 
There are other people in this room, who are also participating in this 
experiment. All participants are reading the same instructions as you are and 
have been recruited in the same fashion. Likewise, all participants are 
participating in this experiment for the first time, as you are. 
It is important that you do not talk, or in any way try to communicate with the 
other participants during the experiment. If you have a question, raise your 
hand and a monitor will come over to where you are sitting and answer your 
question in private. 
The experiment will take no more than 60 minutes, and at the end you will be 
paid in private and in cash. You will be paid a £3 show-up fee, plus an 
additional amount that will depend on the decisions that you and the other 
participants make. It is therefore very important to read these instructions with 
care. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this experiment you will be randomly paired with two other participants to 
form a group of three people. We will refer to each group as a firm, and to 
the three group members as the Employer, the Blue Employee and the 
Red Employee.  
The computer will randomly determine whether you are the Employer, the 
Blue Employee or the Red Employee just at the beginning of the experiment.  
You will not be informed about who of the other participants are in your firm, 
either during or after the experiment. Therefore, all decisions are made 
anonymously. 
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In this experiment you will be asked to perform the following decision task and 
you will do it only once. 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid a £3 show-up fee plus your 
earnings from this task. 
 
2. The decision task  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
Ü The Employer is initially endowed with £22 from which he/she pays a 
wage to the two employees with whom he/she is paired. 
Wages can take three values: £1, £4 or £7. 
The Employer must pay a £7 wage to the Red Employee, while he/she can 
decide on what wage (£1, £4 or £7) to pay to the Blue Employee. [SECRET 
and PUBLIC: The Employer can decide on what wage (£1, £4 or £7) to pay 
to the Red Employee and on what wage (£1, £4 or £7) to pay to the Blue 
Employee. ] 
The wage the Employer chooses for the Blue Employee and the wage 
he/she must pay to the Red Employee will be subtracted from his/her £22 
endowment. [SECRET and PUBLIC: The wages the Employer chooses for 
the Blue Employee and the Red Employee will be subtracted from his/her 
£22 endowment.] 
Ü Each Employee is then informed of the wages paid by the Employer, i.e. 
employees learn their own wage and the wage that the Employer pays to 
the other employee. [SECRET: Each Employee is then informed of the 
wage the Employer pays to him/her, i.e. employees learn their own wage 
but not the wage that the Employer pays to the other employee.] 
Each employee chooses then independently and in private an effort level: 
low, medium or high. 
Low effort costs the employee £1 and reduces the Employers earnings by 
£4. 
Medium effort costs the employee nothing and leaves the Employers 
earnings unchanged. 
High effort costs the employee £1 and increases the Employers earnings 
by £4. 
On the next pages you will find a couple of hypothetical examples which 
will illustrate how to calculate the earnings of each member in the firm.  
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HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES, #1 
The Employer must pay the £7 wage to the Red Employee. Suppose the 
Employer chooses to pay a £4 wage to the Blue Employee. [SECRET and 
PUBLIC: Suppose the Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to the Red 
Employee and a £4 wage to the Blue Employee.] 
Suppose that the Red Employee chooses LOW effort and the Blue 
Employee chooses HIGH effort.  
This situation results in the following earnings: 
 ==> EMPLOYERS EARNINGS:  
The Employer pays a total of £11 [SECRET and PUBLIC: £5] to the 
employees: £7 [SECRET and PUBLIC: £1] to the Red Employee and £4 
to the Blue Employee.  
The Employer receives a £4 revenue from the HIGH effort of the Blue 
Employee, but the Red Employees LOW effort choice decreases his/her 
earnings by £4. 
Therefore the Employers earnings are: £22  £11 [SECRET and 
PUBLIC: £5]  + £4 - £4 = £11  [SECRET and PUBLIC: £17]. 
 ==> RED EMPLOYEES EARNINGS:  
The Red Employee is paid a £7  [SECRET and PUBLIC: £1]  wage. LOW 
effort costs £1 to the employee. 
Therefore the Red Employees earnings are: £7 [SECRET and PUBLIC: 
£1 ] - £1 = £6  [SECRET and PUBLIC: £0]. 
 ==> BLUE EMPLOYEES EARNINGS: 
The Blue Employee receives a £4 wage. HIGH effort costs £1 to the 
employee. 
Therefore the Blue Employees earnings are: £4 - £1 = £3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 170 
 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES, #2 
The Employer must pay the £7 wage to the Red Employee. Suppose the 
Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to the Blue Employee. [SECRET and 
PUBLIC: Suppose the Employer chooses to pay a £7 wage to the Red 
Employee and a £4 wage to the Blue Employee.] 
Suppose that the Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort and the Blue 
Employee chooses MEDIUM effort.  
This situation results in the following earnings: 
 ==> EMPLOYERS EARNINGS:  
The Employer pays a total of £8 to the employees: £7 to the Red 
Employee and £1 to the Blue Employee.  
Employees effort choices do not produce any revenue for the Employer, 
as MEDIUM effort leaves the Employers earnings unchanged. 
Therefore the Employers earnings are: £22  £8 + £0 + £0 = £14. 
 ==> RED EMPLOYEES EARNINGS:  
The Red Employee is paid a £7 wage. MEDIUM effort costs nothing to 
the employee. 
Therefore the Red Employees earnings are: £7 - £0 = £7. 
 ==> BLUE EMPLOYEES EARNINGS: 
The Blue Employee receives a £1 wage. MEDIUM effort costs nothing to 
the employee. 
Therefore the Blue Employees earnings are: £1 - £0 = £1. 
 
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one we 
have just described, in this experiment employees make their decisions before 
learning the wage that the Employer has actually chosen for the Blue 
Employee. 
Employees know however that the Employer must pay a £7 wage to the Red 
Employee. 
If you are an employee, you will then be asked to indicate what you would do 
in each of the following THREE SITUATIONS: 
I. The Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to the Blue Employee.  
II. The Employer chooses to pay a £4 wage to the Blue Employee.  
III. The Employer chooses to pay a £7 wage to the Blue Employee.  
[SECRET: Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is 
the one we have just described, in this experiment employees make their 
decisions before learning the wages that the Employer has actually chosen for 
them. 
If you are an employee, you will then be asked to indicate what you would do 
in each of the following THREE SITUATIONS: 
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I. The Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to you. 
II. The Employer chooses to pay a £4 wage to you  
III. The Employer chooses to pay a £7 wage to you.  ] 
[PUBLIC: Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is 
the one we have just described, in this experiment employees make their 
decisions before learning the wages that the Employer has actually chosen. 
If you are an employee, you will then be asked to indicate what you would do 
in each of the following NINE SITUATIONS: 
I. The Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to you and a £1 wage to the other 
Employee.  
II. The Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to you and a £4 wage to the other 
Employee.  
III. The Employer chooses to pay a £1 wage to you and a £7 wage to the other 
Employee.  
IV. The Employer chooses to pay a £4 wage to you and a £1 wage to the other 
Employee.  
V. The Employer chooses to pay a £4 wage to you and a £4 wage to the other 
Employee.  
VI. The Employer chooses to pay a £4 wage to you and a £7 wage to the other 
Employee.  
VII. The Employer chooses to pay a £7 wage to you and a £1 wage to the other 
Employee.  
VIII. The Employer chooses to pay a £7 wage to you and a £4 wage to the other 
Employee.  
IX. The Employer chooses to pay a £7 wage to you and a £7 wage to the other 
Employee. ] 
Please note that one of these situations will actually count for determining your 
and the other firm members earnings, so make your choices carefully. 
You will be informed of which situation is actually relevant at the end of the 
experiment, once everyone in the firm has taken his/her decision. The wage the 
Employer has actually chosen for the Blue Employee will determine which of 
the three situations above (I, II or III) counts for the computation of earnings. 
[SECRET: The wages the Employer has actually chosen will determine, for 
each employee, which of the three situations above (I, II or III) counts for the 
computation of earnings.] [PUBLIC: The wages the Employer has actually 
chosen will determine, for each employee, which of the nine situations above (I 
to IX) counts for the computation of earnings.] Employees choices in that 
situation will determine the final outcome for each firm member. 
A complete list of all the possible earnings distributions resulting from the 
employees effort choices in each of these three situations is provided in a 
separate sheet. [SECRET and PUBLIC: A complete list of all the possible 
earnings distributions resulting from the employees effort choices in each of 
these three [nine in PUBLIC] situations is provided separately. Two sets of 
Tables are provided. The two sets contain exactly the same information, just 
organised differently for your convenience. If you are a Red Employee you 
should refer to the set labelled USE IF YOU ARE A RED EMPLOYEE. If 
you are a Blue Employee you should refer to the set labelled USE IF YOU 
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ARE A BLUE EMPLOYEE. If you are an Employer you can refer to either 
one.] 
3. What happens next? 
- When the experiment starts, the computer will randomly assign you to a 
firm and randomly determine whether you are the Employer, the Blue 
Employee or the Red Employee.  
- You will then access a couple of screens where you will be asked to answer 
a few questions. You will also have to calculate the earnings of all 
members of your firm for six hypothetical scenarios, with the help of the 
attached Tables. Press the Check answers button on the screen once you 
have answered all the questions. The computer will let you know whether 
your answers are correct. 
- Once everyone has answered all the questions correctly, you will access the 
Decision task screen. Depending on whether you are an employer or an 
employee you will have to choose wage or effort levels, as described above 
in Section 2. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid a £3 show-up fee plus your 
earnings from the decision task.  
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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Appendix B: Earnings Distributions Tables 
 
In this Appendix we report the Earnings Distributions tables used by BLUE 
Employees in the PUBLIC sessions. In order to treat the two employee types 
symmetrically, columns and rows were inverted in the tables used by Red 
Employees and the order in which wage combinations were presented was 
modified accordingly. The tables used in the SECRET treatment were 
identical, but had different captions to account for the fact that only three 
situations could occur in SECRET, depending on the level of the own wage. 
Tables with the same own wage and different levels of the co-workers wage 
were referred to as different cases of the same situation. In the 
PUBLIC/EXO treatment only the tables where the co-workers wage was equal 
to £1 (in PUBLIC/EXO £1) or £7 (in PUBLIC/EXO £7) were used. 
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EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS 
TABLE I: Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION I, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £1 wage for the Blue 
Employee and a £1 wage for the Red Employee.  
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £12 £0 £0 £16 £0 £1 £20 £0 £0 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £16 £1 £0 £20 £1 £1 £24 £1 £0 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £20 £0 £0 £24 £0 £1 £28 £0 £0 
TABLE II : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION II, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £1 wage for the Blue Employee and a £4 
wage for the Red Employee.  
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £9 £0 £3 £13 £0 £4 £17 £0 £3 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £13 £1 £3 £17 £1 £4 £21 £1 £3 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £17 £0 £3 £21 £0 £4 £25 £0 £3 
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TABLE III : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION III, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £1 wage for the Blue Employee 
and a £7 wage for the Red Employee.  
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £6 £0 £6 £10 £0 £7 £14 £0 £6 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £10 £1 £6 £14 £1 £7 £18 £1 £6 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £14 £0 £6 £18 £0 £7 £22 £0 £6 
 
TABLE IV : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION IV, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £4 wage for the Blue Employee and a £1 
wage for the Red Employee.   
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £9 £3 £0 £13 £3 £1 £17 £3 £0 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £13 £4 £0 £17 £4 £1 £21 £4 £0 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £17 £3 £0 £21 £3 £1 £25 £3 £0 
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TABLE V : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION V, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £4 wage for the Blue Employee 
and a £4 wage for the Red Employee.  
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £6 £3 £3 £10 £3 £4 £14 £3 £3 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £10 £4 £3 £14 £4 £4 £18 £4 £3 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £14 £3 £3 £18 £3 £4 £22 £3 £3 
 
TABLE VI: Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION VI, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £4 wage for the Blue Employee 
and a £7 wage for the Red Employee. 
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £3 £3 £6 £7 £3 £7 £11 £3 £6 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £7 £4 £6 £11 £4 £7 £15 £4 £6 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £11 £3 £6 £15 £3 £7 £19 £3 £6 
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TABLE VII : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION VII, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £7 wage for the Blue Employee and a £1 
wage for the Red Employee. 
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £6 £6 £0 £10 £6 £1 £14 £6 £0 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £10 £7 £0 £14 £7 £1 £18 £7 £0 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £14 £6 £0 £18 £6 £1 £22 £6 £0 
TABLE VIII : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION VIII, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £7 wage for the Blue Employee and a 
£4 wage for the Red Employee. 
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £3 £6 £3 £7 £6 £4 £11 £6 £3 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £7 £7 £3 £11 £7 £4 £15 £7 £3 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £11 £6 £3 £15 £6 £4 £19 £6 £3 
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TABLE IX : Earnings distributions resulting from the employees’ effort choices in SITUATION IX, i.e. when the Employer chooses a £7 wage for the Blue Employee and a £7 
wage for the Red Employee. 
 Red Employee chooses LOW effort Red Employee chooses MEDIUM effort Red Employee chooses HIGH effort 
Employer Blue Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee Employer 
Blue 
Employee 
Red 
Employee 
Blue Employee chooses  
LOW effort £0 £6 £6 £4 £6 £7 £8 £6 £6 
Blue Employee chooses  
MEDIUM effort £4 £7 £6 £8 £7 £7 £12 £7 £6 
Blue Employee chooses  
HIGH effort £8 £6 £6 £12 £6 £7 £16 £6 £6 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this thesis we have reported four studies that used novel laboratory 
experiments to explore different research topics in the field of behavioural and 
experimental economics. In two studies (reported in chapter 2 and chapter 3) 
we have explored issues related to cooperation in settings where commitment 
opportunities are available. The two other studies included in this thesis 
(reported in chapter 4 and chapter 5) have explored whether and how the 
presence of social comparison information affects individuals social 
motivation. 
In chapter 2 we studied cooperation in a setting where collective interest 
and individual interest are in conflict. In our setup some individuals can 
credibly commit to cooperate by announcing an early contribution to a public 
good. Previous experiments with this sort of setup have shown that this 
typically encourages others to cooperate as well, which is beneficial for the 
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group. We examined the question of which characteristics should early 
contributors possess to be most effective in promoting the interests of the 
group. Our main finding is that collective interest is best served when early 
contributors are intrinsically inclined to cooperate: these individuals make the 
highest contributions to the public good when they move first, and thus 
succeed in guaranteeing highest efficiency levels for their group. The fact that 
cooperatively inclined individuals are more willing to commit to high 
contributions relative to other types of contributors is partly due to their more 
optimistic expectations that others will cooperate when they commit to 
cooperate, and partly due to their higher intrinsic motivation to act 
cooperatively. Our findings suggest that selective group composition, whereby 
the most cooperative types are chosen to lead the group by committing to an 
initial cooperation level, may be beneficial for the collective interest in settings 
where individuals interact anonymously and non-repeatedly. An interesting 
question, which we leave for further research, is whether our findings extend to 
settings that involve repeated interactions, or to settings where sanctioning or 
rewarding devices are available to group members: in such settings it might be 
more beneficial for the group not to have the most cooperative individuals 
commit to an initial cooperation level, but rather to have them observe the 
contributions of other, less cooperative group members and discipline them 
through the use of costly sanctions or rewards. 
Chapter 3 also studies voluntary contributions to a public good in a 
setting where an agent can credibly commit to an early contribution decision. 
Differently from the usual setup used in experimental economics (and which 
we also used in chapter 2), in chapter 3 we focused on a quasi-linear public 
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goods setting where standard theory makes a stark prediction about the 
effectiveness of sequential contribution mechanisms: the availability of 
commitment opportunities can damage public good provision as first-movers 
enjoy a first-mover advantage by committing to free-ride on the contributions 
of others. The results from our laboratory experiments, together with the results 
from the closely related study by Andreoni et al. (2002), suggest that 
commitment opportunities may be less damaging than predicted by standard 
theory. The reason is that the pull of equilibrium in this framework is 
countervailed by the pull of fairness which originates from the presence of 
individuals who are willing to sacrifice part of their material well-being to 
punish free-riders and/or reward contributors. While in Andreoni et al. (2002) 
the pull of fairness prevails over the pull of equilibrium and sequential 
mechanisms do not lead to lower overall public good provision relative to 
simultaneous contribution mechanisms, in our setting we do observe lower 
total contributions to the public good when commitment opportunities are 
present. However, early contributors who commit to free-ride trigger 
systematic punishment on the part of late contributors, and this eliminates any 
predicted first-mover advantage. Because there is no advantage in committing 
to be a free-rider, an interesting question is whether individuals will actually 
choose to commit if they are given the opportunity to do so. 
In Nosenzo and Sefton (2009) we started investigating this question. We 
used a laboratory experiment where we embedded Varians (1994) two-player 
contributions game used in chapter 3 into a setup where subjects endogenously 
determine the timing of their contributions. Thus, depending on subjects 
timing decisions sequential or simultaneous games may arise in the course of 
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the experiment. We seldom observe sequential games in our experiment: most 
of the times subjects avoid exploiting the possibility of making an early 
commitment, and they end up playing a simultaneous move game. Overall, 
these results, together with the findings reported in chapter 3, suggest that the 
existence of commitment opportunities may not necessarily result in an 
exacerbation of the free-rider problem. 
In chapter 4 and chapter 5 we investigated whether the availability of 
social comparison information affects second-movers behaviour in trilateral 
versions of the gift-exchange game. In both settings studied in these chapters, a 
first-mover is matched with two second-movers who can observe the actions of 
the first-mover and choose whether to respond favourably or unfavourably to 
these actions. In chapter 4 we studied how second-movers responses are 
affected by information about how the first-mover treats the other second-
mover in the group, and by information about how the other second-mover has 
responded to the first-mover. We found that information about others treatment 
does not affect second-movers behaviour, whereas information about how 
others behave can have an important impact on second-movers willingness to 
act favourably towards the first-mover. In particular, a positive relation between 
second-movers actions emerge in our setting, whereby a second-movers 
willingness to act favourably towards the first-mover increases when she 
observes that the other second-mover is also acting favourably. In chapter 5 we 
used a different strategy to identify the impact of information about others 
treatment on second-movers responses. Here we compared a treatment where no 
social comparison information was available with treatments where second-
movers were fully informed about first-movers actions. We find evidence that 
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second-movers responses are negatively affected by information about how the 
first-mover treats the other second-mover. 
A limitation of these two studies is that, while they reveal the existence of 
important social comparison effects in this type of environment, they are not 
informative about the nature of such effects. For example, the observed positive 
relation between second-movers actions documented in chapter 4 could be 
rationalized within current behavioural models of interdependent preferences 
(e.g. through a model accounting for inequity averse preferences, as in Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999), as well as within a framework that explains behaviour as 
the result of a pressure to comply with two distinct social norms: a norm to act 
reciprocally, and a norm to conform to peers actions. To address these issues, 
we have recently started working on a follow-up study where we modify the 
trilateral gift-exchange game used in chapter 4 to disentangle these two 
possible explanations for the observed social comparison effects: genuine 
inequity aversion vs. pressures to comply with norms of reciprocity and 
conformity. Preliminary findings reveal that the observed social comparison 
effects can by and large be rationalized within a framework that models 
behaviour as responding to aversion to payoff inequalities.  
Another interesting development for future research on social comparison 
processes that we have started considering is the use of laboratory experiments to 
explore whether individuals actively manipulate the selection of the relevant 
reference group in comparison processes. With a few exceptions (e.g., Falk and 
Knell, 2004), the common assumption in economics is that individuals take as 
given the relevant reference group in social comparison processes. However, 
research in other disciplines has revealed that individuals do take active part in 
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the selection of the referent others in comparison processes. For example, studies 
in social psychology (e.g., Wood et al., 1985; Gibbons et al., 1994) have shown 
that individuals strategically manipulate comparison targets and dimensions to 
achieve favourable outcomes when threatened with unfavourable social 
comparisons. It would be particularly interesting to explore experimentally 
whether such desire to escape threatening comparisons can actually lead 
individuals to make sub-optimal comparison choices, e.g. shying away from 
(potentially beneficial) performance comparisons with reference targets that 
would put them in a disadvantaged position while favouring (unbeneficial, or 
possibly damaging) comparisons with inferior reference targets. 
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